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Parker, Frederick. |
Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Game Theory; Collective Action; Agricultural Economics; Theory of the Firm; Agribusiness; B5; C7; D7; L2; L3; Q1. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100691 |
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Eaton, Derek J.F.; Tripp, Robert; Louwaars, Niels P.. |
This paper analyzes the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes on the plant breeding sector in developing countries. Most of these countries have implemented a system of plant variety protection (PVP), or are in the process of doing so, generally as part of their obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper presents the results of research on the initial effects of IPRs on the plant breeding sector in five case study countries (China, Colombia, India, Kenya and Uganda). Three of the countries have PVP systems in place and the other two are in the process of either developing or implementing legislation. But the ease of implementing PVP seems to have... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries; L3; O3; Q16. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25455 |
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