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A Principal-Agent Model for Investigating Traceability Systems Incentives on Food Safety AgEcon
Resende Filho, Moises de Andrade.
This article investigates the effects of contingent payments and a traceability system's expected traceback rate of success on the food safety effort exerted by raw material suppliers. This sheds light on when contingent payments and the reliability of a traceability system are substitutes and complements to each other in terms of inducing raw material suppliers to exert higher food safety effort. In addition, the effect of higher penalties and costs of food safety crisis on the effort to be induced by buyers (principal) on suppliers (agents) is investigated under a symmetric information setting. Finally, the asymmetric information setting is formalized as a principal-agent model and left to be explored in a future work. Some numerical exercises are...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Information Asymmetry; Identity Preservation; Food Traceability; Supply Chain Management.; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; D82; D86; C61.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7897
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A Theory of Firm Decline AgEcon
Gian Luca, Clementi; Cooley, Thomas; Di Giannatale, Sonia.
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics; Financial Economics; D82; D86; D92; G32.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92788
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Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks AgEcon
Hiller, Timo.
This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Economics of Conflict; Contest Success Function; Structural Balance; International Relations; Environmental Economics and Policy; D86; D74.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108251
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Bargaining Power in Relational Contracts: An Experimental Study AgEcon
Cordero Salas, Paula.
This paper provides experimental evidence of the economic impact from shifting bargaining power in relational contracts. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers (agents) and the enforceability of the contract. I find that the vast majority of contracts take the form of efficiency wage contracts instead of contingent performance contracts when enforcement is partially incomplete and sellers have more bargaining power than buyers. The total contracted and actual compensation increase with the bargaining power of the sellers. However, sellers' profits are found to increase only if a part of the total payment is third-party enforceable. In this case, observed surplus and efficiency are lower than predictions. When no...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Bargaining; Experiments; Distribution; Institutions; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q13.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103579
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Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services AgEcon
Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto.
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547
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Contracting with Agents Seeking Status AgEcon
Bontems, Philippe.
We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only a subset of potentially "profitable" agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Status; Adverse selection; Contracts; Envy; Externalities; Production Economics; D6; H0; D86.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49507
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Cost Analysis of Alternative Harvest and Storage Methods for Switchgrass in the Southeastern U.S. AgEcon
Larson, James A.; Mooney, Daniel F.; English, Burton C.; Tyler, Donald D..
This study evaluated the potential impacts of dry matter losses from alternative harvest and storage methods on the costs of growing switchgrass for energy production. Data from a switchgrass bale harvest and storage experiment at Milan, TN, indicate that storage losses for covered rectangular bales were greater than for covered round bales. In addition, the cost of delivered feedstock increased with longer storage times because of larger dry matter losses. Even though storage losses were higher with uncovered large round bales, production costs were the lowest because costs of storage were minimal compared to other storage methods.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Bioenergy; Dry matter loss; Storage; Production Economics; D20; D21; D81; D86; Q13; Q42; P42.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56518
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Designing Contracts for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation AgEcon
Cordero Salas, Paula.
Reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) has been identified as a cost effective element of the post-Kyoto strategy to achieve long-term climate objectives. The success of REDD depends primarily on the design and implementation of a financial mechanism that provides land-holders sufficient incentives to participate in a REDD scheme. This paper proposes relational contracting as a more appropriate framework for analyzing proposed REDD incentive regimes rather than that of complete contracting enforcement because relational contracting relies upon mutual self-enforcement in a repeated transaction framework, which better suits the stylized facts of REDD. We characterize the optimal REDD relational contract and provide the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Carbon sequestration; Climate change; Institutions; Development.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; Land Economics/Use; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q54; Q56.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61129
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Do Incentives For Quality Matter? AgEcon
Alexander, Corinne E.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C..
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Marketing; D86; C23; Q13.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6702
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Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits? AgEcon
Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.
Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883
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Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan AgEcon
Pandey, Vivek; Shanoyan, Aleksan; Ross, Brent.
This article analyzes the incentives and compensation problems faced by cellulosic ethanol producer and logging firms and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. The success of this relationship is central to setting up the biofuel industry in Michigan and in the US at large. The theoretical results indicate that specification contract under the principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ problem when the principal contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. Alternative arrangements including JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent; Cellulosic Ethanol; Michigan; Multiple agents; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D82; D86; L23; L24; Q42.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61362
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Market Competition, Institutions, and Contracting Outcomes: Preliminary Model and Experimental Results AgEcon
MacDonald, James M.; Wu, Steven Y..
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contracts; Competition; Market Power; Enforcement; Institutions; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Production Economics; C91; D02; D43; D86.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50625
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Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study AgEcon
Wu, Steven Y.; Roe, Brian E.; Sporleder, Thomas L..
Two well-known hypotheses from the literature on tournaments are that (1) tournaments can filter out common shocks thereby reducing agents’ risk exposure; and (2) disincentive effects can arise when a tournament scheme is administered on a group of mixed ability agents. While handicapping and/or the creation of homogeneous groups have been suggested as mechanisms for mitigating disincentive effects, it is often impractical to use handicapping schemes and nearly impossible to create a completely homogeneous labor force. Hence, contract administrators who intend to use tournaments to elicit effort must be able to assess the positive effects of tournaments (eliminate common shocks) against the negative effects (disincentive effects). Using economic...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Mixed tournaments; Incentives; Relative performance contracts; Experimental economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91 D01; D81; D82; D86.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9703
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Modelo Principal-Agente para contratos entre pequenos produtores e empresa exportadora de manga no Rio Grande do Norte AgEcon
Sampaio, Luciano Menezes Bezerra.
Fruit production is an activity of great importance in the Brazilian commercial balance and even more in the Northeastern region. Intermediation is a regular practice in the fruit exporting market due to existence of requirements, such as quality certificates, and of internal problems in production and commercialization, such as credit limitations and absence of product standardization. Large companies, cooperatives, associations and NGOs receive products from many small producers and export them together with their own products. In Northeast, it is common that the exporting agent offers contracts to producers that include technical, administrative and legal assistance plus input supply. This paper proposes a model, using the principal-agent approach of...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Game theory; Small producers; Irrigated fruit production; Exportation; Agribusiness; Q10; Q12; D86.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61921
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The Choice of Participation Forms in Community-Based Group Farming and Efficiency in Team Production AgEcon
Nakajima, Shinsaku; Tahara, Kengo.
Past studies suggest that family farming is more productive than farming groups, but empirical studies are not enough to conclude which is more efficient. This paper tries to econometrically analyze the efficiency difference between farming groups and family farming, using original plot yield data from a district in Japan. We accomplish this by, first, analyzing the empirical determinants behind the farmers’ choice of participation forms in farming groups based on communities. Second, we verify the presence of free-riding at community-based farming groups which adopts an income-pooling system. Results of the regression analysis showed that for the choice of participation forms in farming groups the most important factor is family labor force. Estimating...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural Collectives; Tenancy Contract; Moral Hazard; Farm Management; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; D23; D86; Q15.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51640
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The Legal Environment Facing Economic Agents in Production AgEcon
Hipp, Janie S.; Francis, Harriet F..
Agriculture has seen a steady movement toward the increased use of contracts. Agricultural contracts now guide the interrelationships of parties throughout the modern production system, extending well beyond the livestock sector. With this predominance come new issues that require us to reexamine contract theory and the roles of the parties. This review examines legislation, regulations, and recent court rulings in seemingly unrelated areas that have specific relationships to the development of contracts in production agriculture: environmental law and labor law.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Contracting; Environment; Labor; Law; Liability; Relationships; Risk; D23; D86; K12; K31; K32.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43508
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The Quality-Quantity Trade-off in the Principal-Agent Framework AgEcon
Olmos, Marta Fernandez; Martinez, Jorge Rosell.
This paper uses the principal-agent theory to analytically investigate the optimal incentive-based compensation contract that a processor should offer to a grower performing efforts in quantity and quality. In this process, we contribute to the substantive literature on multi-task principal-agent models by analyzing the quality-quantity trade-off and studying the implications of such a relationship in the principal-agent framework. One striking result of these effects is that, under appropriate incentive-based grower’s compensation, the processor may encourage grower’s effort in quality without crowding out grower’s effort in quantity.
Tipo: Article Palavras-chave: Quality; Quantity; Trade-off; Incentive contract; Principal-agent framework; Uncertainty; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; D86.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118578
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The Role of Market Power in Agricultural Contracts AgEcon
Cordero Salas, Paula.
I study the economic consequences of shifting bargaining power in relational contracts through interventions such as the formation of a Bargaining Group (BG) for the side of sellers in a market where buyers traditionally hold significant market power. Existing theories of relational contracts predict that such a power transfer will have no impact on market efficiency. In contexts where enforcement institutions are weak, a standard assumption from existing theories of relational contracts - the existence of an enforceable base payment - may not hold. In this case, I show that a transfer of bargaining power can erode market efficiency in a dynamic relational contracting environment, which contradicts findings from existing models of relational contracting....
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Bargaining group; Distribution; Institutions; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q13..
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49376
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The Structural Estimation of Principal-Agent Models by Least Squares: Evidence from Land Tenancy in Madagascar AgEcon
Brown, Zachary S.; Bellemare, Marc F..
We develop a method to structurally estimate principal-agent models by ordinary least squares (OLS). We set up a general principal-agent model which explicitly incorporates the wealth levels of each party and the opportunity cost to the agent of entering the contract. This yields an optimal contract that is linearized by way of an Nth order Taylor approximation. This in turn imposes N(3N-1)/2 restrictions on the parameters and yields an empirical test of the canonical principal-agent model. In the application, we consider the case where N = 2 and apply our method to a sample of land tenancy contracts in rural Madagascar. Empirical tests lead to consistent failure to reject the hypotheses derived from our structural model, which lends support to our...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent Models; Contract Theory; Structural Estimations; Risk and Uncertainty; C12; C13; D86; O12; Q12.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49368
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