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| Stoneham, Gary; Chaudhri, Vivek; Ha, Arthur; Strappazzon, Loris. |
| The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and government. The present paper describes the key elements of auction and contract design employed and the results obtained from a pilot auction of conservation contracts run in two regions of Victoria. The pilot demonstrated that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. The present paper compares a... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118151 |
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| Ha, Arthur; Dyack, Brenda; Stoneham, Gary; Farquharson, Robert J.; Scarborough, Helen; Duke, Charlotte; Wheeler, Sarah Ann; Saunders, Caroline M.; Nicholls, Neville; Essex, Christopher; McKitrick, Ross. |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118506 |
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| Eigenraam, Mark; Strappazzon, Loris; Lansdell, Nicola; Beverly, Craig; Stoneham, Gary. |
| This paper reports on a Catchment Modelling Framework (CMF) designed to support an Australian pilot of an auction for multiple environmental outcomes EcoTender. The CMF is used to estimate multiple environmental outcomes including carbon, terrestrial biodiversity, aquatic function (water quality and quantity) and saline land area. This information was previously unavailable for application to environmental markets. This is the first time a market-based policy has been fully integrated from desk to field with a Catchment Modelling Framework for the purchase of multiple outcomes. This framework solves the unknown information problem of linking paddock scale landuse and management to catchment-scale environmental outcomes. The framework provides the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25673 |
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| Lansdell, Nicola; Stoneham, Gary. |
| Most markets have evolved as buyers and sellers constantly search for ways to create value, however this has not occurred naturally in all areas of the economy markets are missing for some goods, including the environment. In such cases, transaction costs linked to property rights, asymmetric and hidden information and packaging problems have often prevented otherwise valuable deals from being negotiated in relation to the environment. However new capabilities and a better knowledge and understanding of the problems at hand now mean that where the objective is clear, and the knowledge, skills and capability exist to understand, model and measure the relevant characteristics of the problem transaction costs are low enough that economists can, in certain... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Transaction Costs; Property Rights; Asymmetric and Private Information; Public Goods; Government Policy; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25743 |
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| Strappazzon, Loris; Ha, Arthur; Eigenraam, Mark; Duke, Charlotte; Stoneham, Gary. |
| The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency – acting on behalf of the community – employs an auction‐based mechanism to buy biodiversity services from farmers. However, farmers’ production of biodiversity produces a second good as a by‐product (e.g., mitigation of a river pollutant) that is valued by point‐source emitters who are engaged in a pollution trading market. The efficiency implications of allocating the property right of the good, mitigation, to either the agency or farmers are analysed. If the agency owns the mitigation then the agency can sell mitigation to point‐source emitters,... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116171 |
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