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Hahn, Robert W.; Stavins, Robert N.. |
We examine an implication of the “Coase Theorem” which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is very important because it allows equity and efficiency concerns to be separated in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, the property means that the government can establish the overall... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cap-and-Trade System; Tradable Permits; Coase Theorem; Allowance Allocation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q580; H110; L510. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92707 |
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Stavins, Robert N.. |
There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyze an up- stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 percent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cap-and-Trade System; Carbon Dioxide; Greenhouse Gas Emissions; Global Climate Change; Carbon Taxes; Q540; Q280; Q380; Q480; Q580. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42920 |
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