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| Enriques, Luca. |
| This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Takeover Bid Directive; Board Neutrality; Mandatory Bid Rule; Market for Corporate Control; Financial Economics; K22; G34; G38. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60748 |
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| Bortolotti, Bernardo; Fotak, Veljko; Megginson, William; Miracky, William. |
| This study describes the newly created Monitor-FEEM Sovereign Wealth Fund Database and discusses the investment patterns and performance of 1,216 individual investments, worth over $357 billion, made by 35 sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) between January 1986 and September 2008. Approximately half of the investments we document occur after June 2005, reflecting a recent surge of SWF activity. We document large SWF investments in listed and unlisted equity, real estate, and private equity funds, with the bulk of investments being targeted in cross-border acquisitions of sizeable but non-controlling stakes in operating companies and commercial properties. The average (median) SWF investment is a $441 million ($55 million) acquisition of a 42.3% (26.2%) stake in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Sovereign Wealth Funds; International Financial Markets; Government Policy and Regulation; Financial Economics; G32; G15; G38. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50407 |
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| Boutin, Xavier; Cestone, Giacinta; Fumagalli, Chiara; Pica, Giovanni; Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas. |
| This paper provides evidence that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, the paper presents three major findings. First, consistent with theoretical predictions, the amount of financial resources owned by incumbent-affiliated groups has a negative impact on entry in a market. This suggests that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and that they have a potential anti-competitive effect. Second, the impact on entry of group financial strength is more important in markets where access to external funding is likely to be more difficult. Third, the more active are internal capital markets, the more pronounced the effect on entry of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Business Groups; Cash Holdings; Internal Capital Markets; Deep-Pockets; Market Entry; Financial Economics; G32; G38; L41. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55829 |
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