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	Provedor de dados 31 (42) Autor Karp, Larry S. (9) Zhang, Jiangfeng (4) Hirschauer, Norbert (3) Babcock, Bruce A. (2) Bartolini, Fabio (2) Fischer, Carolyn (2) Gallerani, Vittorio (2) Hoel, Michael (2) Langinier, Corinne (2) Raggi, Meri (2) Tsur, Yacov (2) Viaggi, Davide (2) Zwoll, Stefan (2) de Gorter, Harry (2) Arguedas, C. (1) Benner, Dietrich (1) Black, J. Roy (1) Blackman, Allen (1) Boetoft, Peter (1) Bogetoft, Peter (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Asymmetric information (42) Environmental Economics and Policy (12) D82 (8) Q28 (8) H21 (7) Agribusiness (6) D8 (6) C61 (5) Pollution control (5) Choice of instruments (4) Moral hazard (4) Adverse selection (3) Agricultural and Food Policy (3) Certification (3) Farm Management (3) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (3) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (3) International Relations/Trade (3) Livestock Production/Industries (3) Nonpoint source pollution (3) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (19) Conference Paper or Presentation (11) Journal Article (7) Report (2) Article (1) Thesis or Dissertation (1) Working Paper (1) Mais... Ano 2012 (2) 2011 (2) 2010 (1) 2008 (7) 2007 (2) 2006 (4) 2005 (4) 2004 (7) 2003 (2) 2002 (2) 2001 (4) 2000 (3) 1999 (1) 1998 (1) Mais... País United States (42) Idioma Inglês (42)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 42 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última A Model of Producer Incentives for Livestock Disease Management 31 Ranjan, Ram; Lubowski, Ruben N.. We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Asymmetric information; Reporting; Indemnities; Risk management; Livestock Production/Industries; C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15653 Agricultural Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Implications 31 Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18606 An Information Economic Rationale for Cooperatives 31 Boetoft, Peter. We consider how to organize the processing and marketing of an agricultural product when farming costs are known only by the individual farmers. We show that when marginal costs are un-correlated, the market for nal goods is competitive, and the market for processing is non-competitive, the socially optimal production levels are sustained by a cooperative and a cooperative only. We show also that the cooperative form is particularly useful when the cost uncertainty is large and the net average revenue product is small. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Economics of cooperatives; Asymmetric information; Incentives; Rationing; Agribusiness. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24476 An Interdisciplinary Approach to White-collar Crime in the Food Sector 31 Hirschauer, Norbert; Musshoff, Oliver; Scheerer, Sebastian. The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of purchased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through opportunistic behaviour. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers' social contexts - such as values, emotional bonds etc. - that shield them from yielding to economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which combines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theories). The approach is discussed with... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Behavioural food risks; Control theories; Game theory; Moral hazard; Opportunistic malpractice; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; K32; K42. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25688 Asymmetric Information in the Market for Yield and Revenue Insurance Products 31 Makki, Shiva S.; Somwaru, Agapi. This report analyzes farmers' choice of crop insurance contracts and tests for the presence of asymmetric information in the market for multiple yield and revenue insurance products. Farmers' risk characteristics, their level of income, and the cost of insurance significantly affect their choices of yield and revenue insurance products as well as their selections of alternative coverage levels. Empirical analysis indicates that, in the presence of asymmetric information, high-risk farmers are more likely to select revenue insurance contracts and higher coverage levels. The results also indicate that premium rates do not accurately reflect the likelihood of losses, implying asymmetrical information in the crop insurance market. Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Adverse selection; Crop insurance; Revenue insurance; Risk management; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/33587 Bargaining, Search, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Live Hogs Market 31 Vukina, Tomislav; Zheng, Xiaoyong. Using unique panel data on individual transactions between buyers and sellers in the spot market for live hogs, we found a large degree of intra-day price dispersion. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we offer an explanation which is rooted in the bargaining with search theory. We formulate three hypotheses involving the role of farmers’ search cost, bargaining parties’ patience, and asymmetric information that we believe can explain the observed phenomenon. Empirical analysis shows strong support for all three of the stated theoretical predictions, indicating that the bargaining with search theory explains at least 31 percent of the observed intra-day price variation in this market. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Intra-day price dispersion; Bargaining theory; Search cost; Asymmetric information; Demand and Price Analysis. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95603 Bayesian Learning and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 31 Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. We study the importance of anticipated learning - about both environmental damages and abatement costs - in determining the level and the method of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. We also compare active learning, passive learning, and parameter uncertainty without learning. Current beliefs about damages and abatement costs have an important effect on the optimal level of emissions, However, the optimal level of emissions is not sensitive either to the possibility of learning about damages. or to the type of learning (active or passive), Taxes dominate quotas, but by a small margin. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate change; Uncertainty; Bayesian learning; Asymmetric information; Choice of instruments; Dynamic optimization; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Cll; C6l; D8; H2l; Q28. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6214 Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information 31 Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng. Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25071 Determining Project-Based Emissions Baselines with Incomplete Information 31 Fischer, Carolyn. Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary. Evaluating reductions requires assigning a baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns. Parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for baseline determination may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Clean Development Mechanism; Baseline emissions; Asymmetric information; Environmental Economics and Policy; D8; Q4. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10520 Dynamic Quotas with Learning 31 Karp, Larry S.; Costello, Christopher. We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Quotas; Asymmetric information; Searching; International Relations/Trade; D83; L50. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6245 Dynamic regulation of nonpoint source pollution when the number of emitters is large 31 Tsur, Yacov; de Gorter, Harry. When a nonpoint source pollution process involves many polluters, each taking his own contribution to aggregate pollution to be negligible, ambient-based policies become ineffective due to lack of strategic interactions between dischargers. We offer a regulation mechanism for this case. The mechanism consists of inter-period and intra-period components. The first exploits ambient (aggregate) information to derive the optimal pollution and aggregate emission processes and the ensuing social price of emission. The intra-period mechanism takes as given the social price of emission and implements the optimal output-abatement-emission allocation across the heterogenous, privately informed firms in each time period. The mechanism gives rise to the full... Tipo: Article Palavras-chave: Nonpoint source pollution; Abatement; Stock externality; Dynamic regulation; Markov decision process; Asymmetric information; Crop Production/Industries; C61; D82; H23; L51; Q58. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122124 EFFECTIVENESS OF CROSS-COMPLIANCE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND DIFFERENTIATED COMPLIANCE CONSTRAINTS 31 Raggi, Meri; Bartolini, Fabio; Gallerani, Vittorio; Viaggi, Davide. The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate policy mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to present a framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric information with the option of differentiating commitments across farmers. The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. The profitability of the choice of compliance/non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of single farm payment entitlements compared with the total... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Asymmetric information; Single farm payment; Farm Management. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44151 FOOD SAFETY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EVIDENCE FROM THE MEAT INDUSTRY 31 Golan, Elise H.; Roberts, Tanya; Salay, Elisabete; Caswell, Julie A.; Ollinger, Michael; Moore, Danna L.. Recent industry innovations improving the safety of the Nation's meat supply range from new pathogen tests, high-tech equipment, and supply chain management systems, to new surveillance networks. Despite these and other improvements, the market incentives that motivate private firms to invest in innovation seem to be fairly weak. Results from an ERS survey of U.S. meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants and two case studies of innovation in the U.S. beef industry reveal that the industry has developed a number of mechanisms to overcome that weakness and to stimulate investment in food safety innovation. Industry experience suggests that government policy can increase food safety innovation by reducing informational asymmetries and strengthening... Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Food safety; Innovation; Meat; Asymmetric information; Beef Steam Pasteurization System; Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/34083 Green industrial policy: trade and theory 31 Karp, Larry S.; Stevenson, Megan. This paper studies the reality and the potential for green industrial policy. We provide a summary of the green industrial policies, broadly understood, for five countries. We then consider the relation between green industrial policies and trade disputes, emphasizing the Brazil-US dispute involving ethanol and the broader US-China dispute. The theory of public policy provides many lessons for green industrial policy. We select four of these lessons, involving the Green Paradox, the choice of quantities versus prices with endogenous investment, the coordination issues arising from emissions control, and the ability of green industrial policies to promote cooperation in reducing a global public bad like carbon emissions. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Green industrial policy; Trade conflicts; Green paradox; Asymmetric information; Coordination games; Participation games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; F13; F18; H21; H23. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123637 Green payment programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs 31 Arguedas, C.; Meijerink, Gerdien W.; van Soest, Daan P.. Many conservation programs offer financial compensation to farmers in exchange for socially desired services, such as soil conservation or biodiversity protection. Realization of the conservation objective at minimum cost requires payments to just cover the extra costs incurred by each individual (type of) farmer. In the presence of information asymmetries regarding costs, incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but these typically only provide partial improvement because of several distortions. We argue that these distortions are inevitable only if all conservation costs are variable in nature. If there are fixed costs too, we find that the least-cost solution can be incentive compatible. We identify the exact... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Environmental benefits; Mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44320 GREEN PAYMENTS AND DUAL POLICY GOALS 31 Feng, Hongli. Replaced with revised version of paper 07/27/07 Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Cost effect; Green payments; Income support; Information rent; Mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18550 If You Can't Trust the Farmer, Who Can You Trust? The Effect of Certification Types on Purchases of Organic Produce 31 Ward, Ruby A.; Hunnicutt, Lynn; Keith, John E.. An information asymmetry exists in the market for organic produce since consumers cannot determine whether produce is organically or conventionally grown. Various methods may solve this problem including signaling, reputation, and certification. Signaling and reputation may not work well, because signals are noisy, and reputation may be difficult for a producer to establish. Certification of the farm and its growing methods shows the most promise. A survey instrument testing the efficacy of certification is presented along with empirical analysis suggesting that no notable difference existed between independent certification methods, although independent certification had significantly different effects than self-certification. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Ordered probit; Organic produce; Agribusiness. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8145 Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market 31 Castriota, Stefano; Delmastro, Marco. The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the universe of wineries located in four regions of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Reputation; Credibility; Asymmetric information; Quality standards; Industrial Organization; L14; L15. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45504 Information Asymmetry and the Problem of Transfers in Trade Negotiations and International Agencies 31 Hamada, Koichi; Sunder, Shyam. This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations. We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a transfer process uses up additional resources. The difficulty of making transfers renders it less likely that a nation would find it individually rational to participate as a member of an international institution. Costly transfers render the internal and international adjustment difficult, and serve as a barrier to trade liberalization. Costly international transfers harden the resistance against trade liberalization in the (potentially) recipient country and... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International trade; Tariff negotiation; Asymmetric information; Transfer; WTO; Common agency; Two-level game; International Relations/Trade; O82; F13; H21; H71; H77. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28490 Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects 31 Zago, Angelo M.; Pick, Daniel H.. This study considers the welfare impact of labeling policies of agricultural commodities with specific characteristics. Using a model of vertical differentiation, the effects on equilibrium and welfare levels are calculated. The introduction of the regulation and the emergence of two differentiated competitive markets leaves consumers and high-quality producers better off, while low-quality producers are worse off. With high costs and low quality differences, the total welfare impact of the regulation can be negative. Findings show that when high-quality producers can exercise market power, the regulation could be more easily accepted by producers, but it would have a negative effect on consumers. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Food markets; Labeling; Market power; Vertical differentiation; Welfare effects; Agricultural and Food Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31143 Registros recuperados: 42 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última

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