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Registros recuperados: 18
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A multiple equilibria model with intrafirm bargaining and matching frictions Inra
Beugnot, J.; Tidball, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
In this paper, we combine a matching model derived from Pissarides (2000) in the case of large firms with monopolistic competition on the product market and the model of intrafirm bargaining à la Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Moreover, we allow for increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production function leading to multiple equilibria. Then, we study the dynamics of such a framework for various size of returns to scale and propose numerical simulations. Finally, we show how the dynamical properties are altered in the case of multiple equilibria compared to that of a unique equilibrium and illustrate the issues of economic policy design in presence of multiple equilibria.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: EQUILIBRE MATCHING FRICTIONS; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; INTRAFIRRM BARGAINING; MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA; ECONOMIC POLICY.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20104aceb441&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/02/
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Between full and non cooperation in the extraction of a natural resource Inra
Querou, N.; Tidball, M.; GERAD, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherche en Analyse des Décisions (CAN); Czech Society for Operational Research in Cooperation (CZE).
We re-consider the problem of the great fish war developed by Levahri and Mirman when the information is incomplete and agents can form simple beliefs about the other's behavior. Beliefs must be consistent with observed actions. We derive the closed form expressions of the optimal policies, determine the steady state of the dynamics of fish population in our dynamic game, and compare it from an economic and environmental points of view to the non cooperative and cooperative cases. We study the conditions where our results lie in between both cases, and the implications of these findings.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: THEORIE DES JEUX; GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES; JEUX DYNAMIQUES; GESTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2008c6e14904&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
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Changement technologique et régulation environnementale : une approche en information imparfaite Inra
Lavail, E.; Salles, J.M.; Tidball, M.; Université Paris 1 (FRA).
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: QUALITE ENVIRONNEMENTALE; CHANGEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE; REGULATION ENVIRONNEMENTALE.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010dc5ea87b&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/10/
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Comparaison de deux systèmes de tarification de l'eau à usage agricole avec réservation et consommation Inra
SIDIBE, Y.; Terreaux, J.P.; Tidball, M.; Reynaud, A.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Dans cet article, nous comparons les propriétés de deux systèmes de tarification de l’eau d’irrigation en s’inspirant de systèmes de gestion employés par des Compagnies de gestion d’eau en France, la Compagnie d'Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne (CACG) d'une part et la Compagnie (CAEDS) d'autre part. La modélisation utilise un couplage d’un modèle agronomique de croissance de plante (STICS) avec un modèle d’optimisation du comportement des agriculteurs en univers incertain. Sur des données de la région Midi-Pyrénées, nous comparons ces systèmes tarifaires selon les critères de consommation d’eau, de valeur de la production agricole, du profit de l’agriculteur et des recettes du gestionnaire. L’étude des propriétés fait ressortir que le système de...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: CLIMATIC RISK; RISK AVERSION; DROUGHT; PRICING; IRRIGATION WATER. ALEA CLIMATIQUE; AVERSION AU RISQUE; TARIFICATION; EAU D’IRRIGATION.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2011ba5184aa&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Consistent conjunctures in a dynamic model of non-renewable resource management Inra
Querou, N.; Tidball, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
We consider a dynamic model of non-renewable resource extraction under the assumption that players do not know their opponents' utility functions. Agents form conjectures on the behavior of others. Two forms of beliefs are introduced, namely, beliefs based on the state of the resource, and beliefs based on the state of the resource and on the strategy of other agents (their consumption). We focus on consistent equilibria, where states corresponding to the players' beliefs must be consistent with observed past plays. Closed form expressions of the optimal consumption plans and of the state dynamics are derived. Comparisons are made with the full information benchmark case. It is proved that, depending on the initial consumption levels, the present process...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: THÉORIE DES JEUX; JEUX DYNAMIQUES.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20105aad080b&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/03/
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Cyclical versus non-cyclical harvesting policies in renewable resource economics Inra
Erdlenbruch, K.; Jean-Marie, A.; Moreaux, M.; Tidball, M.; EAERE, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (ITA).
In this paper, we explore the link between cyclical and non-cyclical resource exploitation. As already shown (Wirl 1995) in the context of a two state-variable continuous control model, the form of the cost function is essential to explain the cyclical or non-cyclical nature of optimal solutions. We base our analysis on a one-state variable case. We present an impulse control model and study the impact of different cost functions on the type of solution. We show that the optimal harvesting behaviour derived from this model can either be cyclical or converge to a Most Rapid Approach Path solution, like the one in Clark's continuous control model (Clark 1990). We finally discuss the origin of the cost functions we studied and show that there are empirical...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: OPTIMAL CONTROL; IMPULSE CONTROL; HARVEST COST FUNCTION.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2008434c5791&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/08/
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Cyclical versus Non-Cyclical Harvesting Policies in Renewable Resource Management Inra
Erdlenbruch, K.; Jean-Marie, A; Moreaux, M.; Tidball, M.; ETH, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Center of Economics Research (CHE).
In this paper, we explore the link between cyclical and non-cyclical resource exploitation. We define an impulse control framework and show that the optimal harvesting behavior derived from this model can either be cyclical or a Most Rapid Approach Path. For the cyclical solution, we etablished a link between our impulse control framework and the discrete time model by David & Kopel. For the Most Rapid Approach solution, we shoxw the relation to Clark's continuous control model. Our model is general enough to admit convex and concave revenue functions. Using different harvest cost functions proposed in the literature, we show that particular functional forms of harvest costs may be at the origin of cyclical or non-cyclical solutions.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: ECONOMIE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT CONTROLE OPTIMAL; COUT OPTIMAL CONTROL; IMPULSE CONTROL; HARVEST COST CONTROL.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20095eb38595&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
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Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization Inra
Claude, D.; Tidball, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms’ production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm’s ownership status.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: JEU DIFFERENTIEL.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20106a4a6c10&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/08/
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Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization Inra
Claude, D.; Tidball, M..
This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms’ production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm’s ownership status.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: POLITIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT; FIRME.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201195cda115&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Efficient agri-environmental policy design for jointly produced multiple environmental goods Inra
Havlik, P.; Tidball, M.; Boisson, J.M.; Jacquet, F.; AES, Agricultural Economics Society (GBR).
This paper focuses on environmental goods production when contracted by means of agrienvironmental agreements. It is explicitly accounted for jointness among environmental goods and for heterogeneity among farms. Two different types of agri-environmental programmes are considered: 1) part farm programmes, which give to the farmer the liberty to subscribe only a part of the eligible land, and 2) whole farm programmes, which explicitly ask for involving of all the land. Applicability of menus of contracts designed to deal with the adverse selection problem in the Principal-Agent framework is analysed using a general quadratic multi-output cost function. Obtained results are compared with the uniform payment contract option. It is proved that in some cases...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: BIENS ENVIRONNEMENTAUX; JOINTURE; SELECTION ADVERSE.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20077ff30720&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2007/05/
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How to use Rosen’s normalised equilibrium to enforce a socially desirable Pareto efficient solution Inra
Krawczyk, J.B.; Tidball, M.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a complex good created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of outputs that generate the constrained amount of the externality can be computed as a Pareto efficient solution of the agents' joint utility maximisation problem. However, generically, a Pareto efficient solution is not an equilibrium. We suggest the regulator calculates a Nash-Rosen coupled-constraint equilibrium (or a “generalised” Nash equilibrium) and uses the coupled-constraint Lagrange multiplier to formulate a threat, under which the agents will play a decoupled Nash game. An equilibrium of this game will possibly coincide with the Pareto efficient solution. We focus on situations...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: EQUILIBRE DE NASH; CONTRAINTE COUPLED CONSTRAINTS; GENERALISED NASH EQUILIBIUM; PARETO EFFICIENT SOLUTION.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010feb0ebdd&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/02/
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Information revelation through irrigation water pricing using volume reservations Inra
Tidball, M.; Terreaux, J.P.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
We study the properties of a pricing rule for irrigation water with two variables: the volume consumed by the farmer and the volume he/she reserves before the plantation. With a simple deterministic model, we show how this pricing rule allows the Water User Association manager to anticipate any possible usage conflict thanks to farmer information revelation, to guarantee his/her association budget equilibrium. We show too how farmers are incited to restrain their use of water. Moreover this pricing method is fair (all farmers are equally treated), flexible through the possible change of the value of the parameters, and moreover simple and easily understandable (when for example translated in a double entry table). Therefore, it compares favorably to other...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: TARIFICATION DE L'EAU; IRRIGATION WATER; IRRIGATION; ECONOMICS; PRICE.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20098453d87d&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/03/
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On the implication of environmental policy on growth in an OLG model with pollution permits and potential irreversible pollution Inra
Jean-Marie, A.; Prieur, F.; Tidball, M.; EAERE, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (ITA).
We consider an OLG model with emissions arising from production and potential irreversible pollution. Pollution control goes through a system of permits and private agents can also maintain the environment. In this setting, we prove that there exist multiple equilibria. Due to the possible irreversibility, the economy can be dragged into both stationary and asymptotic poverty traps. First, we show that choosing a global quota on emissions at the lowest level beyond a critical threshold is a mean to avoid the two types of traps. Next, we analyze the impact of a political reform on the other equilibria. When the agents do not engage in maintenance, a fall in the quota implies a reduction of pollution but is detrimental to capital accumulation while, in the...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: PERMIS D'EMISSIONS; DEGRADATION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT; TRAPPE DE PAUVRETE; CROISSANCE OPTIMALE; MODELE DE GENERATIONS IMBRIQUEES.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2008674e4d7&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
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Optimality of impulse harvesting policies Inra
Erdlenbruch, K.; Jean-Marie, A.; Moreaux, M.; Tidball, M.; IDEI, Institut d'Economie Industrielle (FRA).
We explore the link between cyclical and smooth resource exploitation. We define an impulse control framework which can generate both cyclical solutions and steady state solutions. For the cyclical solution, we establish a link with the discrete-time model by Dawid and Kopel. For the steady state solution, we explore the relation to Clark's continuous control model. Our model can admit convex and concave profit functions and allows the integration of different stock dependent cost functions. We show that the strict convexity of the profit function is only a special case of a more general condition, related to submodularity, that ensures the existence of optimal cyclical policies.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: CONTROLE OPTIMAL; ECONOMIE DES RESSOURCES; ECONOMIE DES RESSOURCES RENOUVELABLES OPTIMAL CONTROL; IMPULSE CONTROL; RENEWABLE RESOURCE ECONOMICS SUBMODULARITY.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2010f144608d&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/03/
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Tarification différentielle de l’eau d’irrigation en cas de ressource aléatoire Inra
Sidibe, Y.; Terreaux, J.P.; Tidball, M..
Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle de tarification pour gérer l’allocation de l’eau d’irrigation en cas d’aléas sur la disponibilité de la ressource. La méthode proposée s’appuie sur une tarification différentielle de l’eau selon le niveau de sécurité de disponibilité. Nous montrons à l’aide de différents critères économiques qu’une telle tarification est plus performante qu’une tarification linéaire en cas de ressource aléatoire. Avec différents scénarios, selon les priorités des gestionnaires de périmètre, nous présentons comment ce mode de tarification peut contribuer à l’atteinte des objectifs de la Directives Cadre sur l’Eau. Les résultats sont ensuite illustrés par un exemple avec des données empiriques et des simulations numériques. Cette...
Tipo: Conference Paper Palavras-chave: TARIFICATION DE L'EAU; EAU D'IRRIGATION; ALEAS DE RESSOURCE; EFFICIENCE; COUVERTURE BUDGETAIRE.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2011704224f3&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/04/
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The MBR social welfare criterion meets Rawls' view of intergenerational equity Inra
Figuieres, C.; Van Long, N.; Tidball, M.; AERE, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (USA); EAERE, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (ITA).
In this paper we further explore the properties of the Mixed Bentham- Rawls (MBR) criterion for intergenerational justice that was introduced in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009). In a simple economy with a nat- ural resource, cast in discrete time, we study the problem to .nd the best exploitation policy under the MBR criterion. We .nd out su¢ cient condi- tions for optimality, that complements the necessary .rst order conditions o¤ered in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009). Then, we retain a speci.ed version of the model in which we compute the optimal path and shed light on the consequences of using this criterion from the point of view of eq- uity between generations. Interestingly enough, the best program under the MBR criterion shows a pattern of...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: ÉQUITÉ; JUSTICE INTERGENERATIONNELLE.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201027f254e1&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2011/02/
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The Renewable Resource Management Nexus : Impulse versus Continuous Harvesting Policies Inra
Jean-Marie, A.; Tidball, M.; Moreaux, M.; Erdlenbruch, K.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
We explore the link between cyclical and smooth resource exploitation. We define an impulse control framework which can generate both cyclical solutions and steady state solutions. For the cyclical solution, we establish a link with the discrete-time model by Dawid and Kopel. For the steady state solution, we explore the relation to Clark's continuous control model. Our model can admit convex and concave profit functions and allows the integration of different stock dependent cost functions. We show that the strict convexity of the profit function is only a special case of a more general condition, related to submodularity, that ensures the existence of optimal cyclical policies.
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: RESSOURCE RENOUVELABLE; GESTION DES RESSOURCES; EXPLOITATION DES RESSOURCES OPTIMAL CONTROL; IMPULSE CONTROL; RENEWABLE RESOURCE ECONOMICS; SUBMODULARITY.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20098022f70a&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/08/
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Water sharing among competing farmers in temperate climate: a study of different pricing mechanisms Inra
Terreaux, J.P.; Tidball, M.; IWRA, International Water Resources Association (ZAF).
Irrigation is one of the principal water uses in temperate countries, as in France. Limiting some consumption of this natural resource by the agricultural sector is therefore one of the more undisputed environmental problems. Moreover a better use of the water resource by farmers is now an explicit aim of the French Agriculture Ministry. Sharing a limited resource to optimize its use may be done using different tools, but it is all the more complicated in France that the resource legally does not belong to anybody. A lot of tools have been long documented in the literature, and sometime used, too much often without much success. But once recognized that "Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good»...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: TARIFICATION DE L'EAU; INSTRUMENT ECONOMIQUE; ECONOMETRIE; ECONOMIE; EAU; PRIX; THEORIE DES JEUX ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; WATER; PRICING.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009815d0b75&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2009/01/
Registros recuperados: 18
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