SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Alix-Garcia, Jennifer Marie; de Janvry, Alain; Sadoulet, Elisabeth.

Explaining land use change in Mexico requires understanding the behavior of the local institutions involved. We develop two theories to explain deforestation in communities with and without forestry projects, where the former involves a process of side payments to non-members of the community and the latter of partial cooperation among community members. Data collected in 2002 combined with satellite imagery are used to test these theories. For the forestry villages, we establish a positive relationship between the distribution of profits as dividends instead of public goods and forest loss. For communities not engaged in forestry projects, deforestation is largely related to the ability of the community to induce the formation of a coalition of members...

An analysis of farmers’ behaviour and rewarded provision of public goods

Palavras-chave: Deforestation; Common property; Partial cooperation; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D70; H41; O13; N56; Q23; Q24.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25066

Roel, Jongeneel; Ge, Lan.

Aiming to stimulate the role of agriculture as provider of public goods, the new CAP reform raises many theoretical and practical questions. The most relevant ones concern farmers’ response to the policy instruments. This paper uses a formal model to analyse the incentives and constraints generated by policy instruments and their potential impact on farmers’ participation decision. The analysis shows that, when choosing policy instruments to stimulate provision of public good, it is important to take into account different degrees and mechanisms of jointness between commodity and non-commodity (potentially public good) production, as they can enhance or erode the desired effect of the policy instruments. Some implications for modelling and policy analysis...

ASSESSING A PROVISION GAME FOR TWO UNITS OF A PUBLIC GOOD, WITH DIFFERENT GROUP ARRANGEMENTS, MARGINAL BENEFITS, AND REBATE RULES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Palavras-chave: Farmers’ behaviour; Provision of public goods; Jointness; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); Community/Rural/Urban Development; H41; Q12; Q18.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94615

Liu, Pengfei; Swallow, Stephen K.; Anderson, Christopher M..

We design two institutions that collect individual contributions to provide multiple public good units, inspired by a problem to deliver ecosystem services as a step-level public good (delivered in discrete increments). We set up a public good experiment wherein either all individuals for one group and are responsible for providing the two units (aggregated-group approach), or two groups provide one unit separately, but both group benefits if any unit is provided (disaggregated-group approach). Our interest is to test which of these two institutions performs “better” through the collective decision process. Our results show that, in general, the aggregated-group has a higher rate of success delivering at least one unit of the public good, while the...

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Experimental Economics; Environmental and Nonmarket Valuation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; G91; G92; H41.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123205

Bioeconomic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Before and After CAMPFIRE

Fischer, Carolyn; Muchapondwa, Edwin; Sterner, Thomas.

This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Two agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, and a local community chooses to either aid or discourage outside poachers. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of...

Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regulation

Palavras-chave: Bioeconomic; CAMPFIRE; Community; Poaching; Wildlife; Benefit sharing; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H41; Q20.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10717

Pizer, William A.; Kopp, Raymond J..

Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets have equilibrated. In addition to partial...

Can Calibration Reconcile Stated and Observed Preferences?

Palavras-chave: Social cost; Cost-benefit; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q20; Q28; H41; L50; D58.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10762

Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Villages? Project Design, Village Governance and Infrastructure Quality in Rural China

Norwood, F. Bailey.

Hypothetical bias is a pervasive problem in stated-preference experiments. Recent research has developed two empirically successful calibrations to remove hypothetical bias, though the calibrations have not been tested using the same data or in a conjoint analysis. This study compares the two calibrations in a conjoint analysis involving donations to a public good. Results find the calibrations are biased predictors of true donations but that calibrated and uncalibrated models together provide upper and lower bounds to true donations.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Calibration; Experimental economics; Forecasting; Hypothetical bias; Public goods; Stated preference; Voluntary contributions; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Q51; H41.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43735

Liu, Chengfang; Zhang, Linxiu; Huang, Jikun; Luo, Renfu; Rozelle, Scott.

This study seeks to explain the differences in infrastructure quality across China’s villages. Using primary data on three main types of infrastructure projects in rural China, we find that a.) between-project within-village quality differences are small and project design has little explanatory power; b.) between-village variations are larger; and c.) there are strong correlations between the ways villages govern themselves and project quality. We conclude that it is difficult to make good projects work in bad communities and that there is something at the village level that is making some projects succeed in some villages, but not in others.

CAP UNDER FIRE: THE BUDGETARY REVIEW AND THE CAP

Palavras-chave: Infrastructure Quality; Village; Rural China; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Public Economics; H41; H54; H71.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49944

Elekes, Andrea; Halmai, Peter.

During the process of the budgetary review the CAP faces its greatest challenge of its history: not only the (common) financing of the CAP, but the future of the CAP itself is at stake. It is obvious that the reform steps implemented so far – even though they have several forward-looking elements – do not result in a CAP sustainable on the long run. Further changes are inevitable. Basing our analysis on the theories of fiscal federalism and other political economy approaches, we try to answer the following questions. Is common financing of a reformed CAP justified? Can national co-financing be extended? Is it justified to keep the system of commonly financed direct payments?

Climate change policy in a growing economy under catastrophic risks

Palavras-chave: European Union; Common Agricultural Policy; Fiscal federalism; Budget review; Agricultural and Food Policy; F15; F36; H41; H50; Q18.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114345

Tsur, Yacov; Zemel, Amos.

Under risk of catastrophic climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnifed by economic growth. In particular, it implies that green- house gases (GHG) emission should gradually be brought to a halt. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. We find that the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of feasible emissions. We derive the Pigouvian hazard...

Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Environmental catastrophes; Economic growth; Emission policy; Hazard rate; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; H41; O13; O40; Q54; Q58.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7132

Rouviere, Elodie; Soubeyran, Raphael.

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

COMMON FINANCING FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY BUDGETARY QUESTIONS

Palavras-chave: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard; Industrial Organization; L11; H41; I18; Q18.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6325

Vasary, Viktoria; Elekes, Andrea; Halmai, Peter.

Can we agree fully with the statement, that “agricultural spending is a major distorting factor in the EU economy and a distinct obstacle to the Lisbon agenda’s implementation”? (Gros, 2008) Is it without question that Europe’s agriculture is in position to become sustainable and competitive without certain kind of common policy with no Community financing? Is it unambiguous in every respect, that the challenges facing the sector – globalization, trade liberalization, climate change, water management, Lisbon process, enlargement, changing preferences – could be answered at national level utilizing exclusively national financial sources? The answers to these questions are complex. So the purpose of the paper is multiple: - Exploration of factors justifying...

Comparing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Pro-Social Emotions to Enhance Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia

Palavras-chave: Public goods; Fiscal federalism; A new agricultural policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Public Economics; Q14; Q18; H41.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44820

Lopez, Maria Claudia; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..

This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual’s contribution and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are designed to motivate fully efficient contributions.

DEVELOPING A DEMAND REVEALING MARKET CRITERION FOR CONTINGENT VALUATION VALIDITY TESTS

Palavras-chave: Public goods; Field experiments; Pro-social emotions; Social dilemma; Regulation; Enforcement.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C93; H41; Q20; Q28.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53126

Rondeau, Daniel; Poe, Gregory L.; Schulze, William D..

Past research suggests that contingent valuation overstates demand for public goods. These estimates of hypothetical bias are probably invalid since they rely on voluntary contributions mechanisms which fail to reveal demand. An improved mechanism is shown to reveal aggregate demand in controlled experiments. However, individual contributions deviate from induced value. Key Words: contingent valuation, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments JEL Codes: H41, C92, Q20

Development and Implementation of a Mandatory Animal Identification System: The Canadian Experience

Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; H41; C92; Q20.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6856

Discussion: Animal Identification Systems in North America: Achievements and Future Challenges

Carlberg, Jared G..

This article provides a brief history of the animal identification (ID) system that previously existed in Canada along with details on efforts to ‘‘reidentify’’ the country’s cattle herd. The current state of ID for various species is summarized, and the state of regulations federally and for major agricultural province are outlined. A short background on the economics of animal ID is provided. Particular attention is paid to the operation of the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency, an industry–government initiative charged with identifying the national cattle herd. The animal ID system in Canada is found to have performed well when called on in times of animal health crises, although there have been notable deficiencies in its performance on occasion....

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Animal identification; Traceability; Canadian Cattle Identification Agency; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Farm Management; International Development; Livestock Production/Industries; H41; K39; Q18.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92600

Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia

Knutson, Ronald D..

Although Canada has developed an effective animal identification system, and the provinces are progressing toward a system that has full traceback capabilities, the U.S. and Mexico have made little or no progress. Contemporary U.S. proposals for state initiatives will not work. In the meantime, the U.S. livestock industry will continue to lose markets for its products and has little to no basis for complaining about lost sales and the lack of open markets. Also indentified are relevant economic and political principles that both underlie animal identification systems and the failure to make positive steps forward toward establishing a North American animal identification system.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Animal identification (ID); Zoonoses; Livestock diseases; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; International Relations/Trade; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing; Productivity Analysis; F13; H41; I19.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92602

Lopez, Maria Claudia; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..

In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions within groups; both led to higher contributions. The results from the second stage reveal that government regulations always complemented community...

Economic analysis of spatial preferences heterogeneity of water quality

Palavras-chave: Field experiments; Public goods; Government regulation; Community enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C93; H41; Q2.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42128

Martin-Ortega, Julia; Brouwer, Roy; Berbel, Julio.

The main objective of this study is to account for spatial preference variability in the economic valuation of water quality improvements in the river basin context. This is expected to be particularly relevant for the implementation of the European WFD, as it will involve spatially differentiated perceptions of the benefits of water quality changes. A choice experiment is developed based on maps to elicit welfare measures for water quality improvements across sub-basins in the Guadalquivir River Basin in Spain. Variation is introduced simultaneously in the spatial distribution of goods and services and their beneficiaries, for the accounting of spatial preference heterogeneity (i.e. people’s different valuation of changes in environmental good provision...

Ecosystem Services Beyond Valuation, Regulation and Philanthropy: Integrating Consumer Values into the Economy

Palavras-chave: Water economics; Valuation; Choice Experiment; Spatial Heterogeneity; Water Quality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q51; Q25; H41.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50626

Swallow, Stephen K.; Smith, Elizabeth C.; Uchida, Emi; Anderson, Christopher M..

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Environmental Markets; Ecosystem Service Markets; Payment For Ecosystem Services; Incentives; Nature's Services; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q20; Q57; C93; H41.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94656

Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection

Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.; Rive, Nathan.

In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a developing and an industrialized region, both of which independently seek to maximize their utility – a function of private consumption, domestic air quality, and global climate protection. They do so by distributing their finite expenditures across (1) the aggregate consumption good, (2) end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, and (3) greenhouse gas abatement. Based on our analytical findings, we develop two sets of simulations for China in which we vary the rate of the CDM transfer. The simulations differ by the assumption of China’s domestic air quality policy – the first assumes a...

Endogenous Discounting and Climate Policy

Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; CDM; Climate Policy; Impure Public Goods; Transfers; Abatement Technology; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Security and Poverty; Q54; H23; H41; O33.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46650

Tsur, Yacov; Zemel, Amos.

Under risk of abrupt climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnified by economic growth. In particular, we find that greenhouse gases (GHG) emission should be terminated at a finite time so that the ensuing occurrence risk will vanish in the long run. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. In fact, the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of...