|
|
|
Registros recuperados: 17 | |
|
|
Harms, Philipp; Lutz, Matthias. |
Does official aid pave the road for private foreign investment or does it suffocate private initiative by diverting resources towards unproductive activities? In this paper we explore this question using data for a large number of developing and emerging economies. Controlling for countries' institutional environment, we find that, evaluated at the mean, the marginal effect of aid on private foreign investment is close to zero. Surprisingly, however, the effect is strictly positive for countries in which private agents face a substantial regulatory burden. After testing the robustness of this result, we offer a theoretical model that is able to rationalize our puzzling observation. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Aid; Foreign Direct Investment; Institutions; International Relations/Trade; F35; F21; O16; O19. |
Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26128 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
Jayne, Thomas S.; Tschirley, David L.; Rubey, Lawrence; Reardon, Thomas; Staatz, John M.; Weber, Michael T.. |
This report is a synthesis of views presented at the Confronting the Silent Challenge of Hunger USAID Conference, June 28-29, 1994. The purposes of the conference were to provide information to assist AID in defining and articulating its development strategy related to agriculture and food security, to identify issues of consensus for incorporation into future AID strategy, and to identify critical issues of ongoing debate which need to be resolved. |
Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Food security; Food policy; Food Security and Poverty; Downloads July 2008 - June 2009: 8; F35. |
Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54699 |
| |
|
|
Menzies, Gordon Douglas. |
A creditor can balance debt recovery and humanitarian goals within an optimal contract framework. The approach ties together two strands of literature that assume either creditor self-interest (Krugman 1988) or benevolence (Addison and Murshed 2003). A reservation utility for the debtor serves as a metric for creditor benevolence. The optimal hyper-incentive contract recognizes that the attainment of health, education, peace and the appeasement of foreign creditors may be conflicting goals. Forgiving debt to motivate paying creditors may therefore have the unintended effect of reducing effort devoted to winning a civil war. For a given reservation utility for the debtor, aid directly targeted towards ending a civil war is a substitute for debt forgiveness. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Debt overhang; Debt forgiveness; Optimal contracts; Civil war; Exports; Financial Economics; F34; F35. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50148 |
| |
|
|
Gualberti, Giorgio; Bazilian, Morgan; Haites, Erik; Carvalho, Maria da Graça. |
The United Nations General Assembly declared 2012 the “International Year of Sustainable Energy for All”, officially recognising the urgent need to put energy at the centre of the global development agenda. In parallel, a strong international policy effort is being made to achieve the goal of universal energy access to modern energy services by 2030. To support these efforts, a dramatic scaling-up of financing to the energy sector will be required through official development aid, other official flows, climate financing and various private flows. In this paper we analyse the recent evolution of development policies and finance for the energy sector using both descriptive and analytical tools. We find that, although development finance for the energy sector... |
Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development Finance; Energy Policy; Energy Access; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; F35; Q40; O20. |
Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122009 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
Sobhee, Sanjeev K.; Nath, Shyam. |
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign aid by exclusively explaining a donor’s motivation for foreign external assistance. The underlying framework focuses on recipients’ needs for foreign aid to address income inequality as and when growth occurs. A tax-subsidy policy is hypothesised in the manner advocated by optimal tax theory to effectively deal with inequity by minimizing the distortionary effects of income taxes. This framework is ultimately endogeneized in the recipient’s budget constraint, from which the donor derives the demand for foreign assistance. The outcome supports an inverted-U relationship between foreign aid and per capita income in the way postulated by the conventional Kuznets curve. Our postulate is empirically tested... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Foreign aid; Optimal taxation; Fiscal policy; International Relations/Trade; F35; H21; E62. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50163 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
Morrissey, Oliver; Osei, Robert; Lloyd, Tim A.. |
An important feature of aid to developing countries is that it is given to the government. As a result aid has the potential to affect budgetary behaviour. Although the (albeit limited) aid-growth literature has addressed the effect of aid on policy, it has tended to neglect the effect of aid on the fiscal behaviour of governments. While fiscal response models have been developed to examine the effects of aid on fiscal aggregates - taxation, expenditure and borrowing - the underlying theory is ad hoc and empirical methods used are subject to severe limitations. This paper applies techniques developed in the "macroeconometrics" literature to estimate the dynamic structural relationship between aid and fiscal aggregates. Using vector autoregressive methods,... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Aid; Fiscal Response; Ghana; International Development; International Relations/Trade; F35; O23; O11; O55. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26226 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
Anwar, Mumtaz; Michaelowa, Katharina. |
Variations of bilateral aid flows are difficult to explain on the basis of official development objectives or recipient need. At the example of US aid to Pakistan, this paper suggests alternative political economic explanations, notably the relevance of ethnic lobbying and the relevance of US business interests. Time series regressions for the period from 1980 to 2002 and logistic regressions based on votes for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment confirm the significance of these political economic determinants. While in case of the Pressler Amendment, the direct influence of population groups of Indian and Pakistani origins seems to have played a predominant role, the role of ethnic business lobbies appears to have dominated in the context of the Brown... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public Choice; Ethnic lobbying; Foreign aid; International Development; Political Economy; D70; F35. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26202 |
| |
|
|
Xayavong, Vilaphonh; Gounder, Rukmani; Obben, James. |
This paper re-examines the theoretical aid-growth nexus by expounding on the issues relating to policies designed for aid delivery and the lack of aid recipient's state institutional capability to enforce policy conditionality. Two propositions have been demonstrated to explain why policy conditionality attached to aid might not always promote sustainable economic growth in Least Developed Countries. First, the model has simulated that a stable aid flow contributes to economic growth even when aid is fungible. Second, the model has also simulated that unstable aid inflow impairs the favourable effect of stable aid inflow. It is suggested that the contribution of aid to economic growth depends not only on the ability of aid to increase investment in the... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Foreign Aid; Economic Growth; Policies; State Institutions; Food Security and Poverty; D72; D9; F35; H30. |
Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23704 |
| |
|
|
Michaelowa, Katharina; Borrmann, Axel. |
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73. |
Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176 |
| |
Registros recuperados: 17 | |
|
|
|