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| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
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| Suphachalasai, Suphachol. |
| This paper investigates the relationship between a bureaucracy and mass media industry, and its implications to corruption. We develop a bureaucratic model of corruption with mass media. A representative profit maximizing media firm seeks for corruption news to be printed and sold. Channels through which competition in media industry and press freedom affect equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect production and employment decisions of media firms, and this in turn affects the effectiveness of media in monitoring corruption. Competition and freedom in media sector also have an influence on bureaucratic structure and consequently on equilibrium corruption. We find that the degree of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Bureaucracy; Mass Media; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31929 |
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| Gennaioli, Caterina; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector. Taking a political economy approach, we analyze the link between public support schemes for renewable energy and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. The insights of a model of political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using a panel data of Italian provinces for the period 1990-2007. We find evidence that a curse exists in the case of wind energy, and specifically that: i) criminal association activity increased more in high-wind provinces and especially after the introduction of a more favourable public policy regime and, ii) the expansion of the wind energy sector has been driven by both the wind level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Natural Resources Curse; Wind Energy; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115846 |
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| Lapatinas, Athanasios; Litina, Anastasia; Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.. |
| We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two self-fulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H2; H26; H3; Q56; Q58. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101377 |
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| Neeman, Zvika; Paserman, Daniele; Simhon, Avi. |
| We consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption and wealth, which are co-determined in equilibrium, are shown to be negatively correlated. Richer countries tend to be less corrupt, and corrupt economies tend to be poorer. This observation gives rise to the following puzzle: If poorer countries do indeed experience higher levels of corruption, and if indeed as suggested by a number of empirical studies corruption hampers growth, then how did rich countries, who were poor once, become rich? Our answer is simple. In the past, economies were mostly "closed" in the sense that it was difficult to transfer illicit money outside of the economy. In contrast, today's economies are mostly open. In the relatively closed economies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Growth; Openness; International Development; F2; H0; O1; O4. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14977 |
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| Torgler, Benno; Dong, Bin. |
| The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level. The results... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Political Interest; Social Norms; K420; D720; O170; J240. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36763 |
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| Dong, Bing; Torgler, Benno. |
| We explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. Panel data evidence clearly indicates that social interaction has a statistically significantly positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the relevance of social interaction in understanding corruption. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Social Interaction; China; Political Economy; K420; D720; D640; O170; J240. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99686 |
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| Dincer, Oguzhan C.; Gunalp, Burak. |
| In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Our analysis advances the existing literature in four ways. First, instead of using corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we use all commonly used inequality and poverty measures including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, standard deviation of the logarithms, relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and the poverty rate defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Third, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise due to data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality, and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Income Inequality; Poverty; D31; D73; I32. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37848 |
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| Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno. |
| This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Democracy; Income inequality; Property rights; Political Economy; D73; H11; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99685 |
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| Gideon, Kruseman; Lorenzo, Pellegrini. |
| Deforestation in the North western part of Pakistan is a long standing problem. The Forestry Department, as formal managers of the forest resources, has been undergoing a long reform process aimed at improving its performance. This reform process has not resulted in less deforestation. From the policy perspective this has been leading to stated intentions to further reform the Forestry Department, the question is whether organizational reform is the answer. We think there are more limiting bottlenecks to sustainable forest management in Pakistan. De facto property rights are not as simple as denoted by statutory law. In this article we explore the mechanisms behind the deforestation and try to uncover mechanisms to reverse the process. Although our... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: New institutional Economics; Corruption; Forestry; Swat; Q23; Q58. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37669 |
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| Wang, Sen; DesRoches, C. Tyler; Sun, Lili; Stennes, Brad; Wilson, Bill; van Kooten, G. Cornelis. |
| This paper has three main objectives: (1) to investigate whether the four-quadrant approach introduced by Maini (2003) reveals a useful typology for grouping countries by GDP and forest cover per capita, (2) to determine if the framework can enhance our understanding of the relationship between forest cover and GDP per capita, and (3) to investigate why countries in the four-quadrant world occupy different quadrants, and to determine the principal factors affecting country-movement across and within the individual quadrants. The examination reveals that countries can be classified into four broad categories, and that GDP and forest cover per capita have a low but consistent level of negative association. After regressing economic, institutional, social... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economic well-being; Forest cover; Institutions; Corruption; Education; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; G00; I20; Q23. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37036 |
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| Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno. |
| In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Decentralization; Deterrence; Social Heterogeneity; Political Economy; D730; H110; K420. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91024 |
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| Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno. |
| With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that regional... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Economic Development; Inequality; Environment; Political Economy; D720; H110; K420. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91006 |
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| Pellegrini, Lorenzo. |
| Corruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible solutions. As we highlight in this study, the crime and punishment approach is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak. Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden centralised forest management regime, institutional reform should move away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal management of natural... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Forest management; Environmental policy; Institutional reform; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; Q24; Q57. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7439 |
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| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
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