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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Widespread concern over transmission capacity requires theoretical support to infer inadequacy from observed trends indicating reductions in the ratio of transmission to generation capacity over time. If integrated utilities had been regulated with allowed returns exceeding capital costs, transmission generation ratios would have been excessive, and observed trends might be a correction. However, numerous commentators claim that post-restructuring transmission rates have been too low, with NIMBY also discouraging investment. We model the possibility that inadequate separation between generation and transmission may result in reduced investment, in order to preserve incumbent market power in generation. However, consideration of transmission price caps and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity transmission; Regulation; Deregulation; Vertical integration; Environmental Economics and Policy; L94; L51; L22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10723 |
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| Mondello, Gerard. |
| Ultra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Electric Energy; Nuclear Plants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q5; Q58; Q53; K23; L13; L52; L94. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102571 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Residential consumers remain reluctant to choose new electricity suppliers. Even the most successful jurisdictions, four U.S. states and other countries, have had to adopt extensive consumer education procedures that serve largely to confirm that choosing electricity suppliers is daunting. Electricity is not unique in this respect; numerous studies find that consumers are generally reluctant to switch brands, even when they are well-informed about product characteristics. If consumers prefer not to choose, opening regulated markets can reduce welfare, even for some consumers who do switch, as the incumbent can exploit this preference by raising price above the formerly regulated level. Policies to open markets might be successful even if limited to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity markets; Deregulation; Consumer choice; Residential markets; Consumer/Household Economics; L94; L51; D11; B40. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10573 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Demand-side management programs comprise subsidies from franchised electric utilities for the purchase of high-efficiency appliances; e.g., air conditioners. Competition in power generation threatens the viability of these programs. However, it should also reduce the warrant for them. Under regulation, the justification for such programs depends, somewhat paradoxically, on below marginal-cost pricing. Eliminating regulation should permit pricing flexibility to discourage excessive on-peak energy use. It should also eliminate the assurance of returns that may have encouraged overbuilding of generation capacity. Entrants and incumbent utilities should find it easier to offer "energy services," i.e., to bundle electricity with appliances, if consumers are too... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Energy conservation; Regulatory policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L51; L94; Q48. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10615 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Lower prices for polluting goods will increase their sales and the pollution that results from their production or use. Conventional intuition suggests that this relationship implies a greater need for environmental policy when prices of "dirty" goods fall. But the economic inefficiency resulting overproduction of polluting goods may fall, not rise, as the cost of producing those goods falls. While lower costs exacerbate overproduction, they also reduce the difference between private benefit and the total social cost--the sum of private and external costs--associated with that overproduction. We derive a test, based on readily observed or estimated parameters for conditions in which the latter effect outweighs the former. In such cases, making a dirty good... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environment; Regulatory policy; Externalities; Electricity restructuring; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; L51; L94. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10776 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Reserve requirements in electricity markets may get each producer to internalize the cost of grid-wide blackouts it might cause if unable to meet consumer demand. Markets for how such capacity might be procured have been studied. Less examined is how the costs of reserve capacity are covered. "Who pays" depends on how requirements are designed. If each producer has to provide peak capacity available to a grid operator at a below-spot price, requirements will increase volatility-that is, the gap between baseload and marginal peak prices. Requirements based on energy sales act as a tax on baseload to subsidize peak, reducing volatility. Finally, if requirements are designed to ensure that extreme-peak energy is available without scarcity rents, baseload... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Capacity requirements; Reserve requirements; Electricity generation; Utility regulation; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L94; L51; H22. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10569 |
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| Palmer, Karen L.; Burtraw, Dallas. |
| This paper investigates the regional air pollution effects that could result from new opportunities for inter-regional power transmission in the wake of more competitive electricity markets. The regional focus is important because of great regional variation in the vintage, efficiency and plant utilization rates of existing generating capacity, as well as differences in emission rates, cost of generation and electricity price. Increased competition in generation could open the door to changes in the regional profile of generation and emissions. We characterize the key determinant of changes in electricity generation and transmission as the relative cost of electricity among neighboring regions. In general, low cost regions are expected to export power... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Air pollution; Electricity restructuring; Transmission; Environmental Economics and Policy; L94; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10766 |
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| Ando, Amy Whritenour; Palmer, Karen L.. |
| Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.; Palmer, Karen L.; Martinez, Salvador A.. |
| Electricity is one of the last U.S. industries in which competition is replacing regulation. We briefly review the technology for producing and delivering power, the history of electricity policy, and recent state and international experience. We then outline the major questions facing policymakers as they decide whether, when, and how to implement restructuring. We conclude with some thoughts on the California electricity crisis and other political controversies. Although the California experience has come to define what it means for electricity markets to fail, most of the problems it raised are among those we know how to solve or prevent. The still unresolved make-or-break issue remains whether the cooperation necessary to maintain reliability is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Regulation; Deregulation; Public Economics; L51; L94; D4. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10508 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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