Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin AgEcon
Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C71; C78.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7446
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Dairy Policy Modelling Under Imperfect Competition AgEcon
Soregaroli, Claudio; Moro, Daniele; Sckokai, Paolo.
Paper removed at request of author on 11/20/07.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Simulation Models; Imperfect Competition; CAP; Dairy; Livestock Production/Industries; D4; L1; Q11; Q13; Q18.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25360
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Enhancing Irrigation Efficiency but Increasing Water Use: The Jevons' Paradox AgEcon
Gomez, Carlos Mario; Gutierrez, Carlos.
In this paper we analyze the conditions under which increasing technical efficiency of water use in the agricultural sector might not reduce water demand and pressures on water ecosystems. Departing from this basic problem we discuss how policy measures performed to enhance water productivity in the agriculture might be transformed into effective alternatives to improve the conservation of water resources and then guarantee the successful implementation of the Water Framework Directive. A preference revelation model is presented in the third section of the paper and one empirical application to an irrigation district in southern Spain is used in the fourth section to discuss the effectiveness of water savings measures.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Water Framework Directive; Water Economics; Agricultural Economics; Simulation Models; Preference Revelation.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114622
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty AgEcon
Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo.
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations,...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C71; C78.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8224
Registros recuperados: 4
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional