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Registros recuperados: 8
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A Pro-Market Agenda for El Salvador AgEcon
Engel, Eduardo M.R.A..
This paper argues that, despite important productivity gains, reforms have benefited consumers much less than expected in El Salvador. Antitrust legislation, consumer protection and an adequate regulation of privatized utilities are central ingredients of a successful market economy. Major reforms that are needed in each one of these areas in El Salvador are described.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market reform; Antitrust legislation; Consumer protection; Privatization; Regulation of utilities; Political Economy; D18; L40; L51; L94; L96; O12.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28438
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A Simple Theory of Predation AgEcon
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo.
We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. Several extensions are considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or two-sided market effects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Anticompetitive Behaviour; Exclusion; Below-Cost Pricing; Antitrust; Financial Economics; K21; L12; L40.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59420
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Competition Policy Works: The Effect of Competition Policy on the Intensity of Competition - An International Cross-Country Comparison AgEcon
Krakowski, Michael.
This paper explores the relationship between competition policy, experience of the application of competition policy, the intensity of local competition and the standard of living. Perception data from the World Economic Forum is used to measure the intensity of local competition. Richer and larger countries in general introduce competition policy earlier than smaller and poorer countries, and industrialized countries earlier than Latin American, African, transition and Asian countries, in this order. A regression analysis for a sample of 101 countries reveals that experience and overall government effectiveness explain a substantial part of the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. During the first years of (new) competition legislation the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Competition Policy; Effectiveness of legal instruments; International Relations/Trade; L40; K21.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26259
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Competition Regimes in Telecommunications and the International Trading System AgEcon
Koopmann, Georg.
In most countries, competition in the telecommunications industry is subject to both sector-specific regulation and more general antitrust policies. At the same time, a process of international market liberalisation is under way in telecommunications which can only be truly effective - and further advance - if appropriate competitive safeguards are in place. Trading partners should agree on certain minimum standards to be observed in this area in order to better combat anticompetitive conduct and avoid international conflicts. The Reference Paper to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is an important step in this direction and may also serve as a model for other network industries. It is a framework of rules which has to be filled with concrete...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulation; Antitrust; Trade Negotiations; Services; International Relations/Trade; F13; L40; L50; L89.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26230
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Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion AgEcon
Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Ronde, Thomas.
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Monopolization Practices; Vertical Agreements; Financial Economics; L12; L40; L42.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56213
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Measuring Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry Using the Rosse-Panzar Test and Cross-Sectional Regression Analyses AgEcon
Fischer, Thorsten; Kamerschen, David R..
We employ the Rosse-Panzar test to assess market performance in selected airport-pairs originating from Atlanta. The Rosse-Panzar test stands in the tradition of the New Empirical Industrial Organization. It is based on the comparative statics of a reduced form revenue equation. Therefore, it is less powerful than structural models, but it offers the advantage of less stringent data requirements and reduces the risk of model misspecifications. The test statistic allows us in most airport-pairs to reject both conducts consistent with the Bertrand outcome, which is equivalent to perfect competition, and the collusive outcome, which is equivalent to joint profit-maximization. Rather, the test statistic suggests that behavior is consistent with a range of...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Airlines; Oligopoly; Conduct; Price-cost margins; Lerner index; Rosse-Panzar test; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L00; L40; L93.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44041
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Slotting Allowances and Buy-Back Clauses AgEcon
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl.
In this paper we investigate some of the most frequent arguments for the use of slotting allowances. It has been claimed that slotting allowances can be profitability used to increase retail profits at the cost of increasing consumer prices. A second argument is that slotting allowances can be used by producers of new product to signal the demand potential of their products. We find that in perfect information setting slotting allowances will never arise in equilibrium. Moreover, we question whether slotting allowances can serve as a signalling device. We argue that buy-back clauses are far better instruments to signal profitability of new product launches in the grocery sector.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis; L12; L40.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24580
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"Vertical Market Power" as Oxymoron: Getting Convergence Mergers Right AgEcon
Brennan, Timothy J..
"Vertical market power" is a contradiction in terms because "market power" is essentially horizontal-that is, it depends on relationships of firms within markets. FERC invokes the term to assess "convergence" mergers between electricity generators and natural gas suppliers. It misapplies Department of Justice guidelines for vertical mergers and fails to identify exceptions to a presumption that market power depends only on competitive conditions at any single stage. A three-stage test can assess whether convergence mergers resemble horizontal ones. The key stage is the third: A convergence merger is more problematic the less vertical it is-that is, if the acquiring generator had no prior dealings with the acquired gas supplier. FERC's analyses in leading...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Vertical mergers; Electricity restructuring; Vertical integration; Convergence; Energy regulation; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L40; L94; L22; D43.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10871
Registros recuperados: 8
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