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Registros recuperados: 6
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Barriers to and Opportunities for Increasing Participation in Conservation Auctions AgEcon
Whitten, Stuart M.; Reeson, Andrew; Windle, Jill; Rolfe, John.
Participation is a relative concept. Too much implies high costs of administration and many losers in a competitive process. Too little implies relatively few gains from trade are accessed. Thus the aim is to optimise rather than maximise participation. In this paper we outline some rules of thumb for setting participation targets and develop a framework for identifying barriers to achieving targets. We use the framework to evaluate six case study tenders covering a variety of land management objectives. These case studies provided pragmatic on-ground lessons in managing participation in real tender applications and resulted in several further lessons for participation management in tender design.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; Land Economics/Use.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/5973
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Coordination and Strategic Behaviour in Landscape Auctions AgEcon
Valle, Haydn; Capon, Timothy; Harris, Michael; Reeson, Andrew.
Designing a conservation auction where bidders know the ecological value of their land poses challenges for policy makers because bidders will tend to increase their asking price. This is known as strategic behaviour, and it is particularly prevalent in sequential auction settings. The tender process ceases to be competitive when strategic behaviour occurs, eroding the efficiency advantages of an auction. To overcome this problem, contract options can be designed such that early winners are restricted in their efforts to strategically manipulate auction outcomes. Simply offering multi-period contracts could achieve this goal if participants need to wait for their contracts to expire before they can change their asking price. This idea was tested in a...
Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Conservation; Biodiversity; Auctions; Strategic Behaviour; Landscape Design; Coordination; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124466
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Developing Environmental Service Policy for Salinity and Water: Experiments with Regulations and Markets Linking Watersheds with Downstream Water Users AgEcon
Nordblom, Thomas L.; Reeson, Andrew; Whitten, Stuart M.; Finlayson, John D.; Kelly, Jason A.; Hume, Iain H..
Shortfalls in water supplies are perhaps the greatest practical NRM policy concern in Australia today, looming larger in many minds than the great international debates on greenhouse gasses, climate change and biodiversity. Because forest land cover uses more water than any other, wide expansion of upstream tree plantations can significantly reduce water yields upon which downstream urban, agricultural and wetlands depend. We consider the economic efficiency and equity (profitability and distributional) consequences of upstream land use change. The ‘environmental services’ of concern in our study are the mean annual quantities and qualities (volumes and salt concentrations) of water flowing from upper parts of a catchment to the downstream interests...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Experimental economics; Land use; Rival water uses; MBI; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6249
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Experiments with regulations & markets linking upstream tree plantations with downstream water users AgEcon
Nordblom, Thomas L.; Reeson, Andrew; Finlayson, John D.; Hume, Iain H.; Whitten, Stuart M.; Kelly, Jason A..
Land-use change in upper catchments impact downstream water flows. As trees use large amounts of water the expansion of upstream plantations can substantially reduce water availability to downstream users. There can also be impacts on downstream salinity due to reduced dilution flows. In some jurisdictions afforestation requires the purchase of water rights from downstream holders, while in others it does not, effectively handing the water rights to the upstream landholders. We consider the economic efficiency and equity (profitability and distributional) consequences of upstream land use change in the presence of a water market under alternate property rights regimes and different salinity scenarios.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Experimental-economics; Tree-plantations; Environmental-services; Urban; Irrigation; Stock & domestic; Water use; Land use.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47945
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Putting theory into practice: market failure and market based instrument design AgEcon
Whitten, Stuart M.; Coggan, Anthea; Reeson, Andrew; Gorddard, Russell J..
The use of market-based instruments (MBIs) to provide and protect ecosystem services has gained significant attention in Australia. Despite their popularity, MBIs are not appropriate for the provision of all ecosystem services. Rather, MBIs must be carefully designed given the ecosystem service outcomes desired, while meeting the needs of participants. In this paper we detail the importance of a robust theoretical structure to underpin the selection and design of an MBI. In particular, we demonstrate the role of identifying and analysing the nature of the market failures present, and their implications for instrument design. Our conclusions are illustrated using several regional MBI case studies.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Market failure; Market based instrument; Incentives; Marketing.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10441
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When should biodiversity tenders contract on outcomes? AgEcon
Gorddard, Russell J.; Whitten, Stuart M.; Reeson, Andrew.
Making conservation program payments conditional on outcomes offers potential efficiency and innovation improvements over input based contracts. This paper explores the trade-offs involved in choosing the payment criteria for biodiversity tenders. A model where the budget for a conservation tender can be allocated to input, outcome or mixed payments is used to explore the impacts of hidden actions, adverse selection, and landholder risk aversion on the optimal policy design. We discuss the implications of these results for the design of the ‘Nest Egg’ tender. This tender is targeting habitat and breeding of ground-nesting birds in the New South Wales Murray Catchment.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: OUTCOME CONTRACTS; RISK AVERSION; BIODIVERSITY TENDERS; CONTRACT DESIGN; NEST EGG; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/5979
Registros recuperados: 6
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