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| Registros recuperados: 14 | |
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| Hiller, Timo. |
| This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Economics of Conflict; Contest Success Function; Structural Balance; International Relations; Environmental Economics and Policy; D86; D74. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108251 |
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| Querou, Nicolas. |
| We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Conflict; Agency Problem; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D74; J52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96841 |
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| Petrick, Martin. |
| Welfare economics as the traditional, prescriptive theory framework used in agricultural economics has been criticised by institutional economists as being largely irrelevant to real-world policy issues. We therefore ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that does recognise the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition of gains from cooperation. We suggest to reconstruct any interaction as an existing or repealed social dilemma. This approach helps to identify common rule interests which create room for improvement of all parties involved, and to suggest desirable... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Finance; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D02; D63; D74; Q14. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25702 |
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| Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo. |
| Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical approach in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political instability (conflicts) and emergence of different political systems is presented. The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the possibility that paternalistic or “predatory" autocracies emerge are considered. Under certain circumstances, a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal choice for the oil-rich... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Natural Resources; Rentier States; Conflict and Endogenous Political Regimes; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C72; D74; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123277 |
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| Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza. |
| Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as a source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Rent Seeking; Rentier States; Resource Rents; Conflict; Patronage Employment; International Development; D74; Q34. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60687 |
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| Registros recuperados: 14 | |
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