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| Registros recuperados: 13 | |
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| Vercammen, James. |
| A stochastic dynamic programming model is used to compare the farmland investment impact of a fully decoupled direct payment and a standard price subsidy. The direct payment induces the farmer to invest because it lowers the farm's debt to asset ratio, which in turn reduces the probability of bankruptcy. The value of the real option to defer the investment decision is lower with a lower risk of bankruptcy, and thus the direct payment results in a higher probability of immediate investment. Simulation results demonstrate that for a farm facing moderate revenue and land price variability, the impact of a decoupled direct payment on farm investment is nearly as large as the investment impact of an equal-sized price subsidy. These results suggest that... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; International Development. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15847 |
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| Vercammen, James. |
| Over the past decade, Canada’s organic food industry has focused on the production of organic grains, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables and a limited amount of organic dairy products. Canadian organic grains and oilseeds are mostly destined for export, whereas Canadian organic fruits and vegetables and dairy products are mostly consumed domestically. With the exception of dairy products and a few other products such as breakfast cereal and fruit juice, Canadian companies have been mostly absent from the rapidly growing markets for processed organic foods. The extent to which these markets are currently being penetrated by Canadian organic food manufacturers and the size of the price premiums earned by these companies are worthy of investigation. Very little... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45742 |
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| Bontems, Philippe; Vercammen, James. |
| The purpose of the paper is to theoretically examine the welfare implications of public sector involvement in agricultural biotechnology R&D. The model assumes that firms (either a private duopoly consisting of a pair of for-profit firms or a mixed duopoly consisting of one for-profit firm and one public firm) compete in a winner-take-all patent race that is subject to R&D spillovers. Unlike previous research, spillovers are explicitly incorporated into the race, and the size of the prize that accrues to the winner, as well as the size of the ex post social surplus, is contingent on whether or not the public firm participates in the stage two product market. The welfare results concerning the implication of public sector involvement in the R&D... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21367 |
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| Fulton, Murray E.; Vercammen, James. |
| The traditional pricing mechanism examined in the economic literature on cooperatives is uniform (or linear) pricing. The conclusion of the literature is that uniform pricing mechanisms will often give rise to economic inefficiencies. These inefficiencies emerge when the cooperative is operating in a region of either increasing average cost or decreasing average cost. The reason for these inefficiencies is that uniform pricing schemes cannot allocate the profits or losses of a cooperative among its members without distorting the decisions members make. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of non-uniform pricing in generating efficient outcomes and to examine the distributional effects of simple non-uniform pricing schemes. Although the focus of... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46182 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| In this paper we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon offset contracts; Greenhouse gas policy; Soil carbon; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Q200; Q580. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37027 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| In this paper we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15843 |
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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient? In this paper we construct a model that embodies common characteristics of resource contracts. Using this model, we analyze a large class of real-world resource contracts and find them to be economically inefficient. This inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency inherent in these contracts. There are two possible ways to overcome this time inconsistency. The first is to employ a sufficiently large penalty for early termination of the contract. The second and possibly easier method is to offer an upward sloping conservation payment schedule so far overlooked by resource contracts. Under this payment schedule, the agent's ex-ante and ex-post contract choices coincide, social... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15838 |
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| Vercammen, James. |
| A tax on fuel is one of the primary mechanisms for reducing truck transport externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions, road damage, congestion, and accidents. The economic efficiency properties of a fuel tax are examined for the farm-to-elevator grain trucking sector--a sector for which the road damage externality is often severe. Because trucking volumes cumulate more rapidly near the delivery points, marginal external cost is generally not proportional to distance. Further, noncompetitive FOB pricing by grain buyers implies that road tax discounts to offset price markups should be independent of location. In both cases, a fuel tax is not capable of efficiently addressing the externality. With discriminatory pricing by buyers, "cross-hauling"... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31047 |
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| Swinnen, Johan F.M.; Vercammen, James. |
| The relationship between price uncertainty and specific investment is examined in a dynamic model that integrates the theories of real options and investment holdup. Because of weak contract enforcement, bilateral firms cannot use a contract to govern their bilateral investment and exchange relationship. These firms instead rely on an implicit self-enforcing agreement, and they reduce the investment distortion by negotiating an ex ante transfer (i.e., the investment expense of one firm is partially paid for by the other firm). In the absence of uncertainty, the ex ante transfer ensures that investment hold-up is fully eliminated. Our main result is that uncertainty introduces an inefficiency into the ex ante transfer bargaining game, which in turn... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21044 |
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| Registros recuperados: 13 | |
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