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Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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Ethier, Robert G.; Poe, Gregory L.; Schulze, William D.; Clark, Jeremy. |
To date, much of the policy and research debate on contingent valuation mode effects has relied on experiences drawn from other research disciplines. This study provides the first contingent valuation phone-mail comparison that meets current standards for response rates, draws from a general population, is relevant to the valuation of general environmental goods, and allows comparisons with actual sign-ups. Consistent with previous research in other disciplines, social desirability bias is found in responses to subjective questions --thus leading to more environmentally favorable responses on the phone. However, this effect does not carry over to hypothetical participation decisions. Hypothetical bias is found in both modes. Yet, application of calibration... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7245 |
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Bernard, John C.; Mount, Timothy D.; Schulze, William D.. |
Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market. This research uses experimental methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31529 |
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Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
This study investigates the influence of social preferences on voting decisions using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is best thought of as a public goods voting extension of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism for private goods. In particular, this mechanism is used to investigate experimentally whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program. Recent papers have shown that, in additional to selfishness, factors such as inequality aversion, maximin preferences, and efficiency may influence individual decisions. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods by legislatures and public referenda, has not been... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21145 |
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Poe, Gregory L.; Clark, Jeremy; Schulze, William D.. |
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation utilized a demand revealing public good mechanism to implement a green electricity program for provision of renewable energy and planting trees. This GreenChoiceTM program provided an opportunity to test the reliability of contingent valuation for predicting actual participation levels. In this study, participation levels predicted by hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice questions are compared to a reference level obtained from the actual GreenChoiceTM program. This approach represents an important improvement over past public goods contingent valuation validity tests which have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and thus are likely to overestimate hypothetical bias... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7264 |
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Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132 |
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Messer, Kent D.; Kaiser, Harry M.; Schulze, William D.. |
This paper exploits a unique opportunity to test parallelism between the field and laboratory for the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). Most commodities in the United States have checkoff programs assessing producers for generic advertising and promotion, a public good for producers. Examples include: Got Milk? and the Incredible Edible Egg. Originally, participation in many of these programs used the VCM and the freeriding observed follows a similar pattern to that seen in the laboratory by experimental economists. For example, a substantial amount of historical information is available for the egg industrys generic advertising program. We simulate both the economic and psychological details of this industry in a parallelism experiment. The results... |
Tipo: Technical Report |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122094 |
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Messer, Kent D.; Kaiser, Harry M.; Schulze, William D.. |
Many commodities have programs assessing producers for generic advertising. Ads such as "Got Milk?" and the "Incredible Edible Egg" are a public good for producers. Most of these programs originally used the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, but have now become mandatory because of free-riding. This research simulates both the economic and psychological details of the egg industry in experiments that produce strikingly realistic results. Because mandatory programs have recently been declared unconstitutional, we also the test the Provision Point Mechanism and show that observed low levels of free-riding for both mechanisms are the result of status quo bias. |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing; H40; H41; M37. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20072 |
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Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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