Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Boyd, James (2) Brennan, Timothy J. (1) Calzolari, Giacomo (1) Hardesty, Shermain D. (1) Henehan, Brian M. (1) Kirkpatrick, Colin (1) Parker, David (1) Scarpa, Carlo (1) Shultz, Madeline (1) Wells, John (1) Zhang, Yingang (1) Mais... Palavra-chave L43 (5) Competition (2) Contracts (2) Deregulation (2) Electric utilities (2) K12 (2) L94 (2) Regulation (2) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (2) Stranded costs (2) 012 (1) Agribusiness (1) Asymmetric Information (1) Conglomerate Firms (1) Cooperatives (1) Developing Cooperatives (1) Developing economies (1) Economic performance. (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Financial Economics (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (4) Journal Article (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (1) 2004 (1) 1996 (2) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter? AgEcon Zhang, Yingang; Parker, David; Kirkpatrick, Colin. Recent years have seen countries introducing reform of their utility industries with a view to promoting private ownership and competition. This paper studies the effect of the sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985 to 2001. A fixed effects panel data model is used. The study finds that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, improved capital utilisation. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Privatisation; Competition; Regulation; Developing economies; Economic performance.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L33; L43; L44; L50; 012; O38; O50. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30599 New Cooperative Development Issues AgEcon Henehan, Brian M.; Hardesty, Shermain D.; Shultz, Madeline; Wells, John. This article briefly reviews the increased interest in new cooperative development, factors for successful cooperative development, and strategies to improve the performance of new and emerging cooperatives. The article highlights issues identified by a panel of cooperative leaders, USDA specialists and academic experts Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; New Cooperatives; Developing Cooperatives; Agribusiness; P13; L22; L43. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117412 On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist AgEcon Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo. We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulation; Competition; Asymmetric Information; Conglomerate Firms; Multiutility; Scope Economies; Informational Externality; Financial Economics; L51; L43; L52. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52543 Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts AgEcon Brennan, Timothy J.; Boyd, James. This paper explores ways in which economic analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. The paper begins with a description of the stranded cost problem, its magnitude, and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. We then turn to an analysis of contracts in order to understand whether there is, or should be, a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. The paper also argues that efficient approaches to electricity deregulation will rely on more than an analysis of contracts. In particular, the politics... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Takings; Electric utilities; Contracts; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10688 The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: Should Stranded Costs Be Recoverable? AgEcon Boyd, James. Progress toward electricity market deregulation has brought controversy over whether or not utilities are entitled to compensation for "stranded costs," i.e., costs utilities will not be able to recover due to the advent of competition in their markets. This paper uses a legal and economic analysis of contracts to address the desirability of utility cost recovery. First, underlying principles of law are reviewed to determine whether or not there is a legal presumption of recovery. Then, the analysis considers whether or not an implicit "regulatory compact" between utilities and regulators follows from principles in the economic analysis of law, particularly theories of efficient breach and implicit contracts. The paper concludes that recovery should occur... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Contracts; Electric utilities; Environmental Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10803 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco