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Registros recuperados: 42
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Application of transaction costs economics to environmental issues Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Mzoughi, N..
A theoretical framework combining the two branches of TCE, i.e., the governance branch (Williamson, 2005) and the measurement branch (Barzel, 2005) may explain the choice of the governance structure for private environmental transactions. Four case studies, i.e., the market for pure air in polluted cities, the contractual arrangement between La Esperanza and the Monteverde Conservation League, the case of the French mineral water bottler Vittel and the case of land ownership by land trusts are briefly developed in order to support the theoretical framework. Special attention is devoted to the presence (or not) of a 3-D (defined, defended and divestible) property rights system and its influence on the way environmental property rights are likely (or not) to...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: PROPERTY RIGHTS; ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSACTIONS; MEASUREMENT; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010ce674112&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/02/
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Are environmental offsets indulgences? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Teisl, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Environmental offsetting is a concept whereby a company can offset its environmental impacts by paying for another party to reduce its environmental impacts. Offsets are designed for greenhouse gases emissions (carbon) and biodiversity. Though the concept is new in the debate, it relies on the idea common to environmental economists of flexibility and cost efficiency where the firms that have the lowest pollution abatement costs reduce more pollution than firms that have high abatement costs. Even if the offsetting concept makes sense from an economic point of view, the public may oppose it on several grounds. It may be for moral reasons (the polluter must pay), for equity reasons (the victims of the local pollution cannot escape pollution), or for...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: CONSENTEMENT A PAYER OFFSETS; WILLINGNESS TO PAY; STATED CHOICE.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010c6b5e3f1&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Atouts et limites des politiques de préservation de l'environnement par les consommateurs Inra
Bougherara, D.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA); INH, Institut National d'Horticulture (FRA); ESA, Ecole Supérieure d'Agriculture d'Angers (FRA).
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010cdd54a96&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Buy Local, Pollute Less: What Drives Households to Join A Community Supported Farm ? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Mzoughi, N..
Nous analysons les déterminants de la participation des ménages dans des contrats de long terme avec les producteurs locaux, notamment quelle est la part des motivations environnementales dans les choix alimentaires. Un modèle de choix discret de participation à une AMAP (Association pour le Maintien d’une Agriculture Paysanne) est appliqué à 264 ménages français. Les résultats indiquent que les attributs difficilement mesurables tels que les attributs environnementaux jouent un rôle majeur dans la décision de participer à une AMAP.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: AMAP; COUTS DE TRANSACTION COMMUNITY SUPPORTED AGRICULTURE; FOOD SUPPLY; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009185766c8&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/06/
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Buy local, pollute less: what drives households to join a community supported farm? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Mzoughi, N.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Nous analysons les déterminants de la participation des ménages dans des contrats de long terme avec les producteurs locaux, notamment quelle est la part des motivations environnementales dans les choix alimentaires. Un modèle de choix discret de participation à une AMAP (Association pour le Maintien d’une Agriculture Paysanne) est appliqué à 264 ménages français. Les résultats indiquent que les attributs difficilement mesurables tels que les attributs environnementaux jouent un rôle majeur dans la décision de participer à une AMAP.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: COUTS DE TRANSACTION; AMAP COMMUNITY SUPPORTED AGRICULTURE; FOOD SUPPLY; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20105c0e3a25&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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Buying fair trade products: can consumers enable reach social goals through their purchases? Inra
Bougherara, D.; ENESAD, Ecole Nationale d'Enseignement Supérieur Agronomique de Dijon (FRA).
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2002 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20108975d8a9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Can ecolabeling mitigate market failures? An analysis applied to agro-food products Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G..
Tipo: Conference Paper Palavras-chave: ECOLABEL.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010bf8de90f&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Can labelling policies do more harm than good ? An analysis applied to environmental labelling schemes Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Thiébaut, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
In certain plausible circumstances, the introduction of labelling schemes can lead to adverse effects. In the case of ecolabelling, the adverse effects are an environmental degradation rather than an environmental improvement. To take into account the environmental sensitiveness or responsiveness of consumers, we introduce the concept of environmental elasticity which enables us to classify goods. In a basic analytical model, we describe the conditions under which different outcomes –overall impacts of change in environmental quality due to environmental labelling– arise after the introduction of an ecolabelling scheme. We show that an ecolabelling scheme can lead to an increase in purchases of environmentally sustainable products. The net effect on the...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: LABELLING; ECOLABELLING; POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL ELASTICITY.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010ba75aa17&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Book
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010f38a22c9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104341abed&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Can Williamson's analysis of discrete structural alternatives help regulators to choose between environmental policy instruments? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Mzoughi, N.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, SAE2. Département Sciences socialesRennes (FRA).
Alors que l'économie de l'environnement a abondamment utilisé la contribution séminale de Ronald H. Coase, elle n'a pratiquement jamais mobilisé les travaux de Williamson. Un premier pas dans cette direction consiste à appliquer le cadre analytique du choix des structures de gouvernance au choix des instruments de politique d'environnement. Les transactions environnementales qui diffèrent dans leurs attributs sont alignées avec des catégories d'instruments qui diffèrent également dans leurs caractéristiques de manière à obtenir un résultat qui économise les coûts de transaction. Plusieurs prolongements théoriques et implications en terme de politique économique sont suggérés.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: POLITIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT; WILLIAMSON; GOUVERNANCE.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=SAE2000000000000296&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/11/
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Can Williamson's analysis of discrete structural alternatives help regulators to choose between environmental policy instruments? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Mzoughi, N.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Alors que l'économie de l'environnement a abondamment utilisé la contribution séminale de Ronald H. Coase, elle n'a pratiquement jamais mobilisé les travaux de Williamson. Un premier pas dans cette direction consiste à appliquer le cadre analytique du choix des structures de gouvernance au choix des instruments de politique d'environnement. Les transactions environnementales qui diffèrent dans leurs attributs sont alignées avec des catégories d'instruments qui diffèrent également dans leurs caractéristiques de manière à obtenir un résultat qui économise les coûts de transaction. Plusieurs prolongements théoriques et implications en terme de politique économique sont suggérés.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: POLITIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT; WILLIAMSON; GOUVERNANCE.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20109509f8c8&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/11/
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Consolidated report on case studies Inra
Bonnieux, F.; Bougherara, D.; Desjeux, Y.; Dupraz, P.; Latouche, K.; Paoli, J.C.; Tafani, C..
This consolidated report provides an overview of the ten individual reports that present the case studies. It does not give a comprehensive coverage of all materials but emphasises a series of issues of interest for the ITAES project. Although the information contained in the paper mostly comes from the individual reports, additional data from Eurostat are also given in order to compare the various case studies on a homogeneous ground. The consolidated report is a companion of the flat cross country comparison (ITAES WP3 D3 P1-3) and is organised into four sections. The first section outlines background information on the case studies with insights on the general characteristics of agriculture. The second section addresses the supply of Agri Environmental...
Tipo: Report
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104f49d515&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Creating vs. maintaining threshold public goods in conservation policies Inra
Bougherara, D.; Denant-Boèmont, L.; Masclet, D.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Les mesures agri-environnementales mises en oeuvre par de nombreux pays visent à rémunérer les agriculteurs pour le maintien ou même la création de ces biens. Cette distinction entre maintien et création apparaît souvent dans l'exposé des motivations de ces politiques. Par exemple, le site de la Commission Européenne indique que l'agriculture "a contribué à travers les siècles à créer et entretenir toute une gamme d'habitats semi-naturels précieux". Ce projet vise à montrer que cette distinction n'est pas anodine. Nous supposons ici que le comportement des agriculteurs vis-à-vis du maintien ou de la création d'un bien non marchand va sans doute différer. Nous nous appuyons pour cela sur des travaux d'économie expérimentale montrant le rôle du contexte...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: ECONOMIE EXPERIMENTALE; SEUIL; EFFET DE CONTEXTE PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENT; THRESHOLD; FRAMING EFFECT; CONSERVATION POLICY.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010e28e37ca&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L..
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20092eda1a61&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/01/
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Développement durable: conservation et création de biens environnementaux. Une étude expérimentale Inra
Bougherara, D.; Denant-Boèmont, L.; Masclet, D..
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: ÉVALUATION; POLITIQUE PUBLIQUE; BIEN ENVIRONNEMENTAL; ÉCONOMIE EXPÉRIMENTALE.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20078a972fdb&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2008/12/
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Does Aversion to the Sucker's Payoff Matter in Public Goods Games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; AFSE, Association Française de Science Economique (FRA).
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; INSURANCE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201083eb6965&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
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Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Costa, S.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Une des raisons à la faible contribution volontaire aux biens publics est l’aversion au sucker’s payoff (coopération individuelle quand les autres font défection). Afin de distinguer l’effet de cette aversion d’autres causes, nous réalisons une expérience de contribution à un bien public dans laquelle les joueurs ont une assurance contre le risque de sucker’s payoff. Les résultats montrent que l’assurance augmente les contributions de manière directe mais également de manière indirecte à travers les anticipations des individus sur les contributions des autres.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010d5fd7cfb&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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"Eviter le mal ou… faire le bien" : gestion des biens environnementaux et politiques de développement durable Inra
Bougherara, D.; Denant-Boèmont, L.; Masclet, D..
Cet article relate les résultats d’une expérience portant sur les incitations à contribuer à la protection de l’environnement. Il s’agit plus précisément de comparer l’efficacité des politiques de préservation des biens environnementaux et celles visant à améliorer les biens environnementaux actuels. Pour cela, nous recourons à l’approche expérimentale à l’aide d’un jeu de contribution volontaire au financement de bien public. Nos résultats montrent que les politiques visant à créer de nouveaux biens environnementaux sont plus efficaces que celles visant à préserver les biens environnementaux existants.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: ECONOMIE EXPERIMENTALE; BIEN ENVIRONNEMENTAL; POLITIQUE PUBLIQUE; PRESERVATION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009472b2d77&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/02/
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Farmers’ preferences over conservation contract flexibility and duration: an estimation of the effect of transaction costs using choice experiment Inra
Bougherara, D.; Ducos, G.; ESNIE, European School on New Institutional Economics (FRA).
In this article, we analyze farmers’ preferences for variations in three conservation contract attributes, namely flexibility, duration and bureaucratic tasks. Assuming farmers’ preferences to be directly related to their profit variation, we present the different trade-offs associated to each attribute independently. We then show how the choice experiment methodology allows (i) to provide new empirical tests exempt from some endogeneity issues, (ii) to elicit the role of transaction costs on farmers’ preferences, and (iii) to estimate and disentangle the effect of transaction costs on farmers’ preferences. The empirical analysis is based on an experiment among 171 French farmers in 2005. Results highlight the role of transaction costs in farmers’...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: TRANSACTION COST; CHOICE EXPERIMENT; FARMER; PREFERENCE; CONTRACT.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2007442e9b20&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
Registros recuperados: 42
Primeira ... 123 ... Última
 

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