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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Finkelshtain, Israel; Kan, Iddo; Kislev, Yoav. |
| Direct commands, market based, or combined, whichever is the government's mean of intervention, is expected to raise political lobbying and pressure. This study offers a political-economic model of an industry, which is regulated by an integrated system of both direct and market based policies. The model is used for a normative theoretical analysis and as a basis for a structural econometric framework. Exploiting a unique data set that describes the regulations of irrigation water in Israel during the mid eighties by means of quotas and prices, the political and technological parameters of the model are structurally estimated and used to assess the relative efficiency of quotas, prices and integrated regulation regimes. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy; Natural Resources; Water; Political Economy; D72. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93133 |
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| Merlo, Antonio. |
| In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476 |
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| Cook, Michael L.; Plunkett, Brad. |
| This paper introduces and defines the concept of collective entrepreneurship. A review of the defensive single-level rent-seeking objective of traditional agricultural cooperatives is introduced followed by an analysis of recent studies documenting a shift in the objective functions of producers jointly integrating toward more multiple-level rent-seeking entities. This process of shifting from market failure-ameliorating collective action mechanisms toward rent-seeking group action organizations is labeled collective entrepreneurship. The justification for introducing this concept is based on the Olsonian premise that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests without coercion or selective incentives. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural cooperatives; Entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; D23; D72; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43777 |
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| Endoh, Masahiro. |
| This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each countrys import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes efficiency of policy formation. Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them more sensitive to other countries welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. When ruling... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cross-border donations; Truthful equilibrium; Pareto-efficient tariffs; Public Economics; D72; F13; H21; P48. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28397 |
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| Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
| This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732 |
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| Canton, Joan. |
| In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54303 |
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| Jia, Xiangping; Guo, Pei. |
| Historically, China's political attempts to provide access to rural credit has met with mixed results and an institutional structure that often strays from intended policy goals. There has been a close correspondence between financial depression and many policy-driven financial institutions that dominated the rural financial system in China. More recently, ongoing reforms are dedicated towards a gradual liberalization within the system. In this study, we explore the context of agricultural transition and political process as defined by the various interlinkages across the Chinese rural financial system. We find that there has been negligible progress in the evolution of the rural financial market in China. The policy-led financial institutions ended up as... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Rural finance; Institutions; Intervention; Gradualism; China; Financial Economics; E44; N25; D72; Q14. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7944 |
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| Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc. |
| Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337 |
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| Falkowski, Jan. |
| The ‘LEADER community initiatives’ and the ‘LEADER approach’ have been commonly accepted as an innovative way for development of rural areas in the EU. It is widely assumed that promoting growth in rural areas can be achieved through partnerships between representatives of three classes of local actors: civil society, public administration and private/economic sector. While these partnerships certainly have the potential to improve coordination mechanisms that manage local resources, their existence is likely to have an impact on the distribution of political advantages and future economic rents of current incumbents. What follows, it is reasonable to assume that local political elites may either block or impede the adoption of this institutional... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Political accountability; Local government; Rural development; Leader; Community/Rural/Urban Development; D72; D78; H77; O18. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114365 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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