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| Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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| Stark, Oded; Byra, Lukasz. |
| In this paper we study the impact of the international migration of unskilled workers on skill formation and the average skill level in the home country. We analyze what appears to be the least threatening scenario from the point of view of its effect on the supply of skills at home: namely, migration exclusively by unskilled workers. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that even without the departure of skilled workers, the home country suffers reduced aggregate skill formation. Although as a response to a higher wage rate per unit of human capital in the new equilibrium skilled workers choose to accumulate more human capital than before the opening up to migration of unskilled workers, the number and share of skilled workers in the home country’s workforce... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Migration of unskilled workers; Human capital formation; Depletion of human capital; Labor and Human Capital; F22; J24; O15. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122433 |
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| Stark, Oded; Fan, C. Simon. |
| Quite often, migrants appear to exert little effort to absorb the mainstream culture and to learn the language of their host society, even though the economic returns (increased productivity and enhanced earnings) to assimilation are high. We show that when interpersonal comparisons affect individuals' wellbeing and when a more intensive assimilation results in migrants' comparing themselves more with the richer natives and less with fellow migrants, then the effort extended to assimilate will be muted. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7125 |
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| Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A.. |
| Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father’s neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the “span of information.” It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Span of interaction; Span of information; Imitation; Social welfare; Community/Rural/Urban Development; D83; R12; O4. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49924 |
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| Rosenzweig, Mark R.; Stark, Oded. |
| Migration in India, particularly in rural areas, is dominated by the movements of women for the purpose of marriage. We seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among Indian households. In particular, we hypothesize that the marrying out of daughters to locationally distant, dispersed yet kinship-related households, are manifestations of implicit inter-household contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks. Analysis of longitudinal South Indian village data lends support to the hypothesis. Marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 1987 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7515 |
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| Stark, Oded. |
| We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from playing a single-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Individuals who are hardwired as cooperators or defectors are randomly matched into pairs, and cooperators are able to perfectly find out the type of a partner to a game by incurring a recognition cost. We show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators relates negatively to the population's level of wealth. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18763 |
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| Stark, Oded; Falk, Ita. |
| We study the joint role of altruism and impatience, and the impact of evolution in the formation of long-term time preferences and in the determination of optimal consumption and optimal bequests. We show how the consumption paths of dynasties relate to altruism and to impatience, and we reason that long-lived dynasties will be characterized by a higher degree of altruism and a lower degree of impatience than short-lived dynasties. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18749 |
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| Stark, Oded; Hyll, Walter; Wang, Yong. |
| This paper considers a setting in which the acquisition of human capital entails a change of location in social space that causes individuals to revise their comparison groups. Skill levels are viewed as occupational groups, and moving up the skill ladder by acquiring additional human capital, which in itself is rewarding, leads to a shift in the individual’s inclination to compare himself with a different, and on average better-paid, comparison group, which in itself is penalizing. The paper sheds new light on the dynamics of human capital formation, and suggests novel policy interventions to encourage human capital formation in the aggregate and, at the same time, reduce inter-group income inequality. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Human capital formation; Skill levels as occupational groups; Interpersonal comparisons; Relative deprivation; Tax policy; Subsidization; Labor and Human Capital; D11; H24; H30; J24. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99415 |
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| Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A.. |
| Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction." Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma "rule of engagement." A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his m/2 neighbors to the left, and with his m/2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Local interaction; Span of interaction; Imitation; Cooperation; Social welfare; Farm Management; D83; R12; O4. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94280 |
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| Stark, Oded; Fan, C. Simon. |
| This paper provides a novel explanation of "educated unemployment," which is a salient feature of the labor markets in a number of developing countries. In a simple job-search framework we show that "educated unemployment" is caused by the perspective of international migration, that is, by the possibility of a "brain drain." In addition, the analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemployment. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7126 |
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| Stark, Oded; Fan, C. Simon. |
| This paper synthesizes and extends recent research on "The New Economics of the Brain Drain." In a unified framework, the paper shows that while recently identified adverse repercussions of the brain drain exacerbate the long-recognized negative impacts of the brain drain, longer-term consequences turn the brain drain into the harbinger of powerful gains. These gains have been studied already in recent research, or merit attention in future research. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7121 |
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| Cox, Donald; Stark, Oded. |
| It is argued that parents provide help with housing downpayments in order to encourage the production of grandchildren, and that such a subsidization emanates from the "demonstration effect:" a child's propensity to furnish parents with attention and care can be conditioned by parental example. Parents who desire such transfers in the future have an incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate preferences in their children. This generates a derived demand for grandchildren since potential grandparents will be treated better by their adult children if the latter have their own children to whom to demonstrate the appropriate behavior. Empirical work indicates behavior consistent with subsidization of the production of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18751 |
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| Stark, Oded. |
| Although the phenomenon of refugee flows is not devoid of economic connotations, it has so far been investigated primarily by political scientists and sociologists. The analytical tools of economic inquiry have not yet been applied to this subject, although it stands to reason that such a study will contribute to our understanding of why refugee flows occur and will guide the policy response. This note illustrates how economic analysis can be brought to bear on three key aspects of refugee flows: fear, poverty, and group movement. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18757 |
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| Registros recuperados: 34 | |
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