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Competing Screening Rules AgEcon
Hendrikse, George W.J.; Hu, Yamei.
Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Architecture; Screening; Cooperatives; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24522
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Cooperatives, Regulation and Competition in Norwegian Agriculture AgEcon
Tennbakk, Berit.
Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Regulation; Over production; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13; L21; D43.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24907
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Market Power and Output-Based Refunding of Environmental Policy Revenues AgEcon
Fischer, Carolyn.
Output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues combines a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. With imperfect competition, subsidies can discourage output underprovision. However, when market shares are significant, endogenous refunding suffers compared to a fixed subsidy. Refunding the emissions tax according to market share reduces the incentive to abate, and marginal abatement costs will not be equalized if market shares differ. In a Cournot duopoly, endogenous refunding leads to higher output, emissions, and possibly costs compared to a fixed rebate program. These results hold whether emission rates are determined simultaneously or strategically in a two-stage model.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions tax; Earmarking; Tradable performance standards; Imperfect competition; Cournot; Duopoly; Refunding; Subsidy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H23; Q2.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10893
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