


Registros recuperados: 35  

 

 


Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel. 
We study (anti) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are... 
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper 
Palavraschave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85. 
Ano: 2010 
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370 
 

 

 


Kawasaki, Kentaro; Fujie, Takeshi; Koito, Kentaro; Inoue, Norikazu; Sasaki, Hiroki. 
Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 2527, 2010. 
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation 
Palavraschave: Auctions; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; D44; Q24. 
Ano: 2010 
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61188 
 

 

 

 

 


Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela. 
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing... 
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper 
Palavraschave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91. 
Ano: 2010 
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475 
 

 

 

 


Burton, Michael P.. 
It has been suggested that the nature of the task within a multiattribute multialternative choice experiment may be sufficiently complex to make it difficult for individuals to develop response strategies to strategically bias their answers. This experiment tested that hypothesis by setting experimental conditions that provide incentives for strategic bias. By changing design parameters one can investigate whether the strategic bias can be reduced. The answer is effectively no: under most circumstances, respondents could find a strategy that achieved significant bias in inferred preferences. The circumstances where this did not occur (involving ranking alternatives, rather than selecting a single preferred alternative) the inferred preferences reflected... 
Tipo: Journal Article 
Palavraschave: Strategic bias; Choice modeling; Complexity; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q51; C91. 
Ano: 2010 
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95062 
 

 

 

 
Registros recuperados: 35  


