Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 5
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism AgEcon
Mullen, Jeffrey D.; Centner, Terence J.; Wetzstein, Michael E..
Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging. As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone. Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities. Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not. The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Command and control; Environmental education; Environmental policy; Voluntary agreements; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9357
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K..
Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Can an Industry Voluntary Agreement on Food Traceability Minimize the Cost of Food Safety Incidents? AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Souza Monteiro, Diogo M..
In the recent past the United States has had a number of severe food-safety outbreaks in the produce, vegetable and beef industry that greatly disrupted the food system. In all these outbreaks here were severe disruptions on sales that affected the whole industry, and it took an extended period of time to correctly locate the source of the outbreak. Traceability can be an effective tool to reduce the impact of food safety incidents my expediting the search for the origin of outbreaks. This paper investigates to what extent an industry-led voluntary agreement for providing traceability can reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak. We find that a voluntary agreement on traceability can successfully reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak but will unlikely...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Traceability; Voluntary agreements; Food safety; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43860
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms AgEcon
Roosen, Jutta; Ordonez, Andrea.
Voluntary environmental agreements have been popular with government agencies in several countries. However, many questions remain about their efficiency as a regulatory tool. Recent analyses suggest that they are more effective than conventional regulatory or economic approaches when dealing with diffuse pollution and when innovation processes at the source are necessary to define effective regulation. This paper applies an activity-based framework to assess the contribution of such a voluntary agreement to the environmental performance of farms participating in a whole farm plan in the Southern part of Belgium. Using a cross-section of 52 farms, our results show that farms entering into environmental agreements are environmentally more efficient than...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental indicators; Data envelopment analysis; Environmental efficiency; Voluntary agreements; Whole farm plan; Environmental Economics and Policy; C14; Q12; Q2.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24897
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Certification as a Rationale for Voluntary Agreements AgEcon
Gonzalez, Patrick.
I model the participation of firms in a voluntary agreement as a costly certification process whereby a firm informs the Regulator of its pollution intensity. Without this knowledge, the Regulator imposes the same tax on all firms in a heterogeneous industry, unduly hurting the clean ones with the lowest intensity. Certification allows clean firms to get a tax rebate. It also entails an informational externality as the dispersion of types decreases within the pool of non-participating firms, following an unraveling process. Because participation is a firm’s private decision, there is such a thing as a bad voluntary agreement.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Certification; Voluntary agreements; Pigovian taxes; Pollution; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q53; Q58.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117827
Registros recuperados: 5
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional