|
|
|
| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
|
| |
|
|
| Cai, Xiaowei; Stiegert, Kyle W.. |
| Cartel operations still exist worldwide despite the recent development and enforcement of antitrust laws in scores of countries that previously had no such legal framework. Since 1990, 283 international cartels were discovered by antitrust authorities around the world (Connor 2003). According to a 1990s' sample of U.S. Department of Justice and European Commission prosecuted cases, the discovered cartels operated in a wide variety of industries such as chemicals, metals, paper products, transportation, communication, food, textiles and services (OECD 2002). Were it not for the efforts to deter cartels by the antitrust agencies, there would likely have been many more such arrangements (Connor 2005). The presence and societal impacts of domestic and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cartel; Dissolution; Antitrust; Market Uncertainty; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61297 |
| |
|
|
| Koopmann, Georg. |
| In most countries, competition in the telecommunications industry is subject to both sector-specific regulation and more general antitrust policies. At the same time, a process of international market liberalisation is under way in telecommunications which can only be truly effective - and further advance - if appropriate competitive safeguards are in place. Trading partners should agree on certain minimum standards to be observed in this area in order to better combat anticompetitive conduct and avoid international conflicts. The Reference Paper to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is an important step in this direction and may also serve as a model for other network industries. It is a framework of rules which has to be filled with concrete... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regulation; Antitrust; Trade Negotiations; Services; International Relations/Trade; F13; L40; L50; L89. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26230 |
| |
|
|
| Coatney, Kalyn T.; Tack, Jesse B.. |
| The goal of our analysis is to enhance the understanding of the value of antitrust regulatory activities, specifically the impact of investigations of anticompetitive behavior. The results suggest that prices significantly increased as soon as the targets of the investigation were made aware they were being investigated. Higher prices are suggestive of a more competitive market outcome, which in turn suggests that the benefits of an investigation begin accruing immediately upon awareness by the offending party. The higher prices remained as long as the investigation was open. After the investigation was closed, market prices systematically declined to the same low pre-knowledge state. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Antitrust; Auctions; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; K42; D44; C23. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103548 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Harl, Neil E.. |
| Dramatic increases in concentration in the seed business, coupled with aggressive efforts to vertically integrate the agricultural sector and to institute contract-based production of commodities, have raised questions about the economic position of producers. Disparate positions of market power by highly concentrated input suppliers on the one hand (particularly seed suppliers because of control over germ plasm and a monopoly position over seed varieties through plant patents or plant variety protection certificates), and producers in nearly perfect competition on the other, suggest that the revenue division from production is likely to be redefined in favor of the party with the greater market and economic power. Possible solutions include aggressive... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agriculture; Antitrust; Barriers to entry; Collective action; Concentration; Contract; Seed; Vertical integration; Farm Management; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14701 |
| |
|
|
| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Competition policy has become more prominent while the thinking underlying those policies has undergone substantial revision. We survey advances in antitrust economics and the economics of regulation. Increasing reliance on non-cooperative game theory as a foundation for antitrust has led to rethinking conventional approaches. We review some of these contributions in the context of mergers, vertical restraints, and competition in "network industries." Turning to regulation, we review standard rationales and identify some major contemporary refinements, with examples of the motives behind them and their application. After brief thoughts on privatization, we conclude with suggestions on design and implementation, with some observations on whether these... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Antitrust; Regulation; Competition policy; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10716 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
|
|
|
