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| Grant, Jason H.. |
| The degree to which countries are pursuing regional trade agreements (RTAs) has been nothing short of extraordinary. The latest wave of regional integration, however, is “breeding concern” among academics and policymakers as to the extra‐regional effects of these agreements and their impact on North American agricultural exporters who are party to relatively few RTAs in world trade. This study constructs and uses an updated database of agricultural trade flows from 1992‐2008 to shed light on the degree to which outsiders status affects U.S. and Canadian agricultural exports and its competing suppliers. Regarding outsider status, the existing dummy‐variable approach is modified by incorporating region‐specific extra‐bloc trade flow variables to examine the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regionalism; WTO; Trade; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Development; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90888 |
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| Hester, Annette; Beaulieu, Eugene. |
| This paper summarizes the evolution of regional trade agreements in the Americas and examines whether they are contributing to globalization or detracting from it. In theory, regional trade agreements may create incentives that deter countries from entering into multilateral negotiations. The paper draws on the political economy literature and takes a "dynamic time-path effect" perspective. The evolution of six regional trade agreements in Latin America are analyzed in detail: LAIA, Mercosur, NAFTA, Andean Community, Caricom, and CACM. This study concludes that regional trade agreements in the Americas have not discouraged the participatory countries' pursuit of multilateral negotiations. Moreover, regional agreements are contributing to a new power... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Latin America; Multinationalism; Preferential trade agreements; Regionalism; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23840 |
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| Zissimos, Ben. |
| This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free trade. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Coordination; Trade Liberalization; Trade Agreement; Regionalism; International Relations/Trade; F02; F13; F15; C73. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9102 |
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