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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903 |
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Nuppenau, Ernst-August. |
We will analyze a newly emerging conflict within the second pillar of the rural development policy of the EU: a conflict between those farmers, who want to participate in high nature value agriculture, and farmers, who feel negatively impacted by supporting nature provision. We see a link through competition for land between nature provision in agriculture and cost minimal production of commercial farmers. The idea is to model this conflict using a political bargain approach and make a contribution on how to solve the conflict by innovative institutional arrangements. The power of groups will be analyzed and what governments can do. |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Conflict; Political economy; Nature provision; Community/Rural/Urban Development. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95313 |
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Huelemeyer, Kerstin; Schiller, Simone. |
With the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) a guidance document for evaluation of rural development policy has been published by the European Commission. The CMEF defines the requirements on monitoring and evaluation and specifies a limited number of quantitative common indicators applicable to each programme. While in general the introduction of the CMEF is considered as being a helpful tool for carrying out evaluation, substantial criticism has been expressed regarding the suggested methodological approach and the provided set of impact indicators. Based on qualitative analyses, this article focuses on contributing to a better understanding of the evaluation process in order to learn from stakeholder perceptions and draw conclusions on how... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Evaluation; CMEF; Indicators; Political economy; Success factors; Community/Rural/Urban Development. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94920 |
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Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L.. |
Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy. |
Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468 |
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Ando, Amy Whritenour; Palmer, Karen L.. |
Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94. |
Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643 |
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Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F.. |
Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism -the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game- is equal to the tariff that would be set if... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Protectionism; Tariff; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q17; Q56; Q57. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10770 |
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Ranjan, Ram. |
This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642 |
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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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