SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Merlo, Antonio.

In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite...

Climate Policy When the Distant Future Matters: Catastrophic Events with Hyperbolic Discounting

Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476

Karp, Larry S.; Tsur, Yacov.

Low probability catastrophic climate change can have a significant influence on policy under hyperbolic discounting. We compare the set of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) to the optimal policy under time-consistent commitment. For some initial levels of risk there are multiple MPE; these may involve either excessive or insufficient stabilization effort. These results imply that even if the free-rider problem amongst contemporaneous decision-makers were solved, there may remain a coordination problem amongst successive generations of decision-makers. A numerical example shows that under plausible conditions society should respond vigorously to the threat of climate change.

CLIMATE POLICY WHEN THE DISTANT FUTURE MATTERS: CATASTROPHIC EVENTS WITH HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING

Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Event uncertainty; Catastrophic risk; Hyperbolic discounting; Markov Perfect Equilibria; Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C73; D63; D99; Q54.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7186

Karp, Larry S.; Tsur, Yacov.

Low probability catastrophic climate change can have a signifcant influence on policy under hyperbolic discounting. We compare the set of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) to the optimal policy under time-consistent commitment. For some initial levels of risk there are multiple MPE; these may involve either excessive or insufficient stabilization effort. These results imply that even if the free-rider problem amongst contemporaneous decision-makers were solved, there may remain a coordination problem amongst successive generations of decision-makers. A numerical example shows that under plausible conditions society should respond vigorously to the threat of climate change.

Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach

Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Event uncertainty; Catastrophic risk; Hyperbolic discounting; Markov Perfect Equilibria; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C73; D63; D99; Q54.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7181

Benitez, Pablo C.; Kuosmanen, Timo; Olschewski, Roland; van Kooten, G. Cornelis.

Updated version of REPA Working Paper 2004-05.

Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

Palavras-chave: Agroforest systems; Conservation payments; Land allocation; Portfolio diversification; Risk; Stochastic dominance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C73; O54; Q23; Q57; R14.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37024

Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike.

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Depending on the parameters of the model two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the...

DISCOUNTING AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C70; C73; D85.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50723

Karp, Larry S.; Tsur, Yacov.

A constant social discount rate cannot reflect both a reasonable opportunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model in a simple climate change model to calculate constant equivalent discount rates" and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change.

Does Scarcity Exacerbate the Tragedy of the Commons? Evidence from Fishers’ Experimental Responses

Palavras-chave: Discounting; Climate change modeling; Stern Review; Markov Perfect Equilibria; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C73; D63; D99; Q54.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7149

Maldonado, Jorge Higinio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar.

Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the...

Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements

Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the commons intensified; Economic experimental games; Resource abundance; Resource scarcity; Dynamic effects; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; D01; D02; D03; O13; O54; Q01; Q22; C93; C72; C73; C23.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91170

Breton, Michele; Sbragia, Lucia; Zaccour, Georges.

In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial...

Dynamic Programming and Learning Models for Management of a Nonnative Species

Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Non‐Cooperative Dynamic Game; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C73; Q53.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6231

Eiswerth, Mark E.; van Kooten, G. Cornelis; Lines, Jeff M.; Eagle, Alison J..

Nonnative invasive species result in sizeable economic damages and expensive control costs. Because dynamic optimization models break down if controls depend in complex ways on past controls, non-uniform or scale-dependent spatial attributes, etc., decision support systems that allow learning may be preferred. We compare three models of an invasive weed in California’s grazing lands: (1) a stochastic dynamic programming model, (2) a reinforcement-based, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model, and (3) an EWA model that also includes stochastic forage growth and penalties for repeated application of environmentally harmful control techniques. Results indicate that EWA learning models may be appropriate for invasive species management.

Environmental Options and Technological Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Model

Palavras-chave: Invasive weed species; Optimal control; Adaptive management; Environmental Economics and Policy; C73; Q57.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37015

Antoci, Angelo; Borghesi, Simone; Galeotti, Marcello.

This paper analyses the effects on economic agents' behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in the region turns out to be below a given threshold level. On the other hand, it offers the firms that adopt an innovative, non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality is above the threshold level. The...

Palavras-chave: Environmental Bonds; Call and Put Options; Technological Innovation; Evolutionary Dynamics; Environmental Economics and Policy; C73; D62; G10; O30; Q28.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55289

Filtering with Search

Taub, Bart.

A firm monopsonistically hires labor from a pool containing both skilled and unskilled workers. The marginal value of a worker depends on the match between the job and the worker's skill level. Unskilled workers can have negative productivity if they are placed in a skilled job. The firm cannot distinguish the two types. The workers are initially dispersed and search for the high wage jobs from the firm. The workers' skill levels are correlated with their patience; equivalently, they obtain indirect benefits, such as non-firm-specific career capital, from jobs that use their skill appropriately. By judiciously choosing different wages for different types of jobs, the firm can partially filter the appropriate worker types and match them with the appropriate...

Government turnover in parliamentary democracies

Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital; C73; D83; E24; J64.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26256

Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio.

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.

Halting the Rural Race to the Bottom: An Evolutionary Model of Rural Development to Analyse Neo-endogenous Policies in the EU

Palavras-chave: Government stability; Minority coalitions; Surplus coalitions.; Political Economy; D72; H19; C73.

Ano: 1998

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7453

Petrick, Martin.

The article contributes to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development policies from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. Neo-endogenous policies are interpreted as stimuli emerging from an external government authority which help decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. External intervention may thus be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. However, because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside.

Halting the rural race to the bottom: an evolutionary model of rural development to analyse neo-endogenous policies in the EU

Palavras-chave: Rural governance; Neo-endogenous policies; Evolutionary game theory; Collective action.; Community/Rural/Urban Development; C73; R23; R58.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114764

Petrick, Martin.

Measuring the Gains to Groundwater Management with Recursive Utility

Palavras-chave: Rural governance; Neo-endogenous policies; Evolutionary game theory; Collective action; Community/Rural/Urban Development; C73; R23; R58.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94897

Msangi, Siwa.

Replaced with revised version of paper 07/20/05.

Networks with Group Counterproposals

Palavras-chave: Recursive Utility; Dynamic Games; Groundwater Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D91; C73; Q25.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19212

Nieva, Ricardo.

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

On the Micro-Foundations of Money: The Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op

Palavras-chave: Efficiency; Bargaining Protocol; Counterproposals; Network Formation; Transfers; Externalities; Groups; Coalitions; C71; C72; C73; C78.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42901

Hens, Thorsten; Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner; Vogt, Bodo.

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralized markets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationary monetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. The experiment gives support to the theoretical approach.

On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources

Palavras-chave: Micro foundations of money; Optimal; Quantity of money; Financial Economics; C73; C91; C92; E40; E41; E42.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26320

Kossioris, Georgios; Plexousakis, Michael; Xepapadeas, Anastasios; Fe Zeeuw, Aart.

Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.

Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping

Palavras-chave: Differential Games; Non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria; Ecosystems; Optimal State-dependent Tax; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; C73; C61.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94619

Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino.

When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...

Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear

Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370

Antoci, Angelo; Sacco, Pier Luigi; Sodini, Mauro.

In this paper, we develop a simple model of social dynamics governing the evolution of strategic self-protection choices of boundedly rational potential victims facing the threat of prospective offenders in a large population with random matching. We prove that individual (and socially transmitted) fear of exposure to criminal threats may actually condition choices even in the face of objective evidence of declining crime rates, and thereby cause the eventual selection of Pareto inefficient equilibria with self-protection. We also show that a suitable strategy of provision of public security financed through discriminatory taxation of self-protective expenses may actually overcome this problem, and drive the social dynamics toward the efficient no...