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Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field Experiment in the Work Environment AgEcon
Ramos, Joao; Torgler, Benno.
We study the broken windows theory with a field experiment in a shared area of a workplace in academia (department common room). We explore academics’ and postgraduate students’ behaviour under an order condition (clean environment) and a disorder condition (messy environment). We find strong support that signs of disorderly behaviour triggers littering. In the disorder treatment 59% of the subjects litter compared to 18% in the order condition. The results remain robust when controlling compared to previous studies for a large set of factors in a multivariate analysis. When academic staff members and postgraduate students observe that others violated the social norm of keeping the common room clean the probability of littering increases ceteris paribus by...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Broken Windows Theory; Field Experiment; Littering; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; Z130; C930; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94623
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Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level AgEcon
Torgler, Benno; Dong, Bin.
The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level. The results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Political Interest; Social Norms; K420; D720; O170; J240.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36763
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Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China AgEcon
Dong, Bing; Torgler, Benno.
We explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. Panel data evidence clearly indicates that social interaction has a statistically significantly positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the relevance of social interaction in understanding corruption.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Social Interaction; China; Political Economy; K420; D720; D640; O170; J240.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99686
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The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Decentralization; Deterrence; Social Heterogeneity; Political Economy; D730; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91024
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The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that regional...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Economic Development; Inequality; Environment; Political Economy; D720; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91006
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