SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.

We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.

An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885

Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M..

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.

(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions trading; Laboratory experiments; Permit markets; Permit banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93966

Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel.

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are...

ASSESSING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR DIFFERENT UNITS OF ORGANIC MILK: EVIDENCE FROM MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370

Akaichi, Faiçal; Gil, Jose Maria; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr..

Replaced with revised version of paper 06/28/10

Closing down the Farm: An Experimental Analysis of Disinvestment Timing

Palavras-chave: Multi-unit Vickrey auctions; Organic milk; Information; Agribusiness; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; D44.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60982

Maart, Syster Christin; Musshoff, Oliver; Odening, Martin; Schade, Christian.

Agrarian structures are often characterized by some kind of economic inertia. It is particularly puzzling why unprofitable farms persist over time instead of being sold. In this paper we analyze the exit decision of farmers using the real options approach. The validity of the real options theory is assessed by means of laboratory experiments. Our results show that real options models are able to predict actual disinvestment decisions better than traditional investment theory. Nevertheless, the observed disinvestment reluctance was even more pronounced as predicted by theory. This finding suggests the inclusion of bounded rationality into normative disinvestment models.

Comparison of the Investment Behavior of German and Kazakhstani Farmers: an Experimental Approach

Palavras-chave: Disinvestment; Real Options; Experimental Economics; Agricultural Finance; Farm Management; C91; D81; D92.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114375

Tubetov, Dulat; Maart, Syster Christin; Musshoff, Oliver.

Revised April 2012

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Experimental Economics; Investment Timing; Real Options; Kazakhstan; Germany; Agricultural Finance; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; Risk and Uncertainty; C91; D03; D81; D92.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122422

Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

Kawasaki, Kentaro; Fujie, Takeshi; Koito, Kentaro; Inoue, Norikazu; Sasaki, Hiroki.

Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010.

Consumer Willingness to Pay for "Second-Generation" Genetically Engineered Products and the Role of Marketing Information

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; D44; Q24.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61188

Rousu, Matthew C.; Monchuk, Daniel C.; Shogren, Jason F.; Kosa, Katherine M..

Environmental and consumer groups have called for mandatory labeling of genetically engineered (GE) food products in the United States, stating that consumers have the “right to know.” Herein, we use a nonhypothetical field experiment to examine the willingness to pay for GE-labeled products, using the only second-generation GE product currently on the U.S. market-GE cigarettes. Our results suggest consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes when marketing information is absent. But, when presented with marketing information on the attributes of the cigarette, we find no evidence that consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auctions; BDM mechanism; Cigarettes; Field experiment; Genetically engineered foods; Second-generation; C91; Q18.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43501

Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament

Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the...

Expected Utility or Prospect Theory Maximizers? Results from a Structural Model based on Field-experiment Data

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884

Bocqueho, Geraldine; Jacquet, Florence; Reynaud, Arnaud.

We elicit risk preferences of French farmers in a field experimental setting under expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. We use two different estimation methods, namely the interval approach and the estimation of a random preference model. On average, farmers are risk averse and loss averse. They also exhibit an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function, meaning that they tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight high probabilities. We infer from our results that CPT explains farmers’ behaviour better than EUT in the context of our experiment. We also investigate how preferences correlate with individual socio-demographic characteristics. We find that education and agricultural innovation are negatively linked with risk...

Experimental Evidence of Risk Aversion in Consumer Markets: The Case of Beef Tenderness

Palavras-chave: Risk preferences; Field experiment; Experimental economics; Prospect theory; Risk and Uncertainty; C91; D81; J16; Q12.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114257

Alfnes, Frode; Rickertsen, Kyrre; Ueland, Oydis.

Consistency of quality is important for brand loyalty and market share in consumer markets. Among consumers of beef, tenderness is the primary quality attribute. We use an experimental auction market to investigate how inconsistency in tenderness affects consumers willingness to pay (WTP) for beef. We find that both the level and the spread of tenderness affect consumers WTP for beef. Categorization the beef into various classes of tenderness increased the total value of the beef by 8%, which suggests that improved tenderness labeling may be a profitable strategy.

Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games

Palavras-chave: Beef tenderness; Consumer demand; Experimental auction; Marketing; Risk aversion; Consumer/Household Economics; C91; D12; D8; Q13.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24553

Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela.

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing...

FOOD DECISION, INFORMATION AND PERSONALITY

Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475

Loheac, Youenn; Combris, Pierre; Issancou, Sylvie.

This study introduce measures of personality traits in an experiment which associate willingness to pay for food and sensory analysis tools in order to explore potential links between personality and food decisions. Measure of personality traits comes from experimental economics (risk aversion and time preference) and from psychology (sensation seeking and impulsivity). We introduce them in the analysis of behaviours of participants in their food decisions (purchase intent, willingness to pay, reaction to new information), and underline some significant links.

Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation

Palavras-chave: Food decision; Information; Experimental methods; Risk aversion; Time preference; Personality traits; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; C91; D12.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116434

Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M..

This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low. Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to...

Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games

Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Compliance; Emissions trading; Permit markets; Pollution; Laboratory experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42124

Tavoni, Alessandro.

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically; one such example is the impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Chmura, 2008), which introduces a psychological reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations. This paper is concerned with advancing two new, empirically sound, concepts: equity-driven impulse balance equilibrium (EIBE) and equity-driven quantal response equilibrium (EQRE): both introduce a distributive reference point to the corresponding...

Inducing Strategic Bias: and its implications for Choice Modelling design

Palavras-chave: Fairness; Inequity aversion; Aspiration level; Impulse balance; Quantal Response; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C91; D01; D63.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50740

Initial Endowment Effects in Multi-Unit Vickrey Auctions

Burton, Michael P..

It has been suggested that the nature of the task within a multi-attribute multi-alternative choice experiment may be sufficiently complex to make it difficult for individuals to develop response strategies to strategically bias their answers. This experiment tested that hypothesis by setting experimental conditions that provide incentives for strategic bias. By changing design parameters one can investigate whether the strategic bias can be reduced. The answer is effectively no: under most circumstances, respondents could find a strategy that achieved significant bias in inferred preferences. The circumstances where this did not occur (involving ranking alternatives, rather than selecting a single preferred alternative) the inferred preferences reflected...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Strategic bias; Choice modeling; Complexity; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q51; C91.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95062

Akaichi, Faiçal; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr.; Gil, Jose Maria.

We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingness to pay values elicited from multi-unit Vickrey auctions. Comparing bids from an “endow and upgrade” approach with the “full bidding” approach, we find that the direction of the endowment effect generally depends on the number of endowed units of the conventional product that subjects are willing to give up in exchange for units of the upgraded product. The endowment effect is “reverse” when the number of units that participants are willing to give up is lower or equal to the number of remaining endowed units. However, we generally find an endowment effect when the number of units a participant is willing to give up is higher than the number of remaining...

Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria

Palavras-chave: Endowment effect; Number of units of the endowed product; Multi-unit Vickrey auctions.; Agribusiness; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C91; D12; D44.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103041

Cason, Timothy N.; Gangadharan, Lata; Duke, Charlotte.

In theory, competitive emission permit markets minimise total abatement cost for any emission ceiling. Permit markets are often imperfectly competitive, however, if they are thin and dominated by large firms. The dominant firm(s) could exercise market power and increase other firms’ costs of pollution control, while reducing their own emission control costs. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organised using the double auction trading institution. Our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the Port Phillip Watershed in Victoria, Australia. We vary across treatments the...

Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation

Palavras-chave: Market Power; Emission Permits; Experiments; Environmental Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; Q25; Q28.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57841

Mantovani, Marco; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent.

Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior.