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A New Measure of the Producer Welfare Effects of Technological Change AgEcon
Bullock, David S..
It is well recognized that the statistical reliability of the conventional method of estimating the effects of technological change on producer welfare is often quite poor. I present a method that enhances the statistical reliability of such estimates. I emphasize that when measuring the welfare effects of technological change, valuable information can be gleaned from data on input prices and quantities. This type of data is often available, but the conventional measure typically does not take full advantage of its availability. Letting T0 be some initial level of technology and T1 be a subsequent level, the conventional measure of producer welfare change due to a technology change is the change in the “triangle” area under the price and behind the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Technological change; Producer welfare; Applied welfare economics; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; O30; O33.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103834
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A NOTE ON THE EFFICIENCY OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION WITH SIMPLE AND COMBINED POLICIES AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus.
Recent studies have investigated the efficiencies of policies that use several policy instruments simultaneously (for example, a policy that uses a production subsidy combined with a production quota). Several studies of very specific cases find that optimal combination of two policy instruments is more efficient than optimal independent use of either. In this note we demonstrate using set theory and maximization theory, that all such specific results are examples of a more general result, which is that by combining m instruments efficiently, a government can always be at least as efficient as when using a subset of those m instruments. This result holds for any of the several definitions of "efficiency" in the literature.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31524
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Dangers of Using Political Preference Functions in Political Economy Analysis: Examples from U.S. Ethanol Policy AgEcon
Bullock, David S..
Rausser and Freebairn (1974) proposed a method for empirically measuring the political power of interest groups competing in real-world political economies. In the first half of the 1990s, staunch criticism of PPF methodology appeared. Von Cramon-Taubadel (1992) obtained counter-intuitive results in PPF simulations using a simple model of EU wheat and barley policy instrument use. Bullock (1994) emphasized that PPF methodology requires that observed policy be Pareto efficient policy, which requires researchers to manipulate the dimensions of their models so that the number of interest groups is exactly one more than the number of policy instruments. He concluded “[PPF methods] need not reveal anything meaningful about interest group political power, and...
Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Political Economy; Q18; Q16; Q48.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124118
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GOVERNMENT VS. ANARCHY: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S..
This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate). This enforcement mechanism constitutes a credible threat, and is central to the establishment of bilateral cooperation (i.e, government). We highlight the importance of imperfect...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutions; Imperfect Information; Property Rights; Decision Making; Social Games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C72; D7; D81.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21496
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Measuring producer welfare under output price uncertainty and risk non-neutrality AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Garcia, Philip; Shin, Kie-Yup.
Procedures to measure the producer welfare effects of changes in an output price distribution under uncertainty are reviewed. Theory and numerical integration methods are combined to show how for any form of Marshallian risk-responsive supply, compensating variation of a change in higher moments of an output price distribution can be derived numerically. The numerical procedure enables measurement of producer welfare effects in the many circumstances in which risk and uncertainty are important elements. The practical ease and potential usefulness of the procedure is illustrated by measuring the producer welfare effects of USA rice policy.
Tipo: Article Palavras-chave: Price uncertainty; Risk non-neutrality; Welfare economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118434
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On Measuring the Value of a Nonmarket Good Using Market Data AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Minot, Nicholas.
Our purpose is to present in detail numerical methods of measuring the value of nonmarket goods using market data, under either weak neutrality, weak complementarity, or any other preference restriction meeting the requirements discussed in this paper. It has been claimed in a number of places in the literature that numerical methods cannot be used to measure the value of nonmarket goods unless the very restrictive Willig conditions are satisfied. We show that this claim is mistaken, and that numerical methods can be used whether or not the Willig conditions are satisfied. Our numerical methods are more flexible than the existing analytical method because ours can be used with any Marshallian demand system.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25272
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Should We Expect Government Policy to Be Pareto Efficient?: The Consequences of an Arrow-Debreu Economy with Violable Property Rights AgEcon
Bullock, David S..
To address the question, "Should we expect government policy to be efficient?" at its roots, I modify the well-known Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy, allowing property rights to be violable. The result is that equilibria tend to be Pareto inefficient.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Pareto efficiency; Property rights; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D72; D78.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19444
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Simulating the Effects of Supply and Demand Elasticities on Political-Economic Equilibrium AgEcon
Bullock, David S..
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48636
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The Economic Impact of New Technology Use in the U.S. Apple Industry AgEcon
Busdieker, Nichole; Nogueira, Lia; Onal, Hayri; Bullock, David S..
Replaced with revised version of poster 07/20/11.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103864
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The Economics of Delaying Policy Change: An Application to the 1992 CAP Reform AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus; Kola, Jukka.
Positive political economy is usually concerned with economic explanations of observed policy choices, while the timing of a policy reform has not gained similar attention. This is somewhat surprising since policy makers most often are free to decide both the design and timing of a policy reform. Drawing on insights from recent developments in the finance literature on investment under uncertainty, here we apply the idea of option value to the analysis of government policy making. Common political-economic explanations of the 1992 CAP reform are that policymakers felt domestic political pressure to make the CAP more efficient, and also international political pressure and to bring the CAP in line with treaty obligations. Although these arguments are sound,...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50957
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THE ECONOMICS OF NON-GMO SEGREGATION AND IDENTITY PRESERVATION AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Desquilbet, Marion; Nitsi, Elisavet I..
We survey grain and soybean handlers and producers in the U.S. and EU to estimate costs of preserving the identities of GMO and non-GMO crops in marketing channels. We introduce our estimates into the IFPRI IMPACT model to simulate the effects of identity preservation on farm incomes and consumer well-being.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21845
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THE SIZE OF THE PRIZE: TESTING RENT-DISSIPATION WHEN TRANSFER QUANTITY IS ENDOGENOUS AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Rutstrom, Elisabet E..
We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy in which the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and in which over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers. We observe behavior that deviates from dominant strategies.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Political Economy.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20447
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Towards a Theory of Policy Making AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus; Kola, Jukka.
The paper presents a theory of policy timing that relies on uncertainty and transaction costs to explain the optimal timing and length of policy reforms. Delaying reforms resolves some uncertainty by gaining valuable information and saves transaction costs. Implementing reforms without waiting increases welfare by adjusting domestic policies to changed market parameters. Optimal policy timing is found by balancing the trade-off between delaying reforms and implementing reforms without waiting. Our theory offers an explanation of why countries differ with respect to the length of their policy reforms, and why applied studies often judge agricultural policies to be inefficient.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Policy analysis; Uncertainty; Dynamic model; Transaction costs; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114639
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TOWARDS MEASURING PRODUCER WELFARE UNDER OUTPUT PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND RISK NON-NEUTRALITY AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Shin, Kie-Yup; Garcia, Philip.
We combine theory with numerical integration methods to show that for any form of uncompensated supply, compensating variation of a change in higher moments of an output price distribution can be numerically derived.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Producer welfare; Price uncertainty; Risk; Demand and Price Analysis; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21713
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Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Mittenzwei, Klaus.
A brief review of the history of agricultural policymaking in Europe and the U.S. reveals that major policy changes have often been brought about by major socio-political "shocks," such as the Great Depression and World War II. Such shocks also lead to the creation of institutions that tend to stay in place for long periods after the initial shock has passed. We use evolutionary game theory to model and simulate the effects of socio-political shocks on political institutions.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural policy; Evolutionary game theory; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; D72; C73.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24538
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Using Spatial Analysis to Study the Values of Variable Rate Technology and Information AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Lowenberg-DeBoer, James.
We present a review of the last few years' literature on the economic feasibility of variable rate technology in agriculture. Much of the research on this topic has involved the estimation of site-specific yield response functions. Data used for such estimations most often inherently lend themselves to spatial analysis. We discuss the different types of spatial analyses that may be appropriate in estimating various types yield response functions. Then, we present a taxonomy for the discussion of the economics of precision agriculture technology and information. We argue that precision agriculture technology and information must be studied together since they are by nature economic complements. We contend that longer-term, multi-location agronomic...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Precision agriculture; Spatial econometrics; Variable rate technology; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; C31; O33; Q16.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25393
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Who pays the costs of non-GMO segregation and identity preservation? AgEcon
Desquilbet, Marion; Bullock, David S..
This paper proposes an analytical framework to examine the market and welfare impacts of GMOs, when some consumers refuse genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and when two supply channels are segregated (one for goods that containing GMOs and one for non-genetically-modified identity-preserved goods). Our analytical framework begins at the level of individual farmers, handlers and consumers, to build up market supply and demand functions. This allows us to circumvent the difficulties of conducting supply and demand analysis in the different horizontally and vertically related markets concerned by GMOs and market segregation. We represent explicitly the costs of non-GMO segregation and identity preservation (IP) for both producers of non-GM IP goods and...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Genetically modified organisms; Consumers'; Non genetically modified product; Segregation; Innovation; Multi-market analysis; Consumer/Household Economics.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24973
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WHO PAYS THE COSTS OF NON-GMO SEGREGATION AND IDENTITY PRESERVATION, AND WHO IS TO BLAME? AgEcon
Desquilbet, Marion; Bullock, David S..
The paper analyzes the welfare effects of the introduction of GMO technology into a market in which a fraction of consumers refuses to buy GMOs. Our theoretical model recognizes that segregation and identity preservation (IP) of non-GMOs may create costs for both IP producers and non-IP producers. Our results show how GMO-hating consumers may win or lose from the introduction of GMO technology. If IP creates costs for non-IP producers, indifferent consumers and GMO producers may be made worse off because others refuse to consume GMOs. If GMO rejection is strong, IP producers win when GMOs are introduced, even though they do not produce GMOs.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22011
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