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Registros recuperados: 11
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Bilan scientifique du Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière : 2003-2007 Inra
Barkaoui, A.; Bruciamacchie, M.; Brunette, M.; Costa, S.; Couture, S.; Fiquepron, J.; Garcia, S.; Heshmatol-Vaezin, M.; Ibanez, L.; Laye, J.; Lecocq, F.; Marty, G.; Montagné, C.; Niedzwiedz, A.; Préget, R.; Stenger, A.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Le Laboratoire d’Economie Forestière (LEF) est une Unité Mixte de Recherche entre l’Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts et l’Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique. Il a été créé en 2000 et renouvelé en 2005. La mission du LEF est de «concevoir, développer, et transférer des méthodes et des outils d’analyse économique en vue de comprendre et d’améliorer la connaissance, la gestion et l’utilisation des biens, services et produits de la forêt ». L’objet de ce premier numéro des « Cahiers du LEF » de l’année 2008 est de présenter un bilan scientifique des recherches effectuées au Laboratoire pour la période 2003-2007.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: PERSPECTIVES DE RECHERCHE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009bafd1e79&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/07/
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Can ecolabeling schemes preserve the environment? Inra
Ibanez, L.; Grolleau, G..
On analyse les impacts d'un écolabel dans un modèle de différenciation verticale en duopole. Nous considérons un jeu à trois étapes où deux entreprises choisissent simultanément la technologie de production, le signal et le prix du produit. La technologie de production n'est pas observable par les consommateurs. La seule moyen pour l'entreprise d'informer les consommateurs sur la qualité environnementale du produit est d'apposer un écolabel sur le produit. Toutefois, une entreprise polluante a la possibilité d'usurper l'écolabel à un certain coût. En supposant que les consommateurs ont des préférences altruistes et sont donc disposés à payer pour la qualité environnementale, on montre que l'écolabel peut réduire les pollutions. Sous certaines conditions de...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: ALTRUISME; ECOLABEL; DUOPOLE ALTRUISM; ECOLABEL; DUOPOLY; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009bc40a1c0&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/07/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104341abed&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Can positional concerns enhance the private provision of public goods? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, a positional outcome and an outcome in terms of public goods provision. When agents have homogenous positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might...
Tipo: Book
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010f38a22c9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
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Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L..
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20092eda1a61&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/01/
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Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Grolleau, G.; Costa, S.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Une des raisons à la faible contribution volontaire aux biens publics est l’aversion au sucker’s payoff (coopération individuelle quand les autres font défection). Afin de distinguer l’effet de cette aversion d’autres causes, nous réalisons une expérience de contribution à un bien public dans laquelle les joueurs ont une assurance contre le risque de sucker’s payoff. Les résultats montrent que l’assurance augmente les contributions de manière directe mais également de manière indirecte à travers les anticipations des individus sur les contributions des autres.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; ASSURANCE.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010d5fd7cfb&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/06/
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Does Aversion to the Sucker's Payoff Matter in Public Goods Games? Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; AFSE, Association Française de Science Economique (FRA).
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: EXPERIMENT; PUBLIC GOOD; SUCKERS PAYOFF; INSURANCE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201083eb6965&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
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Labeling policies and market behavior: quality standard and voluntary label adoption Inra
Bottega, L.; Delacote, P.; Ibanez, L..
This paper focus's on the third-party certifiers' strategy when choosing a required label quality, and the consequent market outcome. We consider two different objectives of the certifier: maximizing global demand for the labeled product (wide public policy), or maximizing global quality of the market (global quality policy). In a duopoly set up with firms bearing different costs with respect to quality provision, firms always opt for differentiation strategies: only one adopts the label. However, the labeling firm is not necessarily the most efficient one. In the case of a wide public policy, the efficient firm will produce labeled products only if costs of labeling are sufficiently low. In the case of a global quality policy, the low cost firm will...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: ECOLABEL; LABEL DE QUALITE; QUALITE DES PRODUITS; CERTIFICATION LABELING; PRODUCT QUALITY; BERTRAND DUOPOLY.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20102bb00fb0&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/01/
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Perspectives de recherche en économie forestière en France : Programmes Prioritaires pour la Période 2005-2008 Inra
Barkaoui, A.; Bruciamacchie, M.; Costa, S.; Couture, S.; Garcia, S.; Harou, P.; Ibanez, L.; Laye, J.; Lecocq, F.; Préget, R.; Stenger, A.. (Editeur); INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Le laboratoire d'économie forestière est né pour mettre en place un réseau de compétences rassemblant les forces intervenant en France en économie forestière. Les recherches du LEF sur la période 2005-2008 s'inscrivent dans un objectif général qui est de contribuer à développer un secteur intégré de la ressource "forêt" au produit "bois". En amont, cet objectif signifie la valorisation de toutes les fonctions de la forêt en tenant compte des risques. En aval, il s'agit d'organiser la filière et de promouvoir la valorisation du bois pour accroître la compétitivité du secteur. Le LEF est structuré autour de deux axes : l'économie de la multifonctionnalité en forêt ; les industries et marchés du bois.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: INDUSTRIE DU BOIS; RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=SAE2000000000000263&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/08/
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Positional concerns in public goods games Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.. (Présentateur); Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; ESA, Economic Science Association (INT).
When asked to pick which of the two states of the world they would prefer to live in (A: Your current early income is $55,000; others earn $25,000 or B: Your current early income is $100,000; others earn $200,000 ) 56% of respondents preferred a world in which they had half the real purchasing power, as long as their relative income position was high (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). In other words, some people care for their relative position. Although such motivations for purchase have been identified early (e.g., Veblen, 1899; Hirsch, 1976; Frank, 1985; Alpizar et al., 2005), theoretical and empirical investigations about their importance in relation to public goods remain scarce (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 2005). We propose an economic model and an...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: PUBLIC GOOD; POSITION; CONSUMER BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENT.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104e5c03e9&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
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Private provision of public goods: strategic and moral motivations Inra
Bougherara, D.; Costa, S.; Grolleau, G.; Ibanez, L.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Tipo: Meeting Paper
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201084b39141&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
Registros recuperados: 11
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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