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Registros recuperados: 5
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Aggregate Milk Supply Response to the Milk Income Loss Contract Program AgEcon
Bryant, Henry L.; Outlaw, Joe L.; Anderson, David P..
This research tests for changes in aggregate milk production due to the operation of the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program since 2002. Aggregate production is decomposed into the size of the dairy herd and milk production per cow. We find no statistically significant response in either variable. This finding implies that the simultaneous operation of income and price support programs in the United States has not, thus far, proven self-defeating.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Dairy; Income support; Policy; Price support; Agribusiness; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/62292
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Factors Influencing ACRE Program Enrollment AgEcon
Woolverton, Andrea E.; Edwin, Young.
Authorized by the 2008 Farm Act, the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program is the first revenue-based, income-support program that calculates payments using recent market prices and a producer’s actual plantings. The payments are triggered when a farm’s revenue and State revenue (price multiplied by yield per planted acre) fall below a calculated guarantee for a crop. By contrast, other income-support programs are based on legislated rates and support levels, computed using a farm’s base acres and payment yields. Had the ACRE program been available during crop years 1996-2008, this report shows that farmers would have benefited more from participating in 2002 Farm Act programs than in the hypothetical ACRE program. The report further suggests that,...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Average Revenue Crop Election; ACRE; 2008 Farm Act; Farm bill; Commodity programs; Risk management; Income support; ERS; USDA; Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55954
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GREEN PAYMENTS AND DUAL POLICY GOALS AgEcon
Feng, Hongli.
Replaced with revised version of paper 07/27/07
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Cost effect; Green payments; Income support; Information rent; Mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18550
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Integrating Commodity and Conservation Programs: Design Options and Outcomes AgEcon
Claassen, Roger; Aillery, Marcel P.; Nickerson, Cynthia J..
Can a single program support farm income and encourage producers to adopt environmentally sound farming practices? While simple in concept, attempting to roll the farm income support features of existing commodity programs and conservation payments into a single program raises questions. Exactly how would farm commodity and conservation payments be combined? What difference would it make for environmental gain and farm income support? This report approaches the questions in two ways. First, spending patterns in existing commodity and conservation programs are analyzed to determine the extent to which producers who are currently receiving commodity payments also receive conservation payments. Then, a number of hypothetical program scenarios are devised and...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Conservation; Commodity programs; Income support; Agricultural Finance; Farm Management; Land Economics/Use.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6703
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On the optimal design of income support and agri-environmental regulation AgEcon
Bontems, Philippe.
In this paper, we develop a model of regulation for a set of heterogenous farmers whose production yields to environmental externalities. The goal of the regulator is first to offer some income support depending on collective preferences towards income redistribution and second to internalize externalities. The optimal policy is constrained by the information available. We first consider the second best where the regulator is able to observe all individuals decisions in terms of inputs and individual profit, but not the individual farming labor supply. We characterized the generalized transfer in function of the desire to redistribute and the underlying characteristics of the production process. In a second step, we assume that the regulator has only...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Agricultural policy; Agri-environmental policy; Income support; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q18; Q12; Q58.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6246
Registros recuperados: 5
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