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| Beal, Sylvain; Querou, Nicolas. |
| We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and the Repeated Nash Equilibrium (RNE), in which different networks may form. We state a sufficient condition under which a given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form totally different networks at... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12169 |
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| Querou, Nicolas. |
| We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Conflict; Agency Problem; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D74; J52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96841 |
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