|
|
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
Goetz, Linde; Grethe, Harald. |
EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by ad valorem tariffs but also by the entry price system establishing a minimum import price. In addition, the EU applies a comprehensive system of trade preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is that, in contrast to its complexity, the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to its goals, i.e. protecting EU producers and creating imports from preference receiving countries. The comparison of import prices for oranges from extra-EU countries with the EU entry price shows that the former are about 40% higher than the latter on average. Also, it is pointed out that at least 72% of extra-EU orange imports during the EU harvest season enter the EU tariff free. As a conclusion, the... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade preferences; Oranges; Tariff rate quota; Entry price; International Relations/Trade. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10095 |
| |
|
|
Goetz, Linde; Grethe, Harald. |
EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by ad valorem tariffs but also by the entry price system establishing a minimum import price. In addition, the EU applies a comprehensive system of trade preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is that, in contrast to its complexity, the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to its goals, i.e. protecting EU producers on the one hand an d creating imports from preference receiving countries on the other. The comparison of import prices for oranges from extra-EU countries with the EU entry price shows that the former are about 40% higher than the latter on average. Also, it is pointed out that at least 72% of extra-EU orange imports during the EU harvest season en ter the EU... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade preferences; Oranges; Tariff rate quota; Entry price; International Relations/Trade; F13; Q13; Q17; Q18. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25604 |
| |
|
|
Scoppola, Margherita. |
The paper develops a two-stage capacity constrained duopoly model, in which the mode of competition is endogenous and the constraint is flexible, to investigate the impact of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) and their liberalization. The model predicts that the greater the gap between the price of the licences plus the in-quota tariff and the out-of-quota tariff, the closer the outcome of the game to the pure Cournot outcome. The tariff equivalent changes according to the prevailing mode of competition under the TRQ. The model is used to address the issue of the tariffication of the non-ACP TRQ for EU banana imports. The results suggest that under the TRQ firms competed on quantity and that the tariff equivalent is higher than the tariff introduced by the EU in... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tariff rate quota; Oligopoly; Bananas; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; F13; L13. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115419 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|