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Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto. |
Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palabras clave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57. |
Año: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547 |
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Afonso, Antonio; St. Aubyn, Miguel. |
We address the efficiency in education and health sectors for a sample of OECD countries by applying two alternative non-parametric methodologies: FDH and DEA. Those are two areas where public expenditure is of great importance so that findings have strong implications in what concerns public sector efficiency. When estimating the efficiency frontier we focus on measures of quantity inputs. We believe this approach to be advantageous since a country may well be efficient from a technical point of view but appear as inefficient if the inputs it uses are expensive. Efficient outcomes across sectors and analytical methods seem to cluster around a small number of core countries, even if for different reasons: Japan, Korea and Sweden. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palabras clave: Education; Health; Expenditure efficiency; Production possibility frontier; FDH; DEA; C14; H51; H52; I18; I21; I28. |
Año: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37107 |
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