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Bovenberg, A. Lans; Goulder, Lawrence H.. |
The most cost-effective policies for achieving CO2 abatement (e.g., carbon taxes) are considered politically unacceptable because of distributional consequences. This paper explores policies designed to address distributional concerns. Using an intertemporal, numerical general equilibrium model of the United States, we examine how efficiency costs change when CO2 abatement policies include elements that neutralize adverse impacts on energy industries. We find that desirable distributional outcomes can be achieved at relatively low cost in terms of efficiency. Without substantial added cost to the overall economy, the government can implement carbon abatement policies that protect profits and equity values in fossil-fuel industries. The key to this... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Distributional impacts; General equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H22; L51; D58. |
Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10647 |
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Goulder, Lawrence H.; Parry, Ian W.H.; Williams, Roberton C., III; Burtraw, Dallas. |
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with pre-existing factor taxes. We compare the costs and overall efficiency impacts of emissions taxes, emissions quotas, fuels taxes, performance standards, and mandated technologies, and explore how costs change with the magnitude of pre-existing taxes and the extent of pollution abatement. We find that the presence of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement under each instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world. This extra cost is an increasing function of the magnitude of pre-existing tax rates. For plausible values of... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: General equilibrium efficiency analysis; Environmental instrument choice; Second-best regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D58; H21; L51. |
Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10522 |
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