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Registros recuperados: 40
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Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases AgEcon
Alberini, Anna; Austin, David H..
Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on polluters induces firms to handle hazardous wastes properly. We run regressions relating unintended pollution releases to strict liability imposed on polluters, exploiting variation across states and over time in the liability provisions of state mini-Superfund laws. Strict liability reduces the frequency and severity of pollution releases, provided it is modeled endogenously with the latter. Its effects vary with firm size. Partially sheltered from liability, small firms may have specialized in riskier production processes, but their number has not necessarily grown in response to the states' liability policy.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Negligence; Hazardous waste; State environmental policy; Endogenous policy adoption; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; D72; K13.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10518
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Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests AgEcon
Masters, William A.; Garcia, Andres F..
This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables, and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political-economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents’ rational ignorance about small per-person effects, governance institutions’ control of rent-seeking by political leaders, governments’ revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy-making. We also find that larger groups obtain more...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural price distortions; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11; H23.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50301
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Are Two Economic Instruments Better Than One? Combining Taxes and Quotas under Political Lobbying AgEcon
Finkelshtain, Israel; Kan, Iddo; Kislev, Yoav.
Direct commands, market based, or combined, whichever is the government's mean of intervention, is expected to raise political lobbying and pressure. This study offers a political-economic model of an industry, which is regulated by an integrated system of both direct and market based policies. The model is used for a normative theoretical analysis and as a basis for a structural econometric framework. Exploiting a unique data set that describes the regulations of irrigation water in Israel during the mid eighties by means of quotas and prices, the political and technological parameters of the model are structurally estimated and used to assess the relative efficiency of quotas, prices and integrated regulation regimes.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political Economy; Natural Resources; Water; Political Economy; D72.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93133
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Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment AgEcon
Merlo, Antonio.
In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476
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Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure AgEcon
Hefeker, Carsten; Michaelowa, Katharina.
Can process conditionality really enhance poverty reduction in developing countries? This question is addressed in the framework of a politico-economic model considering political distortions both on the recipient and on the donor side. It turns out that process conditionality is a very useful tool to raise the welfare of the poor as long as the international aid organizations hold all necessary information to assess the political situation in recipient countries and to select the true representatives of the poor into a participatory process. If they do not hold this information or if other bureaucratic interests reduce their incentive to acquire this information, process conditionality loses its effectiveness in achieving the desired objective.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Poverty reduction; Process conditionality; Political economy of international organizations.; Food Security and Poverty; Political Economy; D72; D73; F35; O19.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26389
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Collective Entrepreneurship: An Emerging Phenomenon in Producer-Owned Organizations AgEcon
Cook, Michael L.; Plunkett, Brad.
This paper introduces and defines the concept of collective entrepreneurship. A review of the defensive single-level rent-seeking objective of traditional agricultural cooperatives is introduced followed by an analysis of recent studies documenting a shift in the objective functions of producers jointly integrating toward more multiple-level rent-seeking entities. This process of shifting from market failure-ameliorating collective action mechanisms toward rent-seeking group action organizations is labeled collective entrepreneurship. The justification for introducing this concept is based on the Olsonian premise that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests without coercion or selective incentives.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agricultural cooperatives; Entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; D23; D72; Q13.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43777
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Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes AgEcon
Olper, Alessandro; Raimondi, Valentina.
This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) democracies, as well as to permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracies. Moreover, while...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Comparative Political Economics; Agricultural Distortions; Constitutional Rules; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; H23; O13; P16.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50304
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Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs AgEcon
Endoh, Masahiro.
This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each country’s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes efficiency of policy formation. Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them more sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. When ruling...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cross-border donations; Truthful equilibrium; Pareto-efficient tariffs; Public Economics; D72; F13; H21; P48.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28397
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Democracy and Agricultural Protection: Parametric and Semi-parametric Matching Estimates AgEcon
Olper, Alessandro; Falkowski, Jan; Swinnen, Johan F.M..
We estimate the effect of democratic transitions on agricultural protection in a sample of 74 developing and developed countries, observed in the 1955-2005 period. We employ both differences-in-differences regressions and semi-parametric matching methods, exploiting the time series and cross-sectional variation in the data. Our semi-parametric matching estimates show that parametric methods might underestimate the true effect of democracy on agricultural protection. We find a strong increase in agricultural protection (reduce in taxation) after a country transition to democracy. Specifically a democratic transition increases agricultural protection by about 9 percent points. However, the effect is asymmetric as the effect of leaving democracy on protection...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Democratic Reforms; Agricultural Distortions; Comparative Political Economics; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; D72; F13; O13; P16; Q18.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49313
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Do Interest Groups Compete? AgEcon
Ando, Amy Whritenour.
This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732
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Economia política da disputa por terras em Minas Gerais AgEcon
Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco de; Shikida, Claudio; Alvarenga, Patricia Silva.
The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land (conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logit model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agrarian development; Political economy; Regional economics; Agribusiness; D72; D74; O43.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61236
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Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies AgEcon
Canton, Joan.
In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; D72.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54303
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Evolution of Rural Financial Market in China: An Institutional "Lock in" or Gradualism? AgEcon
Jia, Xiangping; Guo, Pei.
Historically, China's political attempts to provide access to rural credit has met with mixed results and an institutional structure that often strays from intended policy goals. There has been a close correspondence between financial depression and many policy-driven financial institutions that dominated the rural financial system in China. More recently, ongoing reforms are dedicated towards a gradual liberalization within the system. In this study, we explore the context of agricultural transition and political process as defined by the various interlinkages across the Chinese rural financial system. We find that there has been negligible progress in the evolution of the rural financial market in China. The policy-led financial institutions ended up as...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Rural finance; Institutions; Intervention; Gradualism; China; Financial Economics; E44; N25; D72; Q14.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7944
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Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance AgEcon
Dutt, Pushan; Mitra, Devashish.
In this paper, we examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. We then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. We find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural protection; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50299
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Government turnover in parliamentary democracies AgEcon
Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio.
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Government stability; Minority coalitions; Surplus coalitions.; Political Economy; D72; H19; C73.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7453
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation AgEcon
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc.
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337
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Lobbying and Political Polarization AgEcon
Ursprung, Heinrich W..
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political competition; Lobbying; Interest groups; Campaign contributions; Political Economy; D72.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26219
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Looking at the LEADER Programme from the Angle of Political Accountability: Evidence from Poland AgEcon
Falkowski, Jan.
The ‘LEADER community initiatives’ and the ‘LEADER approach’ have been commonly accepted as an innovative way for development of rural areas in the EU. It is widely assumed that promoting growth in rural areas can be achieved through partnerships between representatives of three classes of local actors: civil society, public administration and private/economic sector. While these partnerships certainly have the potential to improve coordination mechanisms that manage local resources, their existence is likely to have an impact on the distribution of political advantages and future economic rents of current incumbents. What follows, it is reasonable to assume that local political elites may either block or impede the adoption of this institutional...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Political accountability; Local government; Rural development; Leader; Community/Rural/Urban Development; D72; D78; H77; O18.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114365
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Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes AgEcon
Chong, Alberto E.; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; Wantchekon, Leonard.
Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are...
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640
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Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies AgEcon
Olper, Alessandro; Swinnen, Johan F.M..
Mass media plays a crucial role in information distribution and thus in the political market and public policy making. Theory predicts that information provided by mass media reflects the media’s incentives to provide news to different types of groups in society, and affects these groups’ influence in policy-making. We use data on agricultural policy from 67 countries, spanning a wide range of development stages and media markets, to test these predictions. We find that, in line with theoretical hypotheses, public support to agriculture is strongly affected by the mass media. In particular, an increase in the share of informed voters, and a greater role of the private televisions in society is associated with policies which benefit the majority more: it...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Mass Media; Media Structure; Information; Agricultural Protection; Political Economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Development; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D83; Q18.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51694
Registros recuperados: 40
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