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Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because of hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms which provide incentives for the custom heifer grower to perform accelerated growth without heifers becoming over-conditioned. In order to provide incentives to custom growers, heifers returned to the dairy farm should be compared in performance to other heifers of similar age. We solve for the price paid per pound of gain, price paid for inch... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farm management; Production economics; Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6077 |
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Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
As dairy farms grow and specialize in milking cows, raising replacement heifers is increasingly outsourced. Perhaps the largest challenge of outsourcing the heifer enterprise involves quality, measured as milk production potential, and the possibility for moral hazard due to hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms to provide incentives for the heifer grower to achieve desired growth rates, and enable the return of the heifer to the dairy farm on an accelerated time frame, without sacrificing quality. To mitigate incentive asymmetries, bonuses and deductions are proposed. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Livestock Production/Industries. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99109 |
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Abougamos, Hoda; White, Benedict; Sadler, Rohan. |
The export of grain from Western Australia depends upon a grain supply network that takes grain from farm to port through Cooperative Bulk Handling receival and storage sites. The ability of the network to deliver pest free grain to the port and onto ship depends upon the quality of grain delivered by farmers and the efficacy of phosphine based fumigation in controlling stored grain pests. Phosphine fumigation is critical to the grain supply network because it is the cheapest effective fumigant. In addition, it is also residue free. Unfortunately, over time, common stored-grain pests have evolved to develop resistance to phosphine and there is a risk that phosphine will become less effective and may need to be replaced with more expensive alternative... |
Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Supply contracts; Moral hazard; Stored grain; Biosecurity; Crop Production/Industries. |
Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124216 |
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Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails to attract non-farm or "private" investment? We hypothesize that farm capital is high cost, relative to that provided by private entrepreneurs (or in other words, that there is a degree of asset fixity in farm capital) but that it engenders greater organizational commitment-which is particularly important when expected market returns are low-on the part of producers. This commitment arises from the indirect incentive properties associated with at-risk capital. We... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate financing; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness. |
Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18478 |
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Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G.. |
Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that fails to attract non-farm, or "private" investment? We hypothesize that doing so is a costly mechanism for increasing the maximum penalty farmers face in the case of business failure. For a given market environment, exposing farmers to this risk increases the amount of surplus that can be used to repay lenders, thus expanding the set of market environments in which financing is available. We show how equity investment of this sort can be an efficient organizational response to a... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Corporate finance; Moral hazard; Vertical integration; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18610 |
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Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander. |
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper investigates the determinants of moral hazard among JLL schemes from Malawi, using group level data from 99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the extent of matching problems explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups. The implications are that Joint Liability Lending institutions will continue to rely on social cohesion and... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Moral hazard; Joint liability; Dynamic incentives; Group lending; Malawi; Financial Economics. |
Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25287 |
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Liesivaara, Petri; Myyra, Sami; Jaakkola, Antti. |
Whole-farm income insurances are promoted in the new post-2013 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The current Crop Damage Compensation (CDC) scheme in Finland covers crop failure for farmers who have suffered losses and applied for the payments. This paper analyses the use of the Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) and compares it to the current CDC scheme in Finland. The Finnish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is used to simulate the costs of IST compensation payments. Special attention is paid to pig farms and their possibilities to manipulate the IST. Results show that the IST is triggered with a high frequency on Finnish farms. The IST would be more costly than the current CDC programme. The results also suggest that the IST would act as an income... |
Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Income stabilization tool; Moral hazard; Farm Accountancy Data Network; Farm Management; Risk and Uncertainty; Q14. |
Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122537 |
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Registros recuperados: 30 | |
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