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| Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret. |
| Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories, we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and found no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image. |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Prosocial behavior; Experiments; Voluntary contributions; Financial Economics; Public Economics; D64; C90; L30. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121670 |
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| Kazianga, Harounan. |
| Resource transfers among households have received considerable interest among economists in recent years. Two of the main reasons for the surge of interest in household transfers are the information on human nature conveyed by transfer behavior and the implication on income redistribution policy that private transfer might have. Empirical studies, however, provide mixed results on transfer behavior. This is because previous inquiries were confronted with several estimation issues and have focused on data from developed countries where private transfers are already small. This paper contributes to the literature on transfer behavior by using a multifaceted econometric approach to examine the motives of household transfers in Burkina, a low-income country... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Private transfers; Altruism; Exchanges; Risk sharing; Consumer/Household Economics; D63; D64; I15; I30. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28463 |
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| Ligon, Ethan; Schechter, Laura. |
| What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed `real-world' gift-giving, while... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C92; C93; D03; D64; D85; O17. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120376 |
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| Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132 |
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