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Registros recuperados: 13
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Acumuladores de animais – identificação do perfil MV&Z
Oliveira, J. S.; Chaves, A. M.; Gonçalves, L.; Gomez, M. L. R.; Costa, S.; Rosa, V. B.; Miranda, I. C. S.; Teixeira, M. C..
O acúmulo de animais tem sido estudado pioneiramente nos Estados Unidos e recentemente no Brasil, sendo relacionado como Transtorno de Acumulação de Animais. O tema é pouco conhecido e precisa ser apresentado, de forma mais clara, à comunidade acadêmica e ao futuro médico-veterinário. O acumulador de animais é o indivíduo que tem um número exagerado de animais, em um local com deficiência de saneamento, espaço, alimento disponível, cuidados veterinários e que não atende as necessidades básicas dos animais. Quando o número de animais em uma residência única passa a ser problemático, isso se torna uma psicopatologia psiquiátrica chamada Hoarding, sendo o portador desse transtorno incapaz de reconhecer os efeitos deletérios ao bem- -estar a que os animais...
Tipo: Info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Ano: 2017 URL: http://www.revistamvez-crmvsp.com.br/index.php/recmvz/article/view/36856
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Are environmental offsets indulgences? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Teisl, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Environmental offsetting is a concept whereby a company can offset its environmental impacts by paying for another party to reduce its environmental impacts. Offsets are designed for greenhouse gases emissions (carbon) and biodiversity. Though the concept is new in the debate, it relies on the idea common to environmental economists of flexibility and cost efficiency where the firms that have the lowest pollution abatement costs reduce more pollution than firms that have high abatement costs. Even if the offsetting concept makes sense from an economic point of view, the public may oppose it on several grounds. It may be for moral reasons (the polluter must pay), for equity reasons (the victims of the local pollution cannot escape pollution), or for...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: CONSENTEMENT A PAYER OFFSETS; WILLINGNESS TO PAY; STATED CHOICE.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010c6b5e3f1&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Bilan scientifique du Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière : 2003-2007 Inra
Barkaoui, A.; Bruciamacchie, M.; Brunette, M.; Costa, S.; Couture, S.; Fiquepron, J.; Garcia, S.; Heshmatol-Vaezin, M.; Ibanez, L.; Laye, J.; Lecocq, F.; Marty, G.; Montagné, C.; Niedzwiedz, A.; Préget, R.; Stenger, A.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Le Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière (LEF) est une Unité Mixte de Recherche entre l’Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts et l’Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique. Il a été créé en 2000 et renouvelé en 2005. La mission du LEF est de «concevoir, développer, et transférer des méthodes et des outils d’analyse économique en vue de comprendre et d’améliorer la connaissance, la gestion et l’utilisation des biens, services et produits de la forêt ». L’objet de ce premier numéro des « Cahiers du LEF » de l’année 2008 est de présenter un bilan scientifique des recherches effectuées au Laboratoire pour la période 2003-2007.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: PERSPECTIVES DE RECHERCHE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009bafd1e79&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/07/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Book
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010f38a22c9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104341abed&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L..
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20092eda1a61&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/01/
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Does Aversion to the Sucker's Payoff Matter in Public Goods Games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; AFSE, Association Française de Science Economique (FRA).
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; INSURANCE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201083eb6965&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
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Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Costa, S.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Une des raisons à la faible contribution volontaire aux biens publics est l’aversion au sucker’s payoff (coopération individuelle quand les autres font défection). Afin de distinguer l’effet de cette aversion d’autres causes, nous réalisons une expérience de contribution à un bien public dans laquelle les joueurs ont une assurance contre le risque de sucker’s payoff. Les résultats montrent que l’assurance augmente les contributions de manière directe mais également de manière indirecte à travers les anticipations des individus sur les contributions des autres.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010d5fd7cfb&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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Impacts économiques des tempêtes ; application à la tempête Klaus et au massif forestier landais Inra
Peyron, J.-L.; Costa, S.; Drouineau, S.; Lecocq, M..
Le préjudice économique consécutif à une tempête touchant les forêts est multiforme. Il comprend des éléments relatifs à la forêt, aux activités du bois et à l’ensemble des autres fonctions de la forêt. Son évaluation est opportune mais délicate. C’est pourquoi l’accent est surtout mis ici sur les coûts résultant d’une variation des revenus provenant de l’exploitation des bois. Ces coûts sont généralement pris en charge par les propriétaires eux-mêmes, les assureurs lorsque les peuplements étaient assurés, et l’Etat ; ce dernier est à la fois un propriétaire important et vient compenser une partie du préjudice subi par des mesures gouvernementales agissant directement et indirectement sur le revenu des propriétaires. Les coûts relatifs au préjudice subi au...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: TEMPETE; PREJUDICE; ECHELLE DE GRAVITE FOREST ECONOMICS; WINDSTORM; ECONOMIC LOSSES; VALUATION; GRAVITY SCALE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20112d9cd619&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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L’écolabellisation : un mode d'action efficace pour le développement durable. Rapport scientifique à mi-parcours Inra
Costa, S.; Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Garcia Parpet, M.F.; Mzoughi, N..
Rapport scientifique à mi-parcours
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: ECOLABEL.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010aea77256&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Perspectives de recherche en économie forestière en France : Programmes Prioritaires pour la Période 2005-2008 Inra
Barkaoui, A.; Bruciamacchie, M.; Costa, S.; Couture, S.; Garcia, S.; Harou, P.; Ibanez, L.; Laye, J.; Lecocq, F.; Préget, R.; Stenger, A.. (Editeur); INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Le laboratoire d'économie forestière est né pour mettre en place un réseau de compétences rassemblant les forces intervenant en France en économie forestière. Les recherches du LEF sur la période 2005-2008 s'inscrivent dans un objectif général qui est de contribuer à développer un secteur intégré de la ressource "forêt" au produit "bois". En amont, cet objectif signifie la valorisation de toutes les fonctions de la forêt en tenant compte des risques. En aval, il s'agit d'organiser la filière et de promouvoir la valorisation du bois pour accroître la compétitivité du secteur. Le LEF est structuré autour de deux axes : l'économie de la multifonctionnalité en forêt ; les industries et marchés du bois.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: INDUSTRIE DU BOIS; RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=SAE2000000000000263&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/08/
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Pieris brassicae excrements: cytological effects IPB - Escola Superior Agrária
Fernandes, F.; Teixeira, J.P.; Taveira, M.; Sousa, C.; Costa, S.; Coelho, P.; Valentão, P.; Remião, F.; Pereira, J.A.; Andrade, P.B..
Attention has been focused on identifying naturally occurring compounds with anticarcinogenic activity. Epidemiological data evidence the protective role of Brassica species, especially due to their phenolics and glucosinolates. Pieris brassicae, an insect whose larvae constitutes a frequent pest of Brassica species, has the capacity to uptake, metabolize and excrete these phytochemicals by the faeces. Phenolics composition of excrements from P. brassicae reared on Brassica oleracea var. acephala presents flavonoids (sulfated and glycosilated), some of them not detected in host plant [1]. Their volatiles profile shows compounds belonging to different classes, with especial attention to terpenes and glucosinolates breakdown products (sulfur and nitrogen...
Tipo: ConferenceObject
Ano: 2009 URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10198/4842
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Private provision of public goods: strategic and moral motivations Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201084b39141&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
Registros recuperados: 13
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