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Registros recuperados: 66
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A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; De Cian, Enrica.
In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to adopt cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD countries to undertake a moderate, but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission reductions are moderate, OECD countries find it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy...
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Technology Spillovers; Climate Change; Partial Cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q55; C72.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119104
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Alternative Paths toward a Low Carbon World AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Tavoni, Massimo.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Stabilization Costs; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90948
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(Anti-) Coordination in Networks AgEcon
Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel.
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370
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Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele.
Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of “where” flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to “when” flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emission Trading; Banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C72; H23; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6362
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Bilingualism and Communicative Benefits AgEcon
Gabszewicz, Jean; Ginsburgh, Victor; Weber, Shlomo.
We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two languages and two populations with heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces a binary choice of learning the foreign language or refraining from doing so. We show that both interior and corner linguistic equilibria can emerge in our framework, and that the fraction of learners of the foreign language is higher in the country with a higher gross cost adjusted communicative benefit. It turns out that this observation is consistent with the data on language proficiency in bilingual countries such as Belgium and Canada. We also point out that linguistic equilibria can exhibit insufficient learning which opens the door for government policies that are beneficial for both...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Communicative Benefits; Linguistic Equilibrium; Learning Costs; Labor and Human Capital; C72; D83; O52; Z13.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6380
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Can Co-Management Improve the Governance of A Common- Pool Resource? Lessons From A Framed Field Experiment in A Marine Protected Area in the Colombian Caribbean AgEcon
Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar; Maldonado, Jorge Higinio.
Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention—what we call co-management—on fishermen’s extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co- management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors in the decision-making process for the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common-pool resources; Governance; Co-management; Experimental economic games; Fisheries; Latin America.; Environmental Economics and Policy; C93; C72; D02; D70; Q01; Q22; Q28; C23; C25.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60731
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Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy AgEcon
Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G..
Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms?
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902
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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study AgEcon
Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip.
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: School Choice; Matching; Experiment; Gale-Shapley; Top Trading Cycles; Boston Mechanism; Efficiency; Stability; Truncation; Truthtelling; Safety School; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C78; D78; I20.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50480
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values AgEcon
Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668
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Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms AgEcon
Ilkilic, Rahmi.
Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C62; C72; D85; L11.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50679
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Delayed Action and Uncertain Targets. How Much Will Climate Policy Cost? AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo.
Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Uncertainty; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Delayed Action; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44219
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Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed? AgEcon
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Tavoni, Massimo.
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1) countries decide to delay their GHG emission reductions by 30 years. What would be the cost difference between this scenario and a case in which both developed and developing countries start reducing their emissions at the same time? Then, we look at a scenario in which the timing of developing countries’ participation is uncertain and again we compute the costs of climate policy in developed and developing countries. We find that delayed participation of NA1 countries has...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Delayed Action; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Uncertain Participation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44220
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Do Interest Groups Compete? AgEcon
Ando, Amy Whritenour.
This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732
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Does Scarcity Exacerbate the Tragedy of the Commons? Evidence from Fishers’ Experimental Responses AgEcon
Maldonado, Jorge Higinio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar.
Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the commons intensified; Economic experimental games; Resource abundance; Resource scarcity; Dynamic effects; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; D01; D02; D03; O13; O54; Q01; Q22; C93; C72; C73; C23.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91170
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Dynamic Multilateral Markets AgEcon
Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A..
We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Multilateral Bargaining; Dynamic Markets; Labor Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; J30; L20.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108255
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Endogenous Network Dynamics AgEcon
Page, Frank H.; Wooders, Myrna H..
In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Endogenous Network Dynamics; Dynamic Stochastic Games of Network Formation; Equilibrium Markov Process of Network Formation; Basins of Attraction; Harris Decomposition; Ergodic Probability Measures; Dynamic Path Dominance Core; Dynamic Pairwise Stability; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C71; C72.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50476
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ESTIMATING COKE AND PEPSI'S PRICE ADVERTISING STRATEGIES AgEcon
Golan, Amos; Karp, Larry S.; Perloff, Jeffrey M..
AgEcon Search copy replaced with 1999 version 02/02/06.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strategies; Noncooperative games; Oligopoly; Generalized maximum entropy; Beverages; Marketing; C13; C35; C72; L13; L66.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25057
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Exogenous Targeting Instruments under Differing Information Conditions AgEcon
Spraggon, John M..
This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383
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Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games AgEcon
Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela.
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475
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Fear or Greed? Duty or Solidarity? Motivations and Stages of Moral Reasoning: Experimental Evidences from Public-Goods Provision Dilemmas AgEcon
Meyer, Leandro Fredrico Ferraz; Braga, Marcelo Jose.
As economists increasingly recognize the limits of the canonical self-interest assumption, the lack of a theory of human valuation that clearly specifies what determines an individual’s utility judgments renders the prediction of behavior in social dilemmas virtually impossible.  In this study, we examined the explanatory power of a structuralist-constructivist theory of adult development and this theory’s analytical significance to the understanding of behavioral diversity in situations where individual and collective interests collide. Experimental results suggest that the theoretical constructs built into the selected theory provide a reliable basis for predicting participants’ behavior when presented with two different collective-action dilemmas under...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social dilemmas; Experimental economics; Sociocognitive and moral reasoning; Adult development; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D74.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53249
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