|
|
|
|
|
| Fletcher, Stanley M.; Nadolnyak, Denis A.. |
| In this paper, we make an attempt to rationalize the strategic behavior of major peanut exporting and importing countries in the framework of imperfectly competitive markets with the focus on the global and inter-American peanut trade. This study is motivated by the fact that liberalizing imperfectly competitive and often distorted markets can have unorthodox effects, in particular increase the incentives to overuse certain trade policies. The results suggest that the South American peanut producers stand to benefit from the reductions in the U.S. peanut production supports but, paradoxically, preservation of a tariff may still be mutually welfare enhancing. In the broader context of global peanut trade, multi-lateral tariff reduction increases the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade; Peanuts; Strategic behavior; Tariffs; TRQs; Subsidies; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19460 |
| |
|
|
| Christy, Ralph D.. |
| This address is directed toward applied economists as they provide information to private and public decision makers. Central to this discussion is the role of markets as institutions in achieving society's desired ends. Current "economic correctness" -the view that unfettered markets are superior in achieving efficiency, growth, and welfare- has attempted to return a larger role to the private sector, but the relative roles of market-oriented versus government-oriented solutions to problems are often not well appraised. Views presented herein calls for agricultural economists to move simultaneously toward an understanding of the strategic behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets and toward an adoption of policy analysis consistent with a... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Market; Policy analysis; Strategic behavior; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 1993 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15221 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
