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| Gulati, Sumeet; Mishra, Ashok K.. |
| In an analysis of the determinants of government payments to a farm the paper finds cropping patterns, soil productivity, and more importantly human capital variables such as education, and age as significant. While analyzing the effect of government payments on the profit efficiency of agriculture the paper finds that the inclusion of government payments does not cause structural change in US agriculture (i.e., a change in returns to scale of the underlying technology). Nevertheless, the paper does find evidence of an indirect effect of government payments on efficiency. Farms that received greater government payments on aggregate were more efficient than other farms. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15837 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet. |
| In this paper I consider a small economy facing accession to a trade agreement. Before accession the government has control over trade and environmental policy. After accession it retains control over environmental policy but has to allow free trade. Through the analysis I highlight an effect of free trade neglected in the literature so far. Adoption of free trade shifts the economic incidence of pollution tax from consumers onto producers of the polluting good. Under fairly plausible conditions, this change in incidence can reduce the distortion in pollution tax. Even though the choice of accession is influenced by special interest groups, I find that accession can be accompanied by an improvement in pollution policy and an increase in aggregate welfare. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15849 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet. |
| Several studies hypothesize exogeneous environmental regulation as the primary motive for trade between two regions, often predicting a lower welfare for the region with incomplete environmental protection. Such analyses do not allow the region to adjust its environmental policy in response to a shift in the trade regime. Further, they do not allow the region to refuse free trade in the face of a welfare loss. As an alternative I propose a common agency model of government to endogenize environmental policy and the choice of trade regime. Conditions for the incomplete internalization of an environmental externality are specified, and the pollution tax in autarky is compared to that under free trade. The paper finds that moving to free trade induces a... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20449 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| In this paper we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon offset contracts; Greenhouse gas policy; Soil carbon; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Q200; Q580. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37027 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| In this paper we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15843 |
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| Malhotra, Nisha; Gulati, Sumeet. |
| In this paper we analyze whether the Softwood Lumber Agreement between US and Canada imposed significant economic costs on the users of Lumber in the US. To ascertain this impact we use an event study. Our event study analyzes variations in the stock prices of lumber using firms listed at the major stock markets in the US. We find that events leading to the Softwood Lumber Agreement had significant negative impacts on the stock prices of industries using softwood lumber. The average reduction of stock prices for our sample of firms was approximately 5.42% over all the events considered. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15842 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient? In this paper we construct a model that embodies common characteristics of resource contracts. Using this model, we analyze a large class of real-world resource contracts and find them to be economically inefficient. This inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency inherent in these contracts. There are two possible ways to overcome this time inconsistency. The first is to employ a sufficiently large penalty for early termination of the contract. The second and possibly easier method is to offer an upward sloping conservation payment schedule so far overlooked by resource contracts. Under this payment schedule, the agent's ex-ante and ex-post contract choices coincide, social... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15838 |
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