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Registros recuperados: 40
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A note on the performance measure of conservation auctions 31
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.
We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885
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A Robust Multivariate Long Run Analysis of European Electricity Prices 31
Bosco, Bruno; Parisio, Lucia; Pelagatti, Matteo; Baldi, Fabio.
This paper analyses the interdependencies existing in wholesale European electricity prices. The results of a multivariate long run dynamic analysis of weekly median prices reveal the presence of a strong although not perfect integration among some neighboring markets considered in the sample and the existence of common long-term dynamics of electricity prices and gas prices but not oil prices. The existence of long-term dynamics among gas prices and electricity prices may prove to be important for long-term hedging operations to be conducted even in markets where there are no electricity derivatives.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: European Electricity Prices; Cointegration; Interdependencies; Equilibrium Correction Model; Oil Prices; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C15; C32; D44; L94; Q40.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7438
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An Experimental Examination of Target Based Conservation Auctions 31
Boxall, Peter C.; Perger, Orsolya; Packman, Katherine.
Conservation auctions (CA) are typically employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. This paper exmaines the ability of a CA to meet an environmental target. Previous research on this topic used the number of contracts as a target rather than some specified environmental goal. We used experimental economic methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine a target constraint that must be met by bidders rather than a budget constraint. However, since no budget constraint is employed, agencies with limited resources might have to use other auction design procedures to ensure that financial outlays to pay winning bidders are not too high while meeting the target....
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Environmental target; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; D44.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121624
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ASSESSING CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR DIFFERENT UNITS OF ORGANIC MILK: EVIDENCE FROM MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS 31
Akaichi, Faiçal; Gil, Jose Maria; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr..
Replaced with revised version of paper 06/28/10
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Multi-unit Vickrey auctions; Organic milk; Information; Agribusiness; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; D44.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60982
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Auction Experiments and Simulations of Milk Quota Exchanges 31
Brümmer, Bernhard; Loy, Jens-Peter; Requate, Till.
Since 2000 Germany has a fairly unique market mechanism to trade milk quotas between dairy farms. The two major features are: (1) a quasi auctioning system that produces excess demands which are covered by state reserves free of charge and (2) a price band is used to exclude high price bids. For both features an experimental design is developed to study their impact in comparison to a regular seller’s sealed bid double auction. Results show that both treatments lead to significant misallocations. These are due the direct impact of regulations and due to an imperfect adjustment of bidding functions towards them. The major goal of the market design to reduce quota prices is reached, however, at significant trade losses.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Double Auction; Experiment; Milk Quota; Germany; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L11; D44; Q13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61304
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Auction Markets for Specialty Food Products with Geographical Indications 31
Schamel, Guenter.
We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606
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Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements 31
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.
We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409
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Auctioning Payment Entitlements 31
Nielsen, Kurt.
Payment entitlements is a new commodity that arises from the new European common agricultural policy. The agricultural subsidies are decoupled from the actual production and replaced by the so-called payment entitlements. A payment entitlement has a farm specific value and may be freely traded. This paper discusses the complexity of this new market and suggests an auction that simplifies the complexity. The suggested auction allows a buyer to simultaneously bid on all payment entitlements. The prices are found by a tatonnement that monotonically approximates the equilibrium prices for the different types of payment entitlements for sale. The auction enhances the competition and efficiency of the market, which is essential for the individual members of the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Auction; Multiple goods; Bidding agents; Tatonnement; Agricultural subsidies; Agricultural Finance; D44; Q13.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24566
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Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services 31
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto.
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547
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Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions 31
Davis, David E..
State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123863
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Buying Fields and Marrying Daughters: An Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village 31
Klonner, Stefan.
A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449
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Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better? 31
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.
In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples-procurement, royalty contracts and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Demsetz auction; Double marginalization; Franchising; Joint vs. separate auctions; Monopoly; Procurement; Dealerships; Royalty contracts; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D44; L12; L92.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28406
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Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility 31
Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.
We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms must report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the concession to the firm that reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the concessionaire to optimally decide the investment timing. The focus is on the effect of bidding rules and...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Bidding Rules; Managerial Flexibility; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L51; D44; D92.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6630
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Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments 31
Kawasaki, Kentaro; Fujie, Takeshi; Koito, Kentaro; Inoue, Norikazu; Sasaki, Hiroki.
Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; D44; Q24.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61188
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Conservation Auctions in Manitoba: A Summary of a Series of Workshops 31
Packman, Katherine; Boxall, Peter C..
Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of the utrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market based instruments; Conservation auction; Tender; Wetland restoration; Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; Q20; Q57.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91423
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Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for New Genetically Modified Food Products: Evidence from Experimental Auctions of Intragenic and Transgenic Foods 31
Colson, Gregory; Huffman, Wallace E..
Early GM traits were obtained by transferring genes across species, largely from soil bacteria. Part of the consumer resistance to them has been their transgenic nature. Recently, breakthroughs have occurred using intragenic bioengineering where genes are moved long distances within a specie, for example in potato, and without antibiotic markers. The objective of this research is to assess consumers’ acceptance and willingness to pay (WTP) for new intragenic fresh potato, tomato, and broccoli with higher levels of antioxidants and vitamin C, which are consumer traits. To elicit consumer valuations, a new series of experimental auctions were conducted in 2007 that built upon methodology developed in our earlier research. WTP was assessed in a multi-round...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: GM foods; Consumer attributes; Willingness to pay; Economics experiments; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q10; D11; D82; D44.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49986
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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values 31
Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668
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Do Farmers Value The Environment? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program Auctions 31
Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C..
The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233
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Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits? 31
Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.
Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883
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Effects of Socio-Institutional and Emotional Factors of Japanese Farmland Rental Transactions 31
Kunimitsu, Yoji.
Farmland reallocation between farmers through rental transactions is critical for improving Japanese rice productivity. This study examined effects of socio-institutional and emotional factors as well as economic factors on rental transactions. A stochastic choice model was applied to contingent valuation data by considering regional heteroscedasticity. Empirical results showed (1) existence of economic inefficiencies, 3% loss of economic surplus due to socio-institutional restriction, which is probably reflected in transaction costs; (2) a 15% reduction in surplus due to emotional reluctance of farmers; and (3) strong influences of rice price, wages, and geographical location on the rental rate and agreement level.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation questionnaire; Economic inefficiency; Regional heteroscedasticity; Rental agreement level; Rental rate; Stochastic choice model; Crop Production/Industries; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; C25; D44; Q12; Q15; Q38; R58.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43747
Registros recuperados: 40
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