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Registros recuperados: 32 | |
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Wang, Shinn-Shyr; Rojas, Christian; Lavoie, Nathalie. |
We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Buyer market power; Vertical differentiation; Wal-Mart; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; Industrial Organization; Marketing; D43; L13; L81; M31; Q13. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57165 |
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Tennbakk, Berit. |
Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Regulation; Over production; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13; L21; D43. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24907 |
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Buhler, Benno. |
We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at inefficiently high wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Roaming; Vertical Relations; Regulation; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; L42; L96. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55292 |
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Richards, Timothy J.; Patterson, Paul M.. |
Consumer product manufacturers often compete in dynamic, multi-firm oligopolies using multiple strategic tools. While existing empirical models of strategic interaction typically consider only parts of the more general problem, this paper presents a more comprehensive alternative. Marketing decision are dynamically optimal, consistent with optimal consumer choice, and responsive to rival decisions. Using a single-market case study that consists of five years of four-weekly data on ready-to-eat cereal sales, prices, and new brand introductions, we test several hypotheses regarding the nature of strategic interaction among several rival manufacturers. We find that cereal manufacturers price and introduce new brands cooperatively in the same period, but... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cereal; Differentiated products; Dynamics; Oligopoly; Product line rivalry; Strategic interaction; Demand and Price Analysis; D43; L13; L66; M31; Q13. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43788 |
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Vetter, Henrik. |
In perfectly competitive markets taxes and quotas are fully equivalent measures for environmental protection. Based on this regulators' revealed preferences for quotas over that of fees finds its explanation in the procedures and spirits of political decision making. This paper offers another explanation: Ordinary welfare economic considerations make a quota preferable to a tax when regulating polluting firms in monopolistically competitive markets. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis; D61; D62; D43. |
Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24203 |
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Registros recuperados: 32 | |
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