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| Lee, Myoungki; Wu, Steven Y.; Fan, Maoyong. |
| This study examines legislation that would grant growers termination damages if their contracts are terminated. Our model suggests that, with no contracting frictions, damages would not reduce ex ante efficiency as processors can contract around damages through contract restructuring. Growers would earn less under continuation but would be protected if terminated, although overall expected profits would be unaffected. However, when contracting friction exist, then efficiency losses can occur as processors would be constrained in restructuring contractual incentives to deal with moral hazard. Growers' expected profits would increase while processors' profit would decrease. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract law; Contract regulation; Damages; Incentives; Principal-agent; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42461 |
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| Viaggi, Davide. |
| The aim of this paper is to test the relevance of considering private fixed transaction costs for contract design of Agri-Environmental Schemes, when transaction costs are negatively correlated to marginal compliance costs. In order to do so, a principal-agent model of contract design under adverse selection, including fixed private transaction costs, is developed. The model is applied to the design of payments in the Emilia Romagna region of Italy. The results show that fixed transaction costs in the range of those actually faced by farmers may significantly affect the optimal amount of environmental good to be produced by each farm type. In some cases, fixed transaction costs can even reverse the standard insight that more of a public good should be... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental schemes; Principal-agent; Countervailing incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44322 |
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| Kono, H; 耕野, 拓一. |
| Incidence of animal diseases, such as Hog Cholera and Pasteurella, was found in our field survey of 100 pig farmers in T.T.Hue province in Vietnam Thirty five (36%) of surveyed farmers are in poverty according to the 2005 poverty standard in Vietnam. Low income farmer has a large income share from pig production. We suggest that the increase of pig deaths in low income farms will raise the risk to fall into poverty. Improvement of animal health service, especially for low income farmers, will be important for poverty reduction in rural area in Vietnam. Vietnamese pork distribution is in a state of so-called information asymmetry. In order to solve the problem of information asymmetry, it is necessary to fulfill the requirements of incentive compatibility.... |
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Palavras-chave: Animal health; Incentive; Poverty; Principal-agent; Vietnam. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://ir.obihiro.ac.jp/dspace/handle/10322/2734 |
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