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Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Entry Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection? 31
Quillerou, Emmanuelle; Fraser, Rob W..
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on agricultural foregone income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the scheme. However, the Higher Level Scheme (HLS) design includes some features that potentially reduce adverse selection. This paper studies the adverse selection problem of the HLS using a principal agent framework at the regional level. It is found that, at the regional level, the enrolment of more land from lower payment regions for a given budget constraint has led to a greater overall contracted area (and thus potential...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51068
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Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Evidence in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme? 31
Quillerou, Emmanuelle; Fraser, Rob W.; Fraser, Iain.
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme provides payments to farmers for the provision of environmental services based on foregone agricultural income. This creates a potential incentive compatibility problem which, combined with an information asymmetry on farm land heterogeneity, could lead to adverse selection of farmers into the Scheme and therefore reduced cost-effectiveness of the Scheme. This reduced cost-effectiveness would be represented by a systematic overpayment of farmers for the land enrolled into the Scheme, compared to the opportunity cost of production. This paper examines the potential adverse selection problem affecting the higher tier of the Environmental Stewardship, the Higher Level Stewardship, using a principal agent framework combined...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; Agri-environment; Environmental Stewardship; Principal-agent; Contract; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; D82; H44; Q18; Q58.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91676
Registros recuperados: 2
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