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Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program AgEcon
Arahata, Katsumi.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political process of bureaucrats' seemingly discretionary allocations among prefectures in Japan's rice set-aside program. Some hypotheses and a model are proposed and then these are empirically tested. Two major findings of this study are as follows: Firstly, it is suggested that the bureaucrats' discretionary allocation tends to be revised in response to political pressure. Consequently, allocations among prefectures tend to be inversely proportionate to the degree of political pressures. Moreover, such pressures can be explained by the expected income from rice-production and the share of part-time farmers, who are the majority in Japanese rural society and politically powerful. Secondly, among various...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Rice set-aside program; Bureaucrats' discretion; Uneven allocations; Public choice; Political actors; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q180; H890.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19422
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Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality AgEcon
Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak; Salerno, Gillian.
In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Game theory; Public choice; Imperfect public monitoring; Imperfect private monitoring; Non-point source pollution; Agricultural extension; Public education; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10391
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Equity judgments and context dependence: Knowledge, efficiency and incentives AgEcon
Schilizzi, Steven.
Distributional equity concerns are often at least as important as economic efficiency and ecological sustainability in environmental and natural resource management policies. Until recently, however, economists have shied away from tackling equity issues, primarily because equity appeared as a slippery concept, varying across people and circumstances. This study takes this context-dependence of equity judgments as a starting point and shows that such dependence, far from being random, is systematic. A series of controlled laboratory treatments with University students were designed to investigate the role on distributional equity judgments of such context factors as knowledge of one’s position in society, how the existence of equity-efficiency tradeoffs...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Equity; Fairness; Resource allocation; Environmental policy; Experimental economics; Welfare economics; Public choice; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; D03; D63; H23; Q56; Q58.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100887
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Knowledge and the Valuation of Public Goods and Experiential Commodities: Information Provision and Acquisition AgEcon
Tisdell, Clement A..
Provides empirical evidence of significant lack of relevant knowledge of some public goods and experiential commodities. It also analyses whether information provision about the attributes or characteristics of commodities is likely to result in individuals’ finding their ‘true’ preferences for these, and identifies the type and nature of information that should be conveyed to enable commodities to be appropriately valued. It also recognizes that sometimes commodities may contain attributes that individuals are unable to evaluate. Furthermore, individuals acquire and filter information about commodities. Factors influencing these activities require analysis. A cost-benefit analysis of information acquisition suggests that individuals are less likely to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Behavioral economics; Contingent evaluation; Experiential commodities; Information; Knowledge; Public choice; Public goods; Nature conservation; Valuation; Public Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90545
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RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC CHOICE: SUBSTANCE DEPENDS UPON PROCESS AgEcon
Hite, James C..
Whether or not privatization facilitates rural development depends upon what rural development means. In practice, rural development often is the result of a struggle between rent defenders and rent seekers. A positivist concept of rural development is proposed, and the institutions of public choice are examined to determine how they might influence privatization decisions. The conclusion is that whether or not privatization improves efficiency of adjustment in rural economies depends upon the specifics of political deals required to achieve a particular act of privatization.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Privatization; Rural development; Public choice; Rent-seeking; Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15204
Registros recuperados: 5
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