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Allocation de permis à polluer en asymétrie d'information Inra
Ali, M.; Rio, P.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Dans cet article nous traitons de l’allocation de permis `a polluer dans le cas de la pollution diffuse. Par diffus, nous repérons un double problème informationnel : aléa moral et sélection adverse. Afin de traiter ces deux problèmes d’information, nous concevons un mécanisme en deux étapes, chacune résolvant une asymétrie informationnelle. Dans un premier temps, nous construisons un collectif qui sera responsable si la norme de pollution ambiante est dépassée. Pour y parvenir, nous mettons en place une incitation collective discriminatoire selon que les agents soient `a l’intérieur ou l’extérieur du collectif. Ainsi, au lieu de contrôler le niveau des émissions individuelles le régulateur ne contrôle que la pollution collective donnée par le niveau de la...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: POLLUTION DIFFUSE; ALLOCATION DE PERMIS; MECANISME COLLECTIF; ALEA MORAL; SELECTION ADVERSE; PROCESSUS ITERATIF.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010c07260f7&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/02/
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Collective liability in non-point source pollution Inra
Ali, M.; Rio, P.; Martin-Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Falculty of Economics (DEU).
Non point source pollution is characterized by the fact that individual emissions are not observable at a reasonable cost. This constitutes a moral hazard problem. Furthermore, we explicitly consider adverse selection, a second type of asymmetric information that arises because of the difficulty to differentiate the polluters with respect to their type (marginal benefit of polluting). In this paper, we design a tradable permits market between non point sources of pollution. In order to involve all the polluters contributing to a measured ambient pollution, we consider a collective performance based mechanism. This sanction mechanism is activated if the collective fails to build itself. The threat remains active along a negotiation process in order to make...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: POLLUTION DIFFUSE; PERMIS DE POLLUER NON POINT SOURCE POLLUTION; NEGOTIATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; TRADABLE PERMITS; MORAL HAZARD; REVELATION MECHANISMS; COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20077b3de3b9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2007/05/
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Deterrence vs. efficiency to regulate nonpoint source pollution Inra
Ali, M.; Rio, P.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
In the context of nonpoint source pollution the regulator can not attribute individually the responsibility of pollution because of informational asymmetry which makes the costs of monitoring of individual emission very high. This grounds a moral hazard problem. We analyse group performance based instruments to regulate this kind of informational problem. In particular, we assess randomand collective fining schemes with respect to their deterrence and efficiency. We show that a collective fine scheme is more deterrent than a random fine scheme. However, the analysis of efficiency is less categorical between these two schemes. The efficiency depends on the number of non-compliant agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is high it is better to...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: POLLUTION DIFFUSE; DISSUASION; PERFORMANCE DE GROUPE NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION; GROUP PERFORMANCE BASED INSTRUMENTS; DETERRENCE; EFFICIENCY.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010792d0206&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/02/
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Negotiating the initial permits allocation as a revelation mechanism in non point source pollution Inra
Ali, M.; Rio, P.; EAERE, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (ITA); GERAD, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherche en Analyse des Décisions, HEC Montréal (CAN).
Non point source pollution is characterized by the fact that individual emissions are not observable at a reasonable cost. This constitutes a moral hazard problem. Furthermore, we explicitly consider adverse selection, a second type of asymmetric information that arises because of the difficulty to differentiate the polluters with respect to their type (marginal benefit of polluting). In this paper, we design a tradable permits market between non point sources of pollution in the vein of Taylor (2003). In order to involve all the polluters contributing to a measured ambient pollution, we consider a collective performance based mechanism. This sanction mechanism is activated if the collective fails to build itself. The threat remains active along a...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: ALLOCATION DES RESSOURCES; POLLUTION DIFFUSE; MARCHE DE DROIT A POLLUER.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2008cfac68ba&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
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Tradable Permits under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution Inra
Ali, M.; Le Grusse, P.; Rio, P..
In this article we treat the problemof nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problemwe consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which rises with the exchange of the permits.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: POLLUTION DE L'EAU; MARCHE DES PERMIS A POLLUER NON POINT SOURCE POLLUTION; AMBIENT TAX; TRADABLE PERMITS MARKET.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009a47eb39a&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/05/
Registros recuperados: 5
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