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Registros recuperados: 11
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Centralized versus Individual: Governance of Farmer Professional Cooperatives in China AgEcon
Jia, Xiangping; Hu, Yamei; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Huang, Jikun.
Based on a national representative survey conducted in 2009, this study shows that the decision-making within Farmer Professional Cooperatives (FPCs) in China is decentralized to individual farmers. However, there is a trend that the decision rights of farming are decomposed to marketing, production and input procuring. While the rights for production and input procuring stay with family farmers, marketing rights tend to be collectivized. Compared to FPCs having external initiating sources, FPCs initiated by farmers are more inclined to introduce centralized decision-making. The governance structure of FPCs in transition China presents hybrid forms of both hierarchy and family farming.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farmer; Cooperatives; Governance; China; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; L14; Q13; Q18.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90803
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CEO Compensation in Cooperatives versus Publicly Listed Firms AgEcon
Li, Feng; Hendrikse, George W.J..
A multiple activities principal-agent model regarding CEO compensation in cooperatives is presented, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and that they have to bring the enterprise to value as well as to serve member interests. A cooperative dominates a publicly listed firm in terms of efficiency when either activities are sufficiently complementary, or additional information is considered in the performance measure.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cooperative; CEO compensation; Performance measure; Agribusiness.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51619
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Collective action of small farmers: A case study of Ruoheng farmer watermelon cooperative in China AgEcon
Huang, Zuhui; Liang, Qiao; Hendrikse, George W.J..
Watermelon production investments, incomes and the access to markets between members of a cooperative and individual small farmers are compared. The results of the case study regarding members of a watermelon cooperative and five individual small farmers in Zhejiang province in China indicate that members of the cooperative are prone to produce food of higher quality, have obvious advantage in accessing modern food supply chains over individual small farmers, and subsequently gain a significantly higher return or income than individual small farmers.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farmer cooperative; Benefit; Income; Consumer/Household Economics.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52840
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Competing Screening Rules AgEcon
Hendrikse, George W.J.; Hu, Yamei.
Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Architecture; Screening; Cooperatives; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24522
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Coordination and Governance: The case of Cooperatives versus IOFs AgEcon
Feng, Li; Hendrikse, George W.J..
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114359
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Grower Heterogeneity and Governance: Authority, Access, and Countervailing Power AgEcon
Hendrikse, George W.J..
The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural markets has resulted in many governance structure changes between growers and wholesalers. For example, marketing cooperatives are restructured, heterogeneous associations split up in various one-product associations, growers integrate forward into wholesaling, and so on. These developments are analysed with an incomplete contracting model addressing horizontal as well as vertical relationships in a multilateral setting. The interactions between authority, access, and countervailing power in the choice of governance structure are highlighted.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Industrial Organization.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20046
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On the Coexistence of Spot and Contract Markets: a Delivery Requirement Explanation AgEcon
Hendrikse, George W.J..
A model is presented in which spot and contract market exchange co-exist. A contract consists of a delivery requirement between an upstream and a downstream party. Contract formation determines to a certain extent the probability distribution of the spot market price. This contract formation externality entails the removal of high reservation price buyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price when the number of contracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional residual contract demand increase the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It implies an endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. Contract prices are positively related...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Spot market; Contract externality; Co-existence; Delivery requirement; Marketing; D40; L10.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21041
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On the Nature of a Cooperative: A System of Attributes Perspective AgEcon
Feng, Li; Hendrikse, George W.J..
In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various concepts from the theory of the firm that have been formulated since 1990. Two concepts shed light on this debate: the enterprise as a system of attributes and the delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights and income rights. We argue that viewing the cooperative as a system of attributes integrates these three views. It emphasizes that a cooperative is a firm in itself, with many independent input suppliers as owners. The feature of many input suppliers as owners implies that the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44398
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Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China AgEcon
Hu, Yamei; Huang, Zuhui; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Xu, Xuchu.
A description and analysis of China's Farmer Specialized Cooperatives is presented. Data is presented regarding the historical development of farmer cooperatives in China, the membership composition of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, and the various attributes (governance, quality control system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in this province. Many cooperatives are being transformed in organizations with a market orientation. These cooperatives exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and skewness in the distribution of control rights. Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important than physical asset specificity...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farmer Cooperative; China; Governance Structure; Business Strategy; Agribusiness; Q13.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25610
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Quality Provision and Governance Structure Variety: Pooling versus double markup AgEcon
Liang, Qiao; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Huang, Zuhui.
This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Quality; Cooperatives; Investor-Owned Firms; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; C72; L22; Q13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90805
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Value added and governance structure: Evidence from the pear industry in China’s Zhejiang province AgEcon
Liang, Qiao; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Huang, Zuhui.
Traditional farmer cooperatives, new generation farmer cooperatives, and investor-owned firms (IOFs), are compared regarding their value added and value added rate in terms of product marketing. The results of the analysis regarding the pear supply chain in Zhejiang province in China indicate that IOFs obtain a higher value added or value added rate than farmer cooperatives. New generation cooperatives mitigate the under-investment problem of traditional cooperatives in a certain extent. However, farmer cooperatives have some advantages over investor-owned firms in benefiting farmers.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farmer cooperatives; Investor-owned firms; Value added; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90804
Registros recuperados: 11
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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