SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.

We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.

An American BSE Crisis: Has it affected the Value of Traceability and Country-of-Origin Certifications for US and Canadian Beef?

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885

Ward, Ruby A.; Bailey, DeeVon; Jensen, Robert T..

With a BSE incident in the United States (US) in December of 2003, questions arose about the effect of the incident on consumers in the US. The purpose of this paper is to determine if traceability systems for beef can help preserve consumer demand following the discovery of BSE. Auctions were conducted approximately 3 weeks before and after the December 2003 BSE incident in the U.S It was found that overall there was no effect on the size of the bribes needed by the BSE incidence. However, for some groups there were important changes. The results indicate that information about traceability and country of origin is valuable to consumers. They also suggest that greater uncertainty about certifications and assurances for beef existed among the participants...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: BSE; Traceability; Country-of-origin; Beef market; Auctions; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Livestock Production/Industries.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8160

An Iterative Auction for Spatially Contiguous Land Management: An Experimental Analysis

Banerjee, Simanti; Shortle, James S.; Kwasnica, Anthony M..

Tackling the problem of ecosystem services degradation is an important policy challenge. Different types of economic instruments have been employed by conservation agencies to meet this challenge. Notable among them are Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes that pay private landowners to change land uses to pro-environmental ones on their properties. This paper focuses on a PES scheme – an auction for the cost-efficient disbursal of government funds for selection of spatially contiguous land management projects. The auction is structured as an iterative descending price auction where every bid is evaluated on the basis of a scoring metric – a benefit cost ratio. The ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency of the auction is tested with data...

Assessing local action groups and auctions as institutional alternatives for designing and implementing agri-environmental measures in the EU – results from an expert survey

Palavras-chave: Ecosystem Services; Economic experiments; Auctions; Spatial contiguity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103220

Eggers, Jorg; Mettepenningen, Evy; Beckmann, Volker.

The new European Council Regulation on support for rural development (EC) No. 1698/2005 has opened up the opportunity for two important innovations for the design and implementation of agrienvironmental measures: local action groups (LAG) according to the LEADER approach and calls for tender. The article firstly reviews the political and scientific debate on the possible performance of these innovations and, secondly, analyses how agents in public administrations, private associations and research institutes assess them. This ex-ante evaluation is based on 279 interviews in nine EU member states, carried out in the context of an EU-research project in the Sixth Framework Programme in 2006. The results show that (1) the performance of LAG is generally rated...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: European agri-environmental policy; Decentralisation; Local action groups; Auctions; European Rural Development Policy; European Agricultural Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97702

ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL ACTION GROUPS AND AUCTIONS FOR DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES IN THE EU - RESULTS FROM AN EXPERT SURVEY

Eggers, Jorg; Mettepenningen, Evy; Beckmann, Volker.

In this article the authors focus on two important innovations for agri-environmental measures in the new council regulation: The implementation of local action groups and a call for tenders. The article describes how relevant actors assess the innovations. The results are based on 276 interviews, carried out in 2006 in nine EU Member States. Generally, actors assume that measures designed in local action groups are not necessarily more economically efficient than current measures, but they do have potential to result in a higher ecological effectiveness and in a greater acceptance. However, the opinion on auctions is comparatively critical.

Auction Markets for Specialty Food Products with Geographical Indications

Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental policy; Decentralisation; Local action groups; Auctions; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7584

Schamel, Guenter.

We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we...

Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia

Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Betz, Regina; Seifert, Stefan; Cramton, Peter; Kerr, Suzi.

Allocating permits based on individual historical emissions (‘grandfathering’), or industry benchmark data, is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Free permit allocation has proven complex and inefficient (particularly in the European Union) with distribution implications also politically difficult to justify. For these reasons, auctioning emissions permits has become more popular than allocating permits. The European Union is now moving towards auctioning more than 50 per cent of all permits in 2013. In the US, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has started with auctioning 100 per cent of permits. The Australian proposal for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) also provides for auctioning a significant share of...

Tipo: Report

Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Greenhouse gases; Auctions; Emissions trading; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94878

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate...

AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS

Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar.

This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.

Beurteilung des Milchquotenbörsensystems in Deutschland

Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Auktionen; Ausschreibungsverfahren; Agrar-Umweltverträge; Agrar-Umweltpolitik; Anreizverträge; Experimentelle Ökonomie; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Demand and Price Analysis; Political Economy.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114523

Brümmer, Bernhard; Loy, Jens-Peter; Struve, Carsten.

In this paper the newly established rules for trading milk quotas in Germany are analyzed. These regulations have been in force since April 2000. Following a brief historical review of the quota system, the major changes in economic incentives regarding trading milk and the expected welfare implications are derived. Next, the effects of the new trading rules on quota prices in comparison to a reference system (sealed bid double auction) are discussed. In the empirical part the significance of the theoretical effects is illustrated. Recent changes in the regulations for quota trade are shown to have little effect in terms of mitigating these problems.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Rules for milk quota trading; Auctions; Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97978

Bidding for WIC infant formula contracts: Do non-WIC customers subsidize WIC customers?

Davis, David E..

Although the WIC food assistance program purchases over one-half of all US infant formula, I find the program has little impact on the prices paid by non-WIC customers. I estimate infant-formula marginal cost and find that it is low compared to price, implying large price-cost markups. But, the WIC program is not to blame. Instead large price-cost markups are likely due to customer’s price insensitivity. WIC’s impact on non-WIC customers comes through an increase in sales owing to a WIC “spill-over” effect. The WIC approved brand attains a prominence in the market that makes it a natural choice for non-WIC customers, which makes attaining WIC approval valuable to firms. Firms bid with rebates to attain exclusive WIC approved status which results in...

Bush Tender Participation in First Bidding Round: What are the Characteristics of Rural Landholders who Participated?

Palavras-chave: Price cost margins; WIC; Oligopoly; Food Assistance; Infant Formula; Auctions; Contracts; Consumer/Household Economics; Health Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; L11; L113; I18; D12.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102457

Ha, Arthur; O'Neill, Terry; Strappazzon, Loris; Stoneham, Gary.

In this paper we present results of a statistical analysis of 380 landholders in the North Central and North East regions in Victoria that were interviewed after the first bidding round of the BushTender scheme. This survey asked questions about the economic, attitudinal and demographic factors that influenced their awareness and participation in BushTender. We use logit regression techniques to investigate awareness and participation behaviour of these landholders in BushTender.

Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions

Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Auctions; Logit and tree models; Land Economics/Use.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57882

Buying Fields and Marrying Daughters: An Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village

Davis, David E..

State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123863

Klonner, Stefan.

A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen...

Chapter 06: EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS TO MEASURE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR FOOD SAFETY

Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449

Fox, John A.; Shogren, Jason F.; Hayes, Dermot J.; Kliebenstein, James B..

This book was originally published by Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1995.

Tipo: Book Chapter

Palavras-chave: Food safety; Experimental economics; Auctions; Willingness to pay; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25986

Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.

We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms must report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the concession to the firm that reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the concessionaire to optimally decide the investment timing. The focus is on the effect of bidding rules and...

Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Bidding Rules; Managerial Flexibility; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L51; D44; D92.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6630

Kawasaki, Kentaro; Fujie, Takeshi; Koito, Kentaro; Inoue, Norikazu; Sasaki, Hiroki.

Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010.

Consumer Willingness to Pay for "Second-Generation" Genetically Engineered Products and the Role of Marketing Information

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; D44; Q24.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61188

Rousu, Matthew C.; Monchuk, Daniel C.; Shogren, Jason F.; Kosa, Katherine M..

Environmental and consumer groups have called for mandatory labeling of genetically engineered (GE) food products in the United States, stating that consumers have the “right to know.” Herein, we use a nonhypothetical field experiment to examine the willingness to pay for GE-labeled products, using the only second-generation GE product currently on the U.S. market-GE cigarettes. Our results suggest consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes when marketing information is absent. But, when presented with marketing information on the attributes of the cigarette, we find no evidence that consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auctions; BDM mechanism; Cigarettes; Field experiment; Genetically engineered foods; Second-generation; C91; Q18.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43501

Coordination and Strategic Behaviour in Landscape Auctions

Valle, Haydn; Capon, Timothy; Harris, Michael; Reeson, Andrew.

Designing a conservation auction where bidders know the ecological value of their land poses challenges for policy makers because bidders will tend to increase their asking price. This is known as strategic behaviour, and it is particularly prevalent in sequential auction settings. The tender process ceases to be competitive when strategic behaviour occurs, eroding the efficiency advantages of an auction. To overcome this problem, contract options can be designed such that early winners are restricted in their efforts to strategically manipulate auction outcomes. Simply offering multi-period contracts could achieve this goal if participants need to wait for their contracts to expire before they can change their asking price. This idea was tested in a...

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Conservation; Biodiversity; Auctions; Strategic Behaviour; Landscape Design; Coordination; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124466

Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.